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“[N]ot only should all friendships be safeguarded with the 
greatest devotion and good faith, but especially those which have 
been restored to goodwill after enmity.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 28, 2015, in his address before the United Nations 
General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “a 
new chapter has started in Iran’s relations with the world.”2 This 
development emerges from the conclusion of over a year of 
negotiating efforts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear 
program with the P5+1, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).3 By relaxing decades of trade and 
investment sanctions in exchange for the imposition of strict 
limitations on the development of Iran’s civil nuclear program, the 
JCPOA, according to Rouhani, “showcased the potential for 
constructive dialogue.”4 
Within the United States, the terms and details of the JCPOA 
have been—like the sanctions regime that preceded it—
                                                                                                             
1. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 476 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012) 
(1625). 
2. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the General 
Debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 28, 2015), http://gadebate.un.
org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_Iran_en.pdf [hereinafter Rouhani Statement at the 
General Assembly].  
3. The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council—the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France—as well as Germany. In 
European parlance, the P5+1 is alternatively called the EU+3. See Joshua Keating, You Say 
P5+1, I Say E3+3, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 30, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/you-
say-p51-i-say-e33/; see also Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran 
Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lesson With Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-
negotiations.html; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (providing a basic overview of the 
JCPOA). 
4. Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; see also John Mecklin, The 
Experts Assess the Iran Agreement of 2015, BULL. ATOMIC SCI. (July 14, 2015), 
http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 (summarizing how the JCPOA 
works). 
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controversial.5 The days and months following the signing of the 
JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2015 witnessed a deeply polarized 
array of high-profile comments and criticisms, from a wide variety of 
official and unofficial commentators.6 One way of explaining this 
controversy is the sizeable diversity of JCPOA stakeholders, each 
with uniquely situated interests and expectations concerning the 
deal’s aftermath. For the Obama Administration, which purportedly 
sought to halt Iran’s nuclear program in a way that would avoid 
another US war in the Middle East, the JCPOA was envisioned as 
bringing “extraordinary benefits to our national security and the peace 
and security of the world.”7 For the State of Israel, which has long 
considered Iran to be its most threatening regional rival, the JCPOA 
consisted of a “very bad deal,” representing a victory for “death, 
tyranny and the pursuit of jihad.”8 
Lost in this simplistic dichotomy of “for the deal” or “against the 
deal” are the contours of those various interests, and how their 
architecture might influence, or be strategically used to influence, the 
post-sanctions environment emerging with the JCPOA’s 
implementation.9 The purpose of this Note is to explore the body of 
interests that comprise one such stakeholder group: international 
                                                                                                             
5. See Daniel R. DePetris, A Frustrating Iran Deal for Republicans, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/254756-a-frustrating-iran-deal-for-
republicans (elucidating Republican opposition to the JCPOA); see also Peter Beinart et al., Is 
There a Viable Alternative to the Iran Deal?, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2015), http://www.the
atlantic.com/international/archive/2015/07/iran-nuclear-deal-goldberg-frum-beinart/398816/ 
(debating the merits of the JCPOA). 
6. See Beinart et al., supra note 5 (exploring differing opinions surrounding the JCPOA). 
7. President Barak Obama, Statement by the President on the Adoption of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action at American University (Oct. 18, 2015), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/18/statement-president-adoption-joint-
comprehensive-plan-action; see also Krishnadev Calamur, Obama on the Iran Deal: The 
“Strongest Nonproliferation Agreement Ever Negotiated,” ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/obama-and-the-iran-deal/400535/ (presenting 
the White House’s logic behind the JCPOA). 
8. Krishnadev Calamur, In Speech to Congress, Netanyahu Blasts “A Very Bad Deal” 
with Iran, NPR (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/03/39025098
6/netanyahu-to-outline-iran-threats-in-much-anticipated-speech-to-congress; see also Michael 
Herzog, Contextualizing Israeli Concerns about the Iran Nuclear Deal, WASH. INST. FOR 
NEAR E. POL’Y (2015), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/
PolicyNote26_Herzog.pdf (“ . . . Israel views Iran as its most serious and direct strategic 
threat. Specifically, Israel considers Iran a regional power that expresses its revolutionary 
ideology—an ideology that negates Israel’s right to exist—in both nuclear and hegemonic 
ambitions.”). 
9. Cf. supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (sampling banal positions “for” and 
“against” the JCPOA, in the absence of their functionalist meaning or usefulness). 
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investors, particularly US investors, now theoretically posed to begin 
operations in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Reduced to its simplest, the term “investment” can be defined as 
“the commitment of resources by a physical or legal person to a 
specific purpose in order to earn a profit or to gain a return.”10 Thus, 
the primary interests of investors may be defined as those factors that 
contribute toward their desire to enrich themselves, financially and 
otherwise.11 Yet, as the historical investment experience in Iran itself 
demonstrates, there are (or should be) subtler nuances inherent in the 
calculi that drive international investor behavior.12 While even among 
the international business community investors are not the only 
players that will be influenced by the JCPOA, by its very nature 
investment implies a set of increased stakes and long-term 
commitments that will heighten the intensity of investor interaction 
with the JCPOA.13 As such, the emerging legal and economic 
horizons in Iran pose a lightly trodden territory, within which to 
explore challenges and insights related to international investment law 
generally.14 Key among these is not only the obvious tensions 
between investors and host States, but also the complex relationship 
                                                                                                             
10. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: 
NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 3 
(2013). 
11. See id. 
12. Specifically, the returns generated by investors in pre-revolutionary Iran mattered 
little in the face of eventual government expropriation following 1979. See generally Sebastian 
Lopez Escarcena, Expropriations and Other Measures Affecting Property Rights in the Case 
Law of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 177 (2013) (overviewing 
expropriation resulting from Iran’s 1979 revolution). Indeed, Iran’s larger economic backdrop 
prior to the revolution helped facilitate the fall of the investment-friendly Pahlavi regime. See 
Suzanne Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, in THE IRAN PRIMER: POWER, POLITICS, AND 
U.S. POLICY 95 (Robin Wright ed., 2010) (“The Pahlavi economic program generated rapid 
growth, but the reforms also alienated influential constituencies, including the clergy, 
landlords and merchants or bazaaris . . . Economic grievances helped galvanize opposition to 
the monarchy, and revolutionary leaders such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appealed to 
Iran’s poor and its increasingly squeezed middle class.”); Stephen McGlinchey, How the Shah 
Entangled America, NAT’L INTEREST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/
how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821(“ . . . the disproportionate extent of the military 
investment in the Shah’s regime is partially responsible for the tide of anti-American sentiment 
that endures in Iran to this day.”). 
13. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 23 (contrasting the differing stakes between 
international investment and international trade); Raymond Vernon, International Investment 
and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 80 Q. J. ECON. 190, 196-207 (1966) (theorizing 
the decision-making process that encourages international investors to “take the risks of 
pioneering with production in a new area”). 
14. See infra notes 1118-28 and accompanying text. 
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between investors and their own home States.15 In the case of Iran, the 
United States has an interest in the way international investors 
conduct their operations following the relaxation of sanctions.16 
The JCPOA will be the primary framework within which all 
parties operate going forward.17 Probably the most monumental 
foreign policy achievement of the Obama presidency, the JCPOA is 
also likely to retain ongoing political support throughout the 
foreseeable future, at least among most US Democrats.18 The question 
then becomes how the United States might use the deal, and 
international investment, as a means of furthering US foreign policy 
interests within both Iran and the wider Middle East region.19 From 
nuclear non-proliferation to counterterrorism, human rights to reform 
and/or regime change within the Islamic Republic, the JCPOA 
elevates international investors to a position of heightened influence 
over various longstanding US foreign policy goals.20 
Although the Obama Administration has responded to this 
development by limiting the new freedoms that would otherwise be 
provided to US investors under the JCPOA, a wiser foreign policy 
strategy would be to channel the powerful incentives born of 
international investment as a means of furthering US-Iran relations 
                                                                                                             
15. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 18-19 (articulating host country interests 
in international investment), 22-23 (considering home country interests); see also Robert E. 
Lipsey, Home- and Host-Country Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, in CHALLENGES TO 
GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 333-72 (Robert E. Baldwin & L. Alan 
Winters eds., 2004) (surveying the effects of international investment on home and host 
states). 
16. See generally infra Part III.D (considering an array of US foreign policy interests as 
they relate to post-sanctions Iran). 
17. See Sunny Mann et al., Iran: Overview and Significance of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE NEWS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://globalcompliancenews.
com/iran-overview-and-significance-of-the-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-20150409/; 
John B. Bellinger III & Zachary Laub, How Binding Is the Iran Deal?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (July 23, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/iran/binding-iran-deal/p36828 (discussing 
Congress’ review of JCPOA); see also infra Part II.A. 
18. Cf. Tal Kopan, Senate Democrats Deliver Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal Support, 
CNN (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-richard-
blumenthal-ron-wyden-gary-peters-obama-democrats/; Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats Hand 
Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html. 
19. See infra Part III.D (illustrating how increased foreign investment in Iran could be 
used to secure various US foreign policy interests). 
20. See infra Part III.D. 
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and wider regional US policy goals.21 In doing so, the United States 
would have a strong partner in the international investment 
community, and vice versa.22 If the United States believes that the 
“new chapter” in Iran’s global relations evoked by President Rouhani 
is a development it would like to see in the world, then international 
investment will play a key role in securing this change.23 By 
liberalizing Washington’s JCPOA guidance to the fullest extent 
possible, the United States should seek to encourage US participation 
in international investment in Iran, and play an active role in shaping 
the interests and incentives that investment creates there.24 
Structurally, this Note is comprised of three movements. Part I 
traces the evolution of the sanctions regime, shedding light on the 
historical experiences that will shape Iran’s future behavior as a host 
State, as well as the consequences of past US sanctions policies. Part 
II looks to Iran’s post-sanctions transition, emphasizing what the 
JCPOA means for US investors, contrasted with international 
investors more broadly. Furthermore, by looking to the opportunities, 
risks, and legal frameworks concerning international investment in 
Iran, Part II also demonstrates Iran’s current capacity for foreign 
investment, and why dramatic capital inflows are likely to return to 
Iran whether the United States likes it or not. Finally, Part III turns to 
US foreign policy interests, and how these interests would be best 
served by revising Washington’s policies in a manner that allows 
broad economic engagement and greater US investment in Iran. By 
taking a proactive role in facilitating the way that US investment 
reaches Iran, the United States holds the potential to inspire important 
innovations within international investment law as a whole. 
I. IRAN UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME 
In order to understand the significance of the JCPOA and what it 
will mean for international investors, a larger understanding of Iran’s 
                                                                                                             
21. See infra Part II.A.2 (analyzing remaining limitations on US investment in Iran); 
infra Part III.D (demonstrating the potential positive impacts investment-based engagement on 
an array of US foreign policy goals). 
22. See infra Part III. 
23.  Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2. See generally infra Part 
III. 
24.  See generally infra Part III. Throughout this Note, national capitals will be 
interchangeably used—via synecdoche—to stand in for their respective States and/or 
governments. Thus, one should read “Washington” here as referring to policymakers within 
the US Government. 
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history, as well as that of the sanctions regime, is required. By then 
looking to the costs of the sanctions regime—both on Iran and other 
stake-holding parties—one can finally appreciate the profundity of 
Iran’s post-sanctions transition. For both US investors and US 
policymakers, the history of the sanctions regime provides numerous 
political and economic insights concerning the future of both Tehran 
and Washington going forward. The focus of this Part is to provide 
that contextual background. 
A. Background & Historical Overview 
The United States and Iran share a contentious relationship.25 
While this has not always been the case, the Islamic Republic has 
held a great deal of negative US foreign policy attention since the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979.26 Throughout this era, US-drafted 
international trade and investment sanctions have played the central 
role in guiding how the United States deals with Iran.27 While 
sanctions as a distinct tool of foreign policy have existed at least since 
the ancient Greek city-states, the US sanctions strategy toward Iran 
has, since its inception, fallen under a two-track strategy, which 
sought to influence Iranian behavior by imposing economic pressure 
and simultaneously extending incentives for certain Iranian 
concessions.28 The utility of these sanctions as a tool of US foreign 
                                                                                                             
25. See generally JAMES G. BLIGHT ET AL., BECOMING ENEMIES: US-IRAN RELATIONS 
AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1979-1988 (2012) (tracing the evolution of US-Iran relations 
throughout the Cold War); KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA (2005) (recalling the antagonistic history of the United States 
and Iran). 
26. See McGlinchey, supra note 12 (outlining US-Iran relations before 1979); JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 280-82 
(2007) (introducing the “adversarial relationship” between Washington and Tehran since 
1979). Throughout this Note, the “Islamic Revolution,” the “Iranian Revolution,” or simply the 
“Revolution” are all used interchangeably to refer to the Iranian political upheaval of 1979. 
27. See Raj Bhala, Fighting Iran with Trade Sanctions, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
251, 256 (2014) (“Simply put, for nearly forty years, America has had a sanctions-based trade 
policy toward Iran.”); Patrick Clawson, U.S. Sanctions, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 
115 (“The United States has had sanctions on Iran for most of the period since the 1979 
Islamic revolution. . . .”). 
28. Thucydides’ description of the Megarian decrees represents trade sanctions that 
directly contributed to the Peloponnesian War. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 68 
(Martin Hammond trans., 2009) (“Above all, and in the clearest possible terms, they repeated 
that there would be no war if the Athenians repealed the decree which had denied the 
Megarians access to the ports in the Athenian empire and to the Athenian market itself.”); see 
also Farshad Ghodoosi, Combatting Economic Sanctions: Investment Disputes in Times of 
Political Hostility, a Case Study of Iran, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1731, 1765 (2014) 
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policy has been widely debated.29 However one categorizes it, the 
JCPOA represents a landmark shift in how the United States deals 
with Iran.30 By moving away from almost forty years of near-
continuous sanctions policies, the JCPOA represents the end of an 
era.31 The following Sections will examine this time period, and trace 
the history of US-Iran relations up to the lifting of sanctions.32 
                                                                                                             
(“International sanctions are a reality in international affairs and can be traced back to ancient 
Greece.”). For the logic behind US-Iran sanctions, see SUZANNE MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION 429 (2015) (articulating Washington’s two-
track strategy); see also Suzanne Maloney & Ray Takeyh, The Self-Limiting Success of Iran 
Sanctions, INT’L AFF. (Nov. 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/11/iran-
sanctions-maloney-takeyh (further defining Washington’s two-track sanctions logic). 
29. See Nicholas Colby Watson Wolfe, Nuclear Chain Reaction: Why Economic 
Sanctions Are Not Worth the Public Costs, 27 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2015) (questioning the 
efficacy of Washington’s sanctions regime); Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (“U.S. sanctions 
have been controversial on many scores, with vigorous debates about their impact and their 
negative side effects.”). Many argue that decades of US economic coercion continuously 
undermined sympathetic parties within Iran and further radicalized the Islamic Republic away 
from international cooperation. See, e.g., Steve H. Hanke, On the Failure of the Iranian 
Sanctions, GLOBE ASIA (Feb. 2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/failure-
iranian-sanctions (“[The sanctions regime] has ultimately failed to deter the Iranian regime 
from developing nuclear capacity. Instead, it has generated a great deal of resentment.”); see 
also Wolfe, supra, at 19 (claiming that US sanctions emboldened Iran’s “ultra-conservative 
factions”). In contrast, supporters of the sanctions regime cite its importance as a nonviolent 
policy tool in combating, or at least constraining, problematic Iranian policies. See, e.g., 
Suzanne Maloney, Why “Iran Style” Sanctions Worked Against Tehran (and Why They Might 
Not Succeed with Moscow), BROOKINGS (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
markaz/posts/2014/03/21-iran-sanctions-russia-crimea-nuclear [hereinafter Why “Iran Style” 
Sanctions Worked Against Tehran] (“Now that Iran has become the exemplar of successful 
sanctions, the long experience in deploying economic pressure against the Islamic Republic 
offers a wealth of lessons for those seeking to apply this model elsewhere.”); see also Wolfe, 
supra, at 2-3 (asserting that US sanctions are often misattributed to Iran’s cooperation on 
negotiating the JCPOA). Paradoxically, the JCPOA itself has been cited as supporting both 
sides. Compare Jeffrey Goldberg, White House Official: Nuclear Deal is Best Way to Avoid 
War with Iran, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2015/03/white-house-official-nuclear-deal-is-best-way-to-avoid-war-
with-iran/386806/ (arguing that the JCPOA is the best way to avoid war with Iran), with Leslie 
H. Gelb, The Real Reason Obama Did the Iran Deal, DAILY BEAST (July 14, 2015), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/14/the-iran-deal-s-missing-ingredient.html (“no 
nation, including those far weaker economically than Iran, has ever capitulated after economic 
sanctions.”). 
30. Compare infra Parts I.A.1-4, with Part I.A.5. 
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra Parts I.A.1-5. 
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1. Pre-Revolutionary Iran 
Various contemporary trends within the investment climate of 
Iran trace their roots to the period before the Islamic Republic, when 
Persia was still ruled by the Pahlavi dynasty.33 This era set many 
investment precedents, as well as popular Iranian attitudes concerning 
both the United States and foreign investment that remain largely 
unchanged today.34 The unique interplay between US investment and 
Iran as it developed over the twentieth century traces back to the very 
beginning of US-Iran relations, which essentially began with an 
investment dispute: Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (“AIOC”) in 
1951.35 Initially, Persia’s brief experiment with democracy under 
Mossadegh was of little concern to the United States, and Britain’s 
monopoly on the post-war Iranian oil market gave Washington little 
reason to care about nationalization.36 However, as Britain and 
Persia’s relationship deteriorated over the nationalization of the 
AIOC, economic turmoil and popular unrest sparked US fears that 
Iran would fall into the global communist camp and become a Soviet 
protectorate.37 These fears led to Washington’s intervention in Iran, 
                                                                                                             
33. See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text. 
34. See McGlinchey, supra note 12 (explicating the enduring legacy of Washington’s 
pre-revolutionary policies in Iran); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE 
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 53 (observing the impact of Western intervention on Iran’s 
future attitude regarding foreign oil concessions). 
35. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1735-39 (summarizing Mossadegh’s nationalization 
of the AIOC); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 46-53 (recounting the Mossadegh affair). Although physical US presence in Iran extends 
back to military operations in World War II, it was not until after the War, during a period of 
British imperial decline and budding global Cold War tensions, that Washington took a direct 
interest in the affairs of the country. See id. at 42 (mentioning the US and British military 
intervention in Iran during World War II); id. at 49 (noting the diversion of Britain’s 
mercantile interests in Iran and US fears of Soviet expansionism); see also IRENE L. 
GENDZIER, NOTES FROM THE MINEFIELD: UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN LEBANON AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 1945-1958, 34-35 (2006) (highlighting budding Anglo-American tensions 
as Britain’s colonial hegemony began to unravel). 
36. Indeed, US firms actually benefited in the immediate wake of Mossadegh’s 
nationalization policy. See GENDZIER, supra note 35, at 35 (“Not only did the State 
Department disagree with British rejectionism, but U.S. international oil interests were among 
the beneficiaries of the concessionary arrangements that followed nationalization.”); see also 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 49 
(“Even late in the crisis, President Eisenhower pressed the British to accept Iranian terms and 
briefly contemplated reviving direct assistance to a beleaguered Tehran.”). 
37. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 52 (explaining the growing US fears that brought Washington onboard Britain’s 
interventionist policy); A Short Account of 1953 Coup, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY, 
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ousting the Prime Minister in the jointly orchestrated British-US coup 
remembered today as Operation Ajax.38 In Mossadegh’s place, 
Washington and London imposed the young Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi as an autocrat, who would go on to rule the country until 
1979.39 
Having placed Shah Pahlavi on the throne, Washington 
committed itself to ongoing patronage of the young monarch in the 
form of investment and support for the Shah’s State-centered 
development policies.40 Although much of the Iranian economy 
remained locked up in centrally planned development strategies 
throughout the Shah’s tenure, US investors found a welcome 
destination for their capital in pre-Revolutionary Iran.41 By 1978, US 
investment in Iran stood at approximately US$700 million, with 
50,000 US expatriates living there.42 Within the energy sector, US oil 
companies owned 40 percent of the consortium that purchased Iranian 
oil.43 The surge in global oil prices after the Arab Oil Embargo in 
                                                                                                             
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/coup53/coup53p1.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) 
(portraying the US view that only an “economically sound and financially solvent” Iran would 
be able to fend off Soviet expansion). 
38. See A Short Account of 1953 Coup, supra note 37; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 52-53 (summarizing the Anglo-
American coup that ousted Mossadegh). 
39. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 52-53; GENDZIER, supra note 35, at 35 (noting the reinstating of the Pahlavi dynasty 
under the new shah). 
40. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 52-53; McGlinchey, supra note 12 (addressing Washington’s economic and military 
support for the Shah’s modernization programs). In terms of investment, The Iranian Majles 
(parliament) adopted the Law for the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment in 1955, 
the same year that Iran and the United States formally signed a Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation (“FCN”) treaty. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744 (identifying the Law for the 
Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment); id. at 1757 (examining the Iran-US FCN); 
see also Law of the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment of 1955 (Iran), https://
track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Iran/Laws/Law%20of%20the%20Attraction%2
0and%20Protection%20of%20Foreign%20Investment%20(1956).pdf; Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 U.N.T.S. 93, http://
www.parstimes.com/law/iran_us_treaty.html. 
41. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 53-54 (discussing the growing role of international oil consortiums by the 1960s); 
MELANI CAMMETT ET AL., A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 251 (4th ed., 2015) 
(reviewing Iran’s economy under the Shah). 
42. See Kate Gillespie, US Corporations and Iran at the Hague, 44 MIDDLE EAST J. 18, 
19 (1990). 
43. Id. at 19; Khosrow Fatemi, The Iranian Revolution: Its Impact on Economic 
Relations with the United States, 12 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 303, 303-04 (1980) 
(highlighting US participation in Iran’s pre-revolutionary economy). 
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1973 brought unprecedented revenues to the Pahlavi regime, with 
lucrative investor profits being made in the process.44 A second prong 
of Washington’s patronage involved massive military aid to Iran, in 
hopes of creating a strong regional ally committed to the fight against 
communism.45 In the wider region, intelligence sharing and military 
cooperation between Iran, Turkey, and Israel—what became known 
as the Trident Alliance—also had major US backing, committed to 
the fight against both communism and Arab nationalist movements.46 
Ironically, during this period, the United States also played a direct 
role in facilitating the birth of Iran’s nuclear development program.47 
2. The Islamic Revolution & Regional Turmoil 
Decades of US-Iranian cooperation came to an abrupt end 
following the Islamic Revolution of 1979.48 While foreign investors 
and Iran’s political elite had made a fortune during the Pahlavi years, 
this wealth was widely perceived as occurring at the expense of the 
                                                                                                             
44. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (“With the first great surge in petroleum 
prices in 1973, the shah’s state had at its disposal a tremendous volume of rents.”); see also 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 66 
(restating Iran’s embargo era opportunism); id. at 70 (“Culturally and financially jarring 
foreign enclaves expanded like sponges, soaking up vast sums for the salaries of skilled 
workers fro outside Iran.”). 
45. By 1977, US military sales to Iran were approximately US$6 billion annually. See 
Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19; McGlinchey, supra note 12 (considering US military aid to the 
Pahlavi regime). The United States also played a leading role in the development the Shah’s 
brutal intelligence agency, Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar (“SAVAK”), or the 
National Organization for Intelligence and Security. Used both to fight communism and 
intimidate Iranian citizens out of voicing dissent, SAVAK became a notoriously feared and 
hated source of domestic Iranian oppression. See Ministry of Security SAVAK, 
GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/savak.htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016) [hereinafter Ministry of Security SAVAK] (providing an overview of SAVAK); 
see also ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILISATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST 99 (2005) (illustrating SAVAK’s brutality). 
46. See Yossi Alpher, Trident’s Forgotten Legacy: When Iran, Israel, and Turkey 
Worked Together, FOREIGN AFF. (May 7, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
turkey/2015-05-07/trident-s-forgotten-legacy (outlining the Trident Alliance); see also FISK, 
supra note 45, at 100 (acknowledging wide Iranian-Israeli cooperation before the revolution).  
47. See Alexandra L. Anderson, Good Grief! Iran Sanctions and the Expansion of 
American Corporate Liability for Non-U.S. Subsidiary Violations Under the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 125, 130 (2013) 
[hereinafter Anderson, Good Grief!]; see also Michael Adler, Iran and the IAEA, in THE IRAN 
PRIMER, supra note 12, at 89. 
48. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (noting the reversal in US-Iran 
relations following the storming of the US Embassy in November, 1979). 
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Iranian people.49 The Shah’s form of State capitalism had troubling 
effects on Iran’s traditional merchant class.50 While the national 
coffers enriched, the Bezaari—Iran’s traditional merchant class—
remained confined to their small-scale operations, upsetting their 
traditional balance of economic power.51 Furthermore, State revenues 
were diverted to the exact foreign powers responsible for engineering 
the overthrow of Mossadegh and reversing the people’s 1950s 
nationalization efforts.52 Additionally, SAVAK’s increasingly brutal 
surveillance and intimidation techniques infringed on the rights of all 
Iranians: especially students, leftists, and those advocating for 
increased political freedoms.53 The regular torture and disappearances 
of Iranian citizens were unpopular among the citizens of Iran, and 
these sentiments were left unconsoled as the Pahlavi elite held 
decadent parties and lavish international galas.54 
Along with economic modernization policies, the Shah’s social 
development platform included initiatives antagonistic of the religious 
and cultural practices of ordinary Iranians.55 By imposing Western 
                                                                                                             
49. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 75 (presenting the “conviction among key political constituencies that the government 
had betrayed the nation, squandered its resources, and subjugated the population to foreign 
interests.”); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (noting the absence of the Iranian 
private sector from the state’s economic advances). 
50. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41; see also Kevan Harris, The Bazaar, in THE 
IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 109 (explaining Bazaari—Iran’s traditional merchant class—
disenfranchisement under the Shah). 
51. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50; see also FISK, supra note 45, at 110 (asserting 
the role of the middle class in Iran’s revolution); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 62 (“The expansion of state banks and their 
generous provision of credit to the nascent private sector effectively muscled out two of the 
most important historical functions of the bazaar.”). 
52. See FISK, supra note 45, at 98 (following Operation Ajax, “[t]he Shah would 
henceforth always be seen as a tool of the United States and Britain.”); MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 81 (“In [Khomeini’s] telling, 
the blame for Iran’s poverty and oppression fell at the feet of Washington and its allies.”); id. 
at 82 (“This depiction of a foreign conspiracy centered on the exploitation of Iran’s resources, 
both human and natural, in a way that echoed the Mosaddeq era debates and appealed to the 
leftist and nationalist elements of the revolutionary coalition.”). 
53. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 54 (positing SAVAK’s role in enforcing loyalty to the regime); FISK, supra note 45, at 
99 (recounting SAVAK’s terrorizing methodologies). 
54. See FISK, supra note 45, at 100-01 (contrasting the Shah’s lavish lifestyle with the 
oppression faced by ordinary Iranians); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE 
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 73-75 (presenting an extended look at the regime’s 
decadence). 
55. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 70; FISK, supra note 45, at 100 (observing the cultural and religious alienation of the 
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values on his subjects and marginalizing the nation’s traditional social 
bases, the Shah drew open criticism from Iran’s Ulema—its religious 
clerical class—which retained significant popular power through even 
the most repressive years of the autocracy.56 In this light, the 
explosion of State revenues following the 1973 oil crisis actually 
undermined the Pahlavi regime.57 With increased resources to fuel 
these unpopular modernization policies, the Shah expedited his own 
demise.58 
To call the 1979 Revolution in Iran an “Islamic Revolution” is 
somewhat of a historical misnomer.59 However, the Revolution’s 
various non-Islamist movements had been gutted internally by 
decades of political repression and SAVAK’s operations.60 The 
Ulema, by contrast, was both organized and well resourced, and had 
earned a longstanding popular authority for its history of calling out 
                                                                                                             
Iranian population); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 73-74 (“ . . . one could argue 
that the downfall of the shah in Iran in 1979 and the proclamation of the Islamic republic came 
as the result of rapid and profound social change in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
56. See FISK, supra note 45, at 100 (citing social alienation as a result of the Shah’s 
reform efforts); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, 
supra note 28, at 85-86 (emphasizing the religious establishment’s retained authority in the 
face of state autocracy). 
57. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
58. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 69; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 251 (linking increased oil revenue with the 
disastrous policies that ultimately mobilized the public against the Shah). 
59. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 75-84 (distinguishing the ideological diversity of the Shah’s opposition); see also 
CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 312 (“At the time of the revolution, the opposition to the 
shah seems to have been as widespread as Polish opposition to Communist rule . . . the initial 
coalition led by Khomeini was very broad indeed.”). In reality the events that began with 
student demonstrations in 1977 and evolved into the eviction of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 
were both populist and representative of a wide spectrum of political ideologies. See id.; see 
also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 73-
94 (portraying an overview of the revolution). In particular, Iran’s Marxists and communists 
played an important role in bringing down the regime. See id. at 76 (identifying the importance 
of the Marxist Sharikha-ye Fedayin-e Khalq and Mojahedin-e Khalq movements); Dr. Zayar, 
The Iranian Revolution: Past, Present and Future, Chapter Three: The Communist Party of 
Iran, IN DEFENSE OF MARXISM (July 9, 2006), http://www.marxist.com/the-iranian-
revolution-past-present-future/page-5.htm (providing a wider synopsis of Marxism’s 
contribution to the revolution). 
60. SAVAK’s raison d’être, at least in the eyes of its benefactors in Washington, was 
always the fight against communism. See FISK, supra note 45, at 99; Ministry of Security 
SAVAK, supra note 45. While guerilla groups like Sharikha-ye Fedayin-e Khalq and 
Mojahedin-e Khalq were important, Iran’s larger and traditional communist Tudeh Party had 
been largely “incapacitated and sidelined by the 1970s.” MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 75. 
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the Pahlavi government.61 Thus, while the Revolution was comprised 
of diverse, often antithetical ideologies, it coalesced around the 
charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.62 This 
placed Khomeini and the Ulema in a unique, powerful position after 
the Shah fled Iran and escaped to the United States.63 Only after the 
Iranian Constitution formally adopted the structure of an Islamic 
Republic did the theocratic aims of the Ulema become undeniable.64 
For Washington’s part, the ousting of the Shah was not in itself a 
game-changer.65 Recognizing the strategic importance of Iran, the 
United States initially hoped that it could retain influence with the 
Islamic Republic.66 Such hopes were reinforced by the fact that the 
Iranian Revolution had not been a full social or economic revolution 
of the Bolshevik type.67 State expropriations had not yet occurred and 
many US investors adopted a wait-and-see attitude.68 That said, even 
before expropriations began, the international investment community 
in Iran faced significant disruptions to its operations, stemming from 
                                                                                                             
61. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 85-86. See generally Nikki R. Keddie, The Roots of the Ulama’s Power in Modern Iran, 
29 STUDIA ISLAMICA 31 (1969) (providing a pre-revolutionary account of the lasting power of 
the Ulema—Iran’s clerical class—in Iran). 
62. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 79-84 (describing Khomeini’s politically contrived appeal to broad opposition factions); 
FISK, supra note 45, at 120-21 (characterizing initial revolutionary cooperation between the 
Ulema and Iran’s leftists). 
63. See FISK, supra note 45, at 120-21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 99-107 (assessing the trends that facilitated Khomeini’s 
consolidation of power). Indeed, some of Khomeini’s most formative post-Shah initiatives 
were to clamp down on the left and eradicate his co-revolutionaries. See Iran After the Victory 
of 1979’s Revolution, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.iranchamber.
com/history/islamic_revolution/revolution_and_iran_after1979_2.php [hereinafter Iran After 
the Victory]; FISK, supra note 45, at 121-22 (showing Khomeini’s eventual turning on his co-
revolutionaries). 
64. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980]; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, 129-35 (outlining the drafting processes and consequences 
of the Islamic Republic’s constitution). 
65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
66. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 115; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 429 n.1 (“Iran’s non-oil exports to the U.S. actually 
increased in the months immediately following the revolution.”). 
67. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 113; FISK, supra note 45, at 110 (contrasting 
the Iranian Revolution with other historical revolutionary models). 
68. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19 (“The immediate implications of the Iranian 
Revolution for US corporations operating in Iran were unclear.”); Iran After the Victory, supra 
note 63 (inferring gradual phases of state expropriation of property). 
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the popular unrest of 1978 and 1979.69 Fifteen percent of the five 
hundred US firms operating in Iran had already shut down, and US 
banks found themselves exposed to the potential default of US$2.3 
billion of previously negotiated loans to Iran.70 As a result, the US 
Comptroller of the Currency began appraising Iranian assets held in 
the United States in order to prepare.71 Perhaps sensing this financial 
squeeze, the Islamic Republic enacted its first expropriation on June 
8, 1979, nationalizing Iranian banks.72 This was followed by the June 
25 nationalization of the insurance sector, and the first wave of mass 
nationalization throughout the month of July.73 The Islamic Republic 
justified these actions by claiming that “economic stagnation had 
brought the nation to the brink of disaster and that broader State 
involvement was necessary.”74 Still, the Islamic Republic made 
promises to compensate foreign investors sometime in the future, and 
many investors delayed taking action.75 
For both US investors and the US government, the equation 
changed with the storming of the US Embassy on November 4, 
1979.76 The US Embassy seizure and subsequent hostage standoff 
pressed President Carter to issue Executive Order 12170, which froze 
over US$12 billion of Iranian government assets under US 
                                                                                                             
69. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19 (“US corporations had already experienced losses 
due to the general disruptions of the revolution . . . ”); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 91 (“During the monarchy’s final 
eighteen months, labor activism emerged as a major factor . . . with strikes shutting down most 
major industries for months.”). 
70. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 19-20 (citing US closures and bank exposure); see 
also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 101 
(“ . . . businesses and universities ground to a halt as a result of violence and lack of any real 
authority.”). 
71. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20 (noting the OCC’s assessment of Iranian assets); 
Fatemi, supra note 43, at 310-11 (pointing out Iran’s eventual default on these loans on 
November 23, 1979). 
72. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 117 (mentioning the nationalization of Iranian banks). 
73. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 117-18 (presenting post-revolutionary Iran’s first wave of 
mass expropriations). 
74. Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20. 
75. See id. at 20 (noting Iran’s promises to compensate and investor inaction). But see 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 116 
(arguing that many foreign firms had already exited). 
76. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 256; Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20 (establishing the 
impact of the Iran hostage crisis). 
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jurisdiction.77 By the following April, President Carter had issued the 
first round of US sanctions targeting Iran.78 Meanwhile, US investors 
began a wave of contract breach and expropriation litigation within 
the US court system.79 By the end of 1980, US economic pressure and 
the depletion of spare parts in the Iranian economy (along with the 
start of the Iran-Iraq War) finally brought Iran to the negotiating 
table.80 The Algiers Accords of January 15, 1981 secured the freedom 
of the United States Embassy hostages in exchange for the release of 
Iran’s frozen assets and the lifting of Carter-era US sanctions.81 
Additionally, the Algiers Accords facilitated the creation of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”), set up to sort out 
investment disputes resulting from Iran’s revolution.82 
Following the Algiers Accords, the United States retained a 
sizeable amount of trade with Iran.83 Still, this was not enough to 
prevent a devastating post-Revolution decline in the Iranian economy, 
                                                                                                             
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979); see also 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 126-27 
(addressing the US response to the hostage crisis). 
78. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 20-21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 429-32 (explaining the first round of US economic 
measures). 
79. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660-69 (1981) (offering an 
example of a domestic US claim against Iran that was later usurped by the Algiers Accords); 
see also Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21 (highlighting the wave of US litigation preceding the 
Algiers Accords). 
80. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 433 (analyzing Iran’s cooperation in Algiers). 
81. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 21-22; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 438 (introducing the Algiers Accords). 
82. See Gillespie, supra note 42, at 22; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 438 (presenting the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(“IUSCT”)). While the IUSCT has often been criticized for its excruciatingly slow 
proceedings, the Tribunal’s successes have left a significant mark on international investment 
law. See John J. Chung, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Balancing of 
Rights Between Individual Claimants and the Government of Iraq, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 141, 173-75 (2005) (critiquing the slow methodologies of the IUSCT); see also 
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1739 (noting the influence of the IUSCT on other arbitration 
mechanisms). The IUSCT has influenced the arbitral proceedings of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), and by the 1990s, the experience of the 
IUSCT led many US investors to consider bringing their investments back to Iran. See id.; see 
also Gillespie, supra note 42, at 35-36 (rationalizing US investors’ renewed interest in Iran, 
following the IUSCT). 
83. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 439 (pointing out Iran’s US wheat imports following the release of the Embassy 
hostages); see also Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (mentioning the end of trade restrictions 
upon the release of the hostages). 
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which had been hit hard by stagflation, economic mismanagement, 
and the regime’s injuries to international investor confidence.84 From 
September 1980, Iran was also forced to cope with the Iran-Iraq War: 
a bloody existential war for both States that resulted in more than a 
million deaths, over 100 thousand civilian casualties, and the longest 
conventional war of the twentieth-century.85 Few governments had 
more cause for alarm over Iran’s 1979 Revolution than Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq.86 Hussein’s Sunni dictatorship 
over Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population made his government 
especially vulnerable to Iranian promises to export its Revolution, and 
with Iran still in the shambles of revolutionary transition, he launched 
a full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980.87 
The Iranian experience under the Iran-Iraq War left a lasting 
impression on modern Iran—perhaps one more formative than the 
Islamic Revolution itself.88 While this existential conflict also 
inflicted deep social and political consequences, the war’s impact on 
Iran’s economy left a lasting mark on the nation’s treatment of 
foreign investment.89 Iran’s wartime economy was marked by internal 
ideological tensions between socialism and conservatism.90 The 
                                                                                                             
84. See Kamran M. Dadkhah, Iran and Global Financial Markets: Foreign Investment 
vs. Borrowing, 19 MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REP. 8, 9 (1996); MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 118-19, 439 (surveying the economic 
consequences of Iran’s revolution). 
85. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 141; Michael Eisenstadt, Iran and Iraq, in THE 
IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 151 (assessing the magnitude of the Iran-Iraq War). 
86. See Will D. Swearingen, Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, 78 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 405, 414 (1988); MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE 
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 141 (citing Iran’s promise to export their revolution). 
87. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 141; Swearingen, supra note 86, at 405-06 (summarizing the start of the Iran-Iraq War).   
88. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 142 (“[w]henever the Islamic Republic’s obituary is written, the war will stand as its 
most consequential chapter.”); Claudia Wright, Implications of the Iraq-Iran War, FOREIGN 
AFF. (Winter 1980/81), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1980-12-01/implications-
iraq-iran-war (offering an early prediction of the war’s long term impact on Middle East 
stability). 
89. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. 
90. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 157-61 (addressing Iran’s 
wartime economy). While the Revolution had promised to put Iran’s petroleum wealth in the 
hands of the Iranian people, the total devotion of the economy to the war effort also 
underscored a need for economic pragmatism. See id. This pragmatism extended well beyond 
economics. The Iran-Contra Affair is just one example where tough times mandated some 
level of cooperation with the “Great Satan” in Washington. See generally Robert Busby, The 
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Revolution and subsequent war also had a decimating effect on Iran’s 
national economy.91 Adding to these complications, US support for 
Saddam Hussein, as well as direct military confrontation between the 
United States and Iran in the 1987 Tanker War, evidenced 
intensifying distrust between Washington and Tehran.92 The US State 
Department’s recognition of Iran as a State sponsor of terrorism and 
new US sanctions under President Ronald Reagan also had a 
“catastrophic impact” on Iran’s war effort against Iraq.93 Yet, in what 
would foreshadow a future trend throughout the sanctions regime, 
Washington’s traditional allies refused to take part in US economic 
coercion policies.94 Even after a particularly tough round of US 
                                                                                                             
Scandal That Almost Destroyed Ronald Reagan, SALON (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/02/04/busby_iran_contra/; Stephen R. Shalom, The United States 
and Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, IRAN CHAMBER SOCIETY, http://www.iranchamber.
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91. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 442 (assessing the impact of 
the war on Iran’s economy). During this period, Iranian industrial goods fell from twenty-eight 
percent of non-oil exports in 1976 to just 2.2% in 1985. See id.; HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI, 
REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE 226 (1990) (citing the 
decline in industrial goods). Likewise, Iran’s foreign direct investment (“FDI”) stock made a 
steady decline from US$2.99 billion in 1981 to US$2.04 billion in 1990. See MALONEY, 
IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 442 (stating the fall of Iran’s 
FDI stock); see also Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra, at 96 (discussing wider 
economic consequences of the Iran-Iraq War). 
92. See Shane Harris & Matthew M. Aid, Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped 
Saddam as He Gassed Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 26, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/
08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/ (examining US 
support for Iraq); Shalom, supra note 90; see also James A. Green, The Oil Platforms Case: 
An Error in Judgment?, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 357, 358 (2004); Elaine Sciolino, From 
and Sea, Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1987, http://www.nytimes.
com/1987/09/03/world/from-air-and-sea-iran-iraq-tanker-war-heats-up.html (addressing the 
Tanker War). At the same time, Iran’s ties to regional terrorism, extending back to Imad 
Munighyeh’s 1983 proto-Hezbollah attack on US Marine barracks in Lebanon, shortened 
Washington’s patience with the Islamic Republic. See generally Matthew Levitt, The Origins 
of Hezbollah, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/10/the-origins-of-hezbollah/280809/; Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts, CNN 
(Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-
bombing-fast-facts/ (detailing the 1983 Marine barracks bombing). 
93. MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 
431. 
94. See id. at 433-34; Johannes Reissner, Europe and Iran, in HONEY AND VINEGAR: 
INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 33, 41 (Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. 
O’Sullivan eds., 2000) (noting Europe’s reluctance to join US sanctions, in particular). 
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sanctions in 1987, Washington’s closest allies were more concerned 
with facilitating an end to the Iran-Iraq War than joining sanctions.95 
3. Reconstruction & Reform 
The conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 marked a radical 
shift in Iran, both in terms of the nation’s politics and its economy.96 
The devastation unleashed by the war fueled pragmatic reconstruction 
efforts, which increasingly looked to foreign investment to rebuild 
Iran’s crippled economy.97 The election of Iranian President Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani in August 1989 unlocked the first phase of what 
became known as Iran’s Reform Era.98 This first phase, almost 
entirely concerned with the nation’s economic policies, led to 
numerous economic reforms championed throughout Rafsanjani’s 
two terms.99 Under his tenure, Iran abandoned the “Islamic 
economics” marked by the war years, moved toward integration with 
global economic institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), slashed the national deficit, 
and reduced State interference with imports.100 Additionally, key 
                                                                                                             
95. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 445 (identifying reasons that Washington’s allies failed to join US sanctions); Reissner, 
supra note 94, at 36 (illustrating German diplomacy with Iran through the war years). Notably, 
President Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush, did witness some initial improvements to 
US-Iran relations. President Bush’s extension of “goodwill” to Iran represents one of the few 
meaningful US attempts at engagement throughout the entirety of the sanctions regime. See 
MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 446-47 
(examining the policy shift under Bush); Richard N. Haass, The George H.W. Bush 
Administration, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 136-37 (addressing the new president’s 
goodwill policies toward Iran). In fact, with civil war raging in nearby Lebanon, this short 
window of cooperation did yield some breakthroughs, such as the negotiated release of 
Hezbollah’s Western hostages. See id. at 137; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 447 (exploring Iran’s role in the release of the hostages). 
96. See infra notes 97-141 and accompanying text. 
97. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra 
note 12, at 96; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 386 (characterizing Iran’s post-war reconstruction needs). 
98. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 192-93 (situating Rafsanjani’s reconstruction efforts against wider reformist social and 
political trends); Shaul Bakhash, The Six Presidents, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 
16-17 (recounting Rafsanjani’s presidency). 
99. See Bakhash, supra note 98; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE 
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 194-96 (summarizing Rafsanjani’s reconstruction efforts 
throughout his two terms). 
100. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 194-96; Daniel Pipes & Patrick Clawson, Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors, FOREIGN 
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changes were made within the Iranian energy sector.101 The 
appointment of Bijan Namdar Zangeneh as Iran’s Energy Minister 
facilitated the rise of various capable technocrats within the energy 
industry, and created an effective bureaucracy to advocate for 
economic liberalization.102 These economic shifts led to a twenty 
percent increase in real per capita Iranian incomes between 1989 and 
1992, along with other economic benefits to the Islamic Republic.103 
Although Rafsanjani’s economic pragmatism managed to attract 
much needed foreign investment from Europe and elsewhere, 
politically, Iran’s resource wealth was still wrapped up in sensitive 
notions of national sovereignty.104 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had 
succeeded Khomeini as Iran’s Supreme Leader in 1989, became a 
constant thorn in the side of Rafsanjani’s economic reform efforts.105 
Whatever changes were made within Iran’s domestic economy, the 
country sustained its confrontational foreign policy practices: 
continuing to support regional Islamic revolutionaries and terrorist 
movements, complicating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and 
rhetorically antagonizing Sunni neighbors in the Gulf.106 Additionally, 
one downside of Rafsanjani’s economic platform was that—like other 
nations affected by the global wave of liberalization in the 1990s—
privatization tended to concentrate economic power among those with 
close ties to the political elite.107 This trend was manifest in Iran’s 
energy sector, resulting in what became unpopularly known as the 
                                                                                                             
AFF. (1992), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/1993-02-01/ambitious-iran-
troubled-neighbors (considering Rafsanjani’s reform initiatives). 
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
102. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 194-96, 400; Bakhash, supra note 98, at 16 (assessing Rafsanjani’s attempts at 
liberalization). 
103. See Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 2-3; Maloney, The Revolutionary 
Economy, supra note 12, at 97 (recalling the economic growth in Iran following liberalization). 
104. See Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97; Ghodoosi, supra 
note 28, at 1734 (noting the rise of foreign investment); see also MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 193 (drawing connections between 
economic livelihoods and the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy). 
105. See Abbas Milani, The Green Movement, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 42 
(citing Khamenei’s succession of Khomeini); see also Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17; Reissner, 
supra note 94, at 38 (presenting Khamenei’s eventual opposition to Rafsanjani’s reforms). 
106. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17 (noting the continuation of Iran’s antagonistic 
foreign policy initiatives, from a US point of view); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 3-5. 
107. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 116; Paul Starr, The Meaning of 
Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL. REV. 6, 34-35 (1988) (highlighting privatization’s potential 
for abuse). 
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“Oil Mafia:” Rafsanjani elites perceived as privately usurping Iran’s 
national wealth.108 
President Rafsanjani’s economic reforms, while popular among 
global investors, had not achieved a softening of the Islamic Republic, 
nor anything close to an advancement of Washington’s various 
regional policy interests.109 Adding to this, new forces were at work in 
the United States that would push Washington further from any sort 
of rapprochement with Tehran.110 Following the crushing multilateral 
expulsion of Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1990-91, there 
was a growing belief in some policy circles that Iran remained the 
greatest threat to US regional interests.111 Such viewpoints gained 
strength in the early administration of President Bill Clinton, as 
proposals began circulating from the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (“AIPAC”) advocating for Washington to adopt a 
comprehensive and concurrent Middle East strategy that exerted 
simultaneous pressure on both Iraq and Iran.112 Israeli in origin, 
President Clinton’s “Dual Containment” strategy would go on to 
govern Washington’s dealings with Iran for the next decade, until US 
forces returned to Iraq to remove the Ba’ath Party from power in 
2003.113 
                                                                                                             
108. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 401-04; Fareed Mohamedi, The Oil and Gas Industry, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 
12, at 102 (explaining Iran’s “oil mafia”). 
109. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17 (contending that economic reconstruction failed 
to foster meaningful Iranian foreign policy changes); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 5. 
110. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
111. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 286 (examining the rise of Iran as 
Washington’s primary perceived foreign policy threat); Pipes & Clawson, supra note 100, at 2. 
112. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 286-87; Leon T. Hadar, Pax 
Americana’s Four Pillars of Folly, 27 J. PALESTINE STUD. 49, 52-53 (1998) (identifying 
AIPAC’s role in the Clinton administration’s Iran policies). Dual Containment as a strategy 
made sense for Israel, which had witnessed great benefits from its two greatest regional rivals 
being preoccupied with each other throughout the Iran-Iraq War. See Tritia Parsi, 
TREACHEROUS ALLIANCE: THE SECRET DEALINGS OF ISRAEL, IRAN, AND THE UNITED 
STATES 112 (2008) (addressing Israel’s interest in an Iran-Iraq stalemate); Sasan 
Fayazmanesh, On the US Policy of Dual Containment of Iran and Iraq, PAYVAND IRAN NEWS 
(Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.payvand.com/news/08/mar/1200.html. 
113. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 449 (summarizing Dual Containment); see also F. Gregory Gause III, The Illogic of 
Dual Containment, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 1994), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1994-03-01/illogic-dual-containment (detailing the flaws of 
Dual Containment, including the exact flaw that manifested upon the removal of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003). 
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Dual Containment imposed real complications on the United 
States’ international business community.114 By 1994, partially as a 
result of Rafsanjani’s reform efforts, roughly twenty-five percent of 
Iran’s exports were being purchased by US firms.115 But that same 
year, the US State Department intervened in a proposed sale of 
Boeing 747s to Iran, foreshadowing a new era of US policy on Iran.116 
The economic frustrations of Dual Containment were most severe for 
the US oil industry, which soon found operations restricted from two 
of the most oil-rich States in the entire world.117 
The clash between international investment and Dual 
Containment is poignantly illustrated in the 1995 Conoco episode.118 
In March of that year, the Iranian energy sector awarded its first US 
upstream oil deal to the US firm Conoco, in the form of a USD$1 
billion contract to develop the Sirri oil fields.119 Facing outrage from 
AIPAC and members of Congress, President Clinton signed 
                                                                                                             
114. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
115. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
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116. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
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HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 19, 1994), 
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economy at a time when Iran was still struggling to recover from the war and the aftereffects 
of revolutionary turmoil and mismanagement.”). 
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Myanmar Puts Cheney in the Spotlight, WALL STREET J., Oct. 27, 2000, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB972608941928577211; see also Stephen M. Walt, Accentuate the Positive: Why 
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118. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
119. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 288; Clawson, supra note 27, at 
116; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 452 
(recalling the Conoco debacle); cf. Charles Breckinridge, Note, Sanctions First, Ask Questions 
Later: The Shortsighted Treatment of Iran Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 88 
GEO. L. J. 2439, 2444 (2000); see also M. McCary, End Run on Sanctions (A Case Study on 
Contemporary Energy Investment in Iran), 12 FLA. J. INT’L L. 263, 265 (1998) (describing the 
loss of “lucrative profits”). 
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Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 1995, blocking the Conoco deal 
and prohibiting US investors from investing in the Iranian oil 
sector.120 Two months later, Clinton followed up with Executive 
Order 12959, sanctioning all investment and exports of goods and 
services to Iran by US firms and their subsidiaries.121 In Conoco’s 
place, the French firm Total S.A. was awarded the Iranian contract.122 
The Clinton executive orders marked the beginning of an 
increasingly complex, increasingly encompassing sanctions regime.123 
Yet, concerned with the President’s discretionary waiver authority 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 
upon which the Clinton orders were based, both AIPAC and Congress 
pushed for a more permanent resolution in the form of the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act (“ILSA”), which passed by unanimous consent in both 
the House and the Senate in 1996.124 
Meanwhile, Rafsanjani’s Iran continued to strike deals with 
Europe, often leading to rhetorical flare-ups between Washington and 
its European allies.125 Although European enthusiasm for its ongoing 
“Critical Dialogue” with Iran waned following the 1997 verdict of the 
Mykonos Trial, it soon picked up again with the Iranian election of 
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ACT (ILSA) 3 (2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66441.pdf; ROBERT J. 
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%20with%20PATRIOT%20Act.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). 
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President Mohammad Khatami later that year.126 Indeed, this period 
witnessed approximately fifty Bilateral Trade Agreements (“BITs”) 
between Iran and other States, as well as the passing of the Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Act (“FIPPA”) in the Majles 
(parliament): the first Iranian investment-based legislation in almost 
five decades.127 
President Khatami’s tenure represented the second phase and 
high water mark of Iran’s Reform Era.128 Elected on promises to 
expand domestic civil and political liberties, his focus shifted national 
attention from Iran’s economy to primarily social issues.129 This was 
part of the President’s larger pragmatic reform strategy, which sought 
to mobilize Iranian people-power to change the Islamic Republic, 
without taking a direct shot at the regime’s—or Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s—legitimacy.130 However, Khatami’s exclusive focus on 
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1744-45 (discussing the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (“FIPPA”)); 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002. 
128. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17-18; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 258 (assessing Khatami’s place amongst Iran’s 
Reform Movement). 
129. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 17; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 258 (“The president’s agenda was centered on a campaign 
that advanced the concepts of moderation, tolerance, accountability, and the supremacy of 
man-made law.”); see also id. at 263-66; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 
12, at 97 (indicating Khatami’s social, as opposed to economic, reform preferences). Initially, 
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REVOLUTION, supra, at 261; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra, at 97 (identifying 
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130. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 260-62; Ahmad Siddiqi, Khatami and the Search for Reform in Iran, 6 STANFORD J. 
INT’L REL. (Winter 2005), https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.04_siddiqi.html (detailing 
Khatami’s reform strategy). 
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Iranian social issues posed serious credibility problems, as world oil 
prices declined and Iran entered an economic recession.131 Not 
helping the matter, US sanctions on Iran continued to intensify 
throughout the late Clinton years.132 
In spite of these US pressures, the traumatic events of September 
11, 2001 inspired increased Iranian outreach toward President George 
W. Bush, notably centered on common security interests.133 Indeed, 
Iran played a major role in the early phases of the subsequent US war 
in Afghanistan, even conducting joint military operations alongside 
US Special Forces in the liberation of Herat.134 Even after Iran was 
vilified in President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech on January 29, 
2002, President Khatami pushed for normalization with Washington, 
especially following the quick US overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
2003. 135 Signing onto a Swiss-brokered “Grand Bargain” that would 
open direct negotiations with Washington on a comprehensive range 
of topics—from Iran’s nuclear program to its support for Hezbollah 
and Hamas—Khatami was spurned by a hubristic Bush 
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Sunni Wahhabi extremism since the time of Khomeini, and already Tehran had been playing 
an active role supporting various elements of the Afghan Northern Alliance in their long civil 
war against the Taliban government. See FISK, supra note 45, at 125 (highlighting Khomeini’s 
warnings against Wahhabi extremism); Najat Fawzy Al-Saied, The War of Ideologies in the 
Arab World, GATESTONE INST. (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3600/arab-
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Barbara Slavin, Iran Helped Overthrow Taliban, Candidate Says, USA TODAY (June 9, 2005), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-09-iran-taliban_x.htm; Hadley, supra, at 
142-43 (citing Iran’s role in ousting the Taliban). 
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (highlighting US-Iran cooperation 
following 9/11). 
135. For the Axis of Evil speech, see President George W. Bush, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/
print/20020129-11.html. For Bush era efforts at US-Iran normalization, see Hadley, supra note 
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Administration at the height of its regional military power.136 As the 
security situations deteriorated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, US 
negotiating leverage from there only diminished.137 
Increasing economic difficulties, the hardening US stance on 
Iran, and internal political deadlock all contributed to widespread 
disenchantment with President Khatami’s Reform Movement.138 
Blocked at every turn, Khatami’s initiatives failed to maintain public 
support.139 From ongoing US sanctions to policymaking on behalf of 
special interests, the United States played a sizeable role in 
undermining Khatami’s reform efforts. 140 In his place, from 2005-13, 
Washington would be forced to contend with a very different type of 
Iranian President in former Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.141 
4. The Ahmadinejad Years 
United States hostility to Iranian détente efforts helped fuel the 
radicalization and populist impulses that brought Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad to power in 2005.142 Ahmadinejad’s presidential 
campaign reflected broad populist promises concerning a return to 
revolutionary economics and breaking up Rafsanjani’s surviving Oil 
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SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 326 (showing Washington’s obsolescing 
bargaining power as the Iraq War devolved into a quagmire). 
138. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 262; Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18 (extrapolating the popular disenfranchisement under 
Khatami that empowered his hardliner opponents). 
139. See Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra 
note 12, at 97 (citing the hardliner obstructionism that eroded popular belief in Khatami). 
140. For the Israeli lobbying role in blocking US-Iran détente, see MEARSHEIMER & 
WALT, supra note 26, at 282, 286. For the influence of Iran’s economy on disenchantment 
with Khatami, see The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 97; see also Simon Tisdall, 
US Targets “Rogue Nation” Iran, GUARDIAN (May 10, 2001), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2001/may/10/iran (correctly predicting the danger of US sanctions empowering Iranian 
hardliners). 
141. See infra Part I.A.4. 
142. See Hossein Mousavian, How to Engage Iran: What Went Wrong Last Time – And 
How to Fix It, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/
2012-02-09/how-engage-iran (pointing out the role of US policies on the election of 
Ahmadinejad); Bakhash, supra note 98, at 18 (exploring the populism that fostered 
Ahmadinejad’s election). 
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Mafia—initiatives popular among the poor and regime hardliners.143 
In both form and substance, Ahmadinejad was the polar opposite of 
his immediate predecessor.144 Controversial from the start, one of 
President Ahmadinejad’s first moves was to resume the nation’s 
dormant nuclear program, breaking the UN seals on its uranium 
enrichment facilities at Isfahan and Natanz in early August of 2005.145 
This move encouraged Washington to apply many of its new post-
September 11 expanded executive powers to Iran for the first time, 
including the antiterrorism provisions under Executive Order 
13224.146 The result was an effective financial innovation that would 
be used throughout the later sanctions regime: extraterritorially 
closing the loophole of U-turn transactions, and using the unique 
global power of the US dollar to force third parties to choose between 
conducting business with Iran or conducting business with the United 
States.147 
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145. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 460; Ian Traynor, EU Warns Iran: No Talks if Nuclear Freeze Ends, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
2, 2005), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/03/eu.iran; SaraBeth Egle, The 
Learning Curve of Sanctions—Have Three Decades of Sanctions Reform Taught Us 
Anything?, 19 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L. J. 34, 42 (2011) (examining the restart Iran’s 
nuclear program). 
146. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); see also MALONEY, 
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 461 (explaining 
Executive Order 13224). Essentially targeting terrorist financial support channels, the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) within the US Treasury added Bank-e Saderat and Iran’s 
Quds Force to Executive Order 13224’s list of institutions funding terrorism in September 
2006. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 461 (specifying the impact of OFAC’s designations). 
147. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 462; Matthew Levitt, Financial Sanctions, in THE IRAN Primer, supra note 12, at 124 
[hereinafter Levitt, Financial Sanctions] (outlining U-turn transactions, and US efforts to 
prevent them); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, 
supra, at 462 (acknowledging Washington’s success at closing the U-turn transaction 
loophole). U-turn transactions involve the transfer of funds between two non-US parties, 
which are nonetheless momentarily serviced by a US financial institution, primarily by the 
means of correspondent banking. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL 
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS 
TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT, 67 (Oct. 2006), 
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Within Iran, the Ahmadinejad years were marked by gross 
economic mismanagement and waste.148 Despite record State 
revenues from skyrocketing international oil prices, Ahmadinejad 
proved a spendthrift.149 He racked up massive budget deficits and 
depleted key reserve funds set up by his predecessors to provide for 
future government investment in the oil sector.150 These policies drew 
                                                                                                             
https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/CBFTFS_Complete.pdf; Steven R. Weisman, U.S. 
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461-62; Adam J. Szubin, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, US Department of 
Treasury, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
(Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp92.aspx 
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IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 463 (explaining that Chinese 
companies faced at least 62 enforcement actions for sanctions violations under the Bush 
years). 
148. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 330; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98 (establishing the 
economic waste under Ahmadinejad). 
149. See Afshin Molavi, Iran and the Gulf States, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 
161; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 313 (citing the explosion of oil prices under 
Ahmadinejad’s tenure); see also Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98; 
Hashem Kalantari, Iran’s Unemployment Falls to 10.3 Pct –Minister, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-unemployment-idINDAH13987520080331 
(acknowledging the reckless spending under Ahmadinejad). 
150. See Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Farideh Farhi, Adjunct Professor, 
University of Hawaii (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/iran/farhi-new-iranian-majlis-
critical-ahmadinejad-domestic-issues/p15747 [hereinafter Gwertzman interview with Farhi]; 
Muhammad Sahimi, An Administration Plagued by Fraud and Corruption, FRONTLINE (Mar. 
30, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/03/ahmadinejad-and-
his-men-embodiments-of-fraud-and-corruption.html (surveying the economic mismanagement 
under Ahmadinejad). The raiding of Iran’s oil fund for consumption purposes instead of 
investment became especially problematic as more and more Iranian banks fell under the 
umbrella of US financial sanctions, thereby lacking access to the foreign exchange needed for 
capital expenditures within Iran’s aging oil fields. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 295-96; Ida A. 
Mirzaie, Government Policy, Inflation, and Exchange Rates in the Era of Sanctions: The Case 
of Contemporary Iran, HARV. ECON. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://harvardecon.org/?p=3106 
(explaining the impact of sanctions on accessing foreign currency); see also MALONEY, 
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 413; Mohamedi, 
supra note 108, at 102 (characterizing Iran’s old, capital-intensive oil infrastructure). 
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sharp criticism from both pragmatists and Ahmadinejad’s own 
conservative camp.151 To stymie such criticism, and to make good on 
his campaign promises to break up the Oil Mafia, Ahmadinejad 
replaced many of the nation’s qualified technocrats with his own 
loyalists and sycophants.152 Throughout all of these disastrous 
economic policies, the economic pressures of foreign-imposed 
international sanctions provided President Ahmadinejad with a 
convenient scapegoat to mask his own blatant mismanagement.153 
However, two areas where Ahmadinejad made theoretical 
improvements to Iran’s economy involved efforts aimed at 
privatization and weaning the nation off crippling food and energy 
subsidies.154 While both of these areas were in dire need of internal 
reform, the specific initiatives pressed by President Ahmadinejad 
were shaped by his populist, hardliner politics.155 Past efforts in 
privatizing Iran’s expansive and inefficient State-owned enterprises 
(“SOEs”) failed under Khatami, in the face of accusations of private 
enrichment.156 Yet, Ahmadinejad managed to push the New 
Privatization Act of 2008 through the Majles: a law that promised to 
cede eighty percent of the share value of particular economic 
activities to non-State actors by the end of Iran’s fourth five-year 
development plan in 2009-10.157 Yet, much of the privatization that 
                                                                                                             
151. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
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152. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 404; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98; Mohamedi, supra note 
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153. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 366; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2457 (commenting on the foreign scapegoat 
provided by US sanctions). 
154. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. 
155. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. 
156. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 402; Shirzad Azad, The Politics of Privatization in Iran, RUBIN CTR. RES. INT’L AFF. 
(Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.rubincenter.org/2010/12/azad-2010-12-05/ (assessing Khatami’s 
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157. See Ardeshir Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, in BANKR. 
L. CLIENT STRATEGIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 1, 3 (2011); MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 333 (overviewing 
Ahmadinejad’s privatization program). Basically, these targeted economic sectors represented 
the category of economic activities allowed to the private sector under Article 44 of Iran’s 
Constitution. See infra notes 626-30 and accompanying text; see also Atai, supra, at 3; PRS 
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occurred under Ahmadinejad transferred SOEs to State-affiliated 
parties and quasi-State entities via noncompetitive no-bid contracting 
processes.158 
Another result of Ahmadinejad’s privatization was a dangerous 
concentration of the State’s economy within the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”)—the 125,000-member branch 
of Iran’s armed forces under the direct control of the Supreme Leader 
and tasked with protecting the Islamic system of government.159 
Composed of some of Iran’s most pitched hardliners, the IRGC was 
awarded major operations within Iran’s energy, construction, 
telecommunications, and automobile sectors.160 Analysts estimate that 
by 2015, the IRGC had acquired control of up to thirty percent of 
Iran’s total economy.161 
President Ahmadinejad’s attempts to reform Iran’s subsidy 
system, while populist-oriented, had a more positive outcome.162 Born 
of the sensitive interplay between Iran’s oil reserves and notions of 
national sovereignty, the Iranian Revolution fostered numerous 
policies aimed at bringing Iran’s natural resource wealth to the tables 
of ordinary Iranian citizens.163 Indeed, the subsidies paid by the 
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POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 342; Maloney, The 
Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 98 (documenting privatization’s empowerment of 
the IRGC). 
160. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 405-06 (highlighting IRGC involvement in the energy sector); Sadakova, supra note 158 
(identifying IRGC involvement in the telecomm and automotive sectors). 
161. See BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL, IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT 10 (Q2 
2015); Elliott Abrams et al., The JCPOA’s Economic Benefits for Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guards, IRAN TASK FORCE, 1 (Dec. 2015), http://taskforceoniran.org/pdf/The_JCPOA
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162. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
163. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 368-69; Semira N. Nikou, The Subsidies Conundrum, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 
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Islamic Republic on domestic food and energy consumption evolved 
to become a cornerstone of Iranian economic life and the regime’s 
long-term legitimacy.164 Such programs, however, resulted in massive 
structural inefficiencies.165 Paying little attention to energy costs, the 
moral hazards of the State’s subsidy program turned Iran into one of 
the most energy inefficient economies in the entire world.166 With 
limited oil production and even more limited refining capacity, Iran 
was consistently forced to rely on imports to satisfy the nation’s 
massive energy consumption, despite its own resources.167 
Representing the first real reforms of the subsidy program, President 
Ahmadinejad implemented a phased, partial rationalization of these 
commodity prices, in exchange for cash payment “justice shares” 
being issued to poor Iranians dependent on such artificially low 
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legitimacy). 
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165. As late as 2010, Iranians paid approximately US$0.38 per gallon of gasoline, a fact 
that led to both illegal gas smuggling to neighboring countries and unchecked, runaway 
domestic consumption. See Nikou, supra note 163, at 105; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 
(noting the costs of subsidized goods paid by Iranian consumers); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S 
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28, at 419; Nikou, supra note 163, at 105; Saeed Moshiri, Energy Price Reform and Energy 
Efficiency in Iran, INT’L ASSOC. ENERGY ECON. 33, 34 (2013), http://www.iaee.org/en/
publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=197 (assessing Iran’s dismal energy efficiency). 
167. See Moshiri, supra note 166, at 34; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (stating 
Iran’s reliance on energy imports). In 2010, these imports reflected forty percent of Iran’s 
refined oil needs, comprising approximately twenty percent of Iran’s whole GDP. See id.; 
Djavad Salehi-Ishfahani, Iran: Subsidy Reform amid Regional Turmoil, BROOKINGS (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/03-iran-salehi-isfahani (showing 
the extent of Iran’s GDP diverted to subsidies). In this light, whatever the actual military 
intentions of Iran’s long-desired nuclear program, the economic logic behind civil nuclear 
power generation actually made a lot of theoretical sense. See id. Such trends were also 
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being thrown away or smuggled to neighboring states. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 350 (citing the above waste figures); 
Soazic Heslot, Iran’s Food Security, FUTURE DIRECTIONS INT’L (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/1858-iran-s-food-
security.html (further emphasizing Iranian food waste). 
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prices.168 Although subsidy reform continues to rank high on the 
Islamic Republic’s agenda, early signs indicated that Ahmadinejad’s 
reforms represented a silver lining to an otherwise disastrous overall 
economic policy.169 
In the United States, meanwhile, the 2008 election of President 
Barack Obama was notable in Obama’s campaign promises to 
negotiate with Iran over its ongoing nuclear program.170 However, 
Iran’s own presidential elections in 2009 provided Obama little 
political space to try such initiatives.171 The contested and allegedly 
fraudulent reelection of Ahmadinejad over his reformist rival Mir-
Hossein Mousavi ushered a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic 
Republic, consisting of street demonstrations and the rise of Iran’s 
short-lived Green Movement.172 The State’s brutal crackdown on 
protestors, along with subsequent arrests and human rights abuses, 
provided renewed vigor to Washington’s sanctions regime.173 The 
passing of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”) intensified targeted sanctions 
against Iran’s energy sector and oil-refining capacity, and broadened 
the trade embargo against Iran by closing prior exceptions for Iranian 
caviar, carpets, and pistachios.174 Against the backdrop of CISADA, a 
                                                                                                             
168. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 351; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN: 2015 COUNTRY REVIEW 329 (Denise Youngblood 
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28, at 352; IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 17 (emphasizing the initial 
promise of Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reforms). 
170. See David E. Sanger et al., Election 2008 – On the Issues: Iran, N.Y. TIMES, May 
23, 2012, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/iran.html; Michael R. Gordon & 
Jeff Zeleny, Obama Envisions New Iran Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.
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campaign platform). 
171. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. 
172. See Milani, The Green Movement, supra note 105, at 41; Hooman Majd, Think 
Again: Iran’s Green Movement, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 6, 2010), http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/
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173. See Ahmed Shaheed (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Seventieth Session of the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/70/411 (Oct. 6, 2015); Hamid Dabashi, What Happened to the 
Green Movement in Iran?, AL JAZEERA (June 12, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html (illustrating the state’s crackdown on Green 
Movement protestors). 
174. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 466 (evaluating CISADA); see also Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010). 
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wider shift in Iran’s access to international investment was also 
evident.175 The regime’s crackdown on protesters following the 
reelection of Ahmadinejad in 2009 sparked new concerns over the 
state of human rights in Iran, both in Europe and throughout the 
world, helping to intensify the successes of multilateral sanctions.176 
With the world signed on to sanctions policies, Ahmadinejad’s second 
term was marked by a gradual strengthening of the sanctions regime 
and the ramping up of pressure against the Iranian economy.177 
5. Climax of Sanctions: Rouhani, Obama, & the JCPOA 
By the end of President Ahmadinejad’s second term, the 
international sanctions regime had reached its apex.178 This, combined 
with Ahmadinejad’s disastrous economic policies (including a wave 
of massive corruption scandals in which the President was personally 
implicated) led Supreme Leader Khamenei to step in and sideline 
Ahmadinejad during the last two years of his presidency, usurping his 
control over Iran’s economy.179 The election of President Hassan 
Rouhani in 2013 was premised on a platform promising better 
relations with the world and the reintegration of Iran into the global 
economy.180 This allowed for renewed international negotiations with 
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180. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 492-93; Hamidreza Gholamzadeh, The Rouhani Metre: a Mix of Broken Promises and 
Hope, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.
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Iran, including the dialogue with the Islamic Republic initially 
promised by President Obama during his campaign.181 Starting in 
February 2013, secret negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were 
conducted in Oman, which eventually resulted in the preliminary and 
non-binding Joint Plan of Action (“JPA”) of November 24, 2013.182 
The deal promised a six-month pause in the development of Iran’s 
nuclear program, in exchange for limited sanctions relief and the 
release of unspecified frozen assets.183 During this six-month window, 
both sides made a further voluntary commitment to resume 
negotiation efforts in hopes of reaching a final nuclear deal.184 After 
numerous deadline extensions, Iran and the P5+1 finally reached a 
framework agreement in Lausanne on April 2, 2015, which was 
finalized in the JCPOA on July 14, 2015.185 Six days later, the UN 
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REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 475 (evaluating Iran’s economy at the outset of Rouhani’s 
presidency). Iran’s reliance on barter stemmed from the nation’s inability to access foreign 
currency transactions, including energy commodity sales denoted in petrodollars. Such barter 
transactions had painful destabilizing consequences, such as the sudden influx of cheap 
Chinese goods into Iran’s economy. See id. at 359; Christopher Harmer, Iranian Efforts to 
Bypass Oil Sanctions, INST. STUD OF WAR (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.
understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_IranSanctions.pdf (surveying the costs 
of Iranian barter transactions). 
182. See Joint Plan of Action, Iran-P5+1, Nov. 24, 2013, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/
spi/iran/jcpoa/index.htm [hereinafter JPA]; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, 
at 109; Arshad Mohammed & Parisa Hafezi, U.S., Iran Held Secret Talks on March to Nuclear 
Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-bilateral-id
USBRE9AN0FB20131124 (describing the negotiating process up to the JPA). 
183. See JPA, supra note 182; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110 
(summarizing the JPA). 
184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
185. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran-P5+1, July 14, 2015, https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/2165399/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf [hereinafter 
JCPOA]; see also Kelsey Davenport, Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, ARMS 
CONTROL ASSOC. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-
Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran (providing a helpful timeline of the JCPOA negotiating 
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Security Council unanimously approved Security Council Resolution 
2231, making the JCPOA binding international law and—at least 
officially—drawing a conclusion to the international sanctions regime 
targeting Iran’s nuclear program.186 
The above traces a broad trajectory of the sanctions regime’s 
development, from the era preceding it through its unwinding with the 
formation of JCPOA.187 In such broad brushstrokes, this history 
mirrors that of wider US-Iran relations.188 Upon closer inspection, it 
becomes clear that as a matter of policy, US sanctions targeting Iran 
were often misaligned with the economic and political developments 
within domestic Iranian history.189 Whatever might be said for missed 
opportunities, this history set the operating parameters that steered the 
behavior of the United States, Iran, and a broad class of international 
investors.190 
For international investors in particular, however, the rules and 
regulations that made up the sanctions regime were of equal 
importance to these historical trends.191 To truly understand today’s 
international investment landscape in Iran, one should look also to the 
evolution of the legal framework that actually comprised the 
sanctions regime.192 This legal framework is the focus of the next 
Part.193 
B. Legal Framework of the Iran Sanctions Regime 
The sanctions regime targeting Iran has been described as 
“arguably the most complex the United States and the international 
                                                                                                             
process); Jonathan Tirone et al., Iran Nuclear Talks on Verge of Another Missed Deadline, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-06/
iran-nuclear-talks-on-verge-of-another-missed-deadline-in-vienna (noting the JPA’s series of 
deadline extensions). 
186. See S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); see also IRAN: 2015 COUNTRY REV., supra note 
168, at 308; Colum Lynch & John Hudson, Obama Turns to U.N. to Outmaneuver Congress, 
FOREIGN POL'Y (July 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/15/obama-turns-to-u-n-to-
outmaneuver-congress-iran-nuclear-deal/ (explaining how Security Council adoption makes 
the deal binding). 
187. See supra notes 33-186 and accompanying text (summarizing the history of the 
sanctions regime, and wider US-Iran relations). 
188. See id. 
189. Cf. id. 
190. See id. 
191. See infra Part I.B. 
192. See id. 
193. See id. 
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community have ever imposed on a rogue State.”194 Because the 
gradual expansion of these restrictions was comprised of a cumulative 
network of laws, executive orders, and other administrative actions, 
spanning over nearly four decades, a comprehensive review of the 
entire sanctions regime is not realistic, nor especially helpful. 
However, a limited review of key sanctions developments in both the 
United States and the international community provides a sufficient 
glimpse at how the sanctions regime advanced through the decades. 
In examining the expansive restrictions faced by investors seeking to 
operate in Iran over time, the magnitude of changes represented by 
the JCPOA becomes evident.195 
1. The US Sanctions Regime Targeting Iran 
For the majority of the sanctions regime, the United States was 
essentially alone in placing trade and investment restrictions against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.196 First adopted by President Carter as a 
direct response to the US Embassy hostage crisis, the proliferation of 
the US sanctions regime has progressed through phases of various 
justifications.197 Given this diversity of rationale, it is no surprise that 
the application of US sanctions has been at times inconsistent.198 Such 
inconsistencies, combined with the cumulative nature of US unilateral 
                                                                                                             
194. DIANNE RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43311, IRAN: US ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS AND THE AUTHORITY TO LIFT RESTRICTIONS 1 (2015); cf. Bhala, supra note 27, at 
254 (“ . . . American trade rules against Iran are complex. Navigating them is not for the faint-
hearted, but doing so is essential in the everyday practice of international trade law around the 
globe. The sanctions cover not only trade in goods and services, but also foreign direct 
investment, transportation, banking, securities, and insurance”). 
195. See infra Parts I.B.1-2. 
196. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing US disagreements with allies 
over Iran sanctions). 
197. See RENNACK, supra note 194, at Summary (“ . . . in an effort to change the 
government of that country’s support of acts of international terrorism, poor human rights 
record, weapons and missile development and acquisition, role in regional instability, and 
development of a nuclear program”); Clawson, supra note 27, at 116-17 (listing the various 
rationales for sanctions). 
198. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (“ . . . analysts and policymakers do not agree 
about how to use unilateral U.S. sanctions to help achieve [US] goals”); Bhala, supra note 27, 
at 255-56 (“ . . . they were not systematic or seamless from inception. Instead, they were a 
confusing array of haphazard measures, mostly targeted at the Iranian energy sector, but with 
plenty of gaps that later needed plugging”). 
876 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 
efforts, make disentangling the US sanctions regime especially 
difficult.199 
To start, the primary bulk of US sanctions against Iran are 
domestically authorized under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act of 1977.200 Under the IEEPA, the President is given broad 
economic coercive powers to deal with “any unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national 
emergency with respect to such threat.”201 The President delegates 
IEEPA authority to the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”) to 
administer these decisions.202 As a subdivision of the US Department 
of the Treasury, OFAC is “entrusted with considerable policy, 
enforcement, and regulatory operational responsibilities.”203 By 
working with other branches of US foreign policy agencies, as well as 
with federal law enforcement, OFAC is the primary developer, 
                                                                                                             
199. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 264 (“[i]n reviewing [US sanctions], it is important to 
note, as a practical matter, that all the sanctions apply. That is, the evolution is cumulative: one 
set of sanctions does not substitute another, but rather supplements all previous sanctions.”); 
Kenneth Katzman, Easing US Sanctions on Iran, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 1-8 (June 2014), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Easing_US_Sanctions_on_Iran.pdf 
[hereinafter Katzman, Easing US Sanctions] (parsing out the sanctions regime’s complex 
interplay between legislative and executive authority). 
200. See generally International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1708 (2012). As a matter of background, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”) was an attempt to reinstate some of the executive coercive powers that had been 
originally contained in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (“TWEA”), but later stripped 
by the National Emergency Act of 1976. See Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 
1-44 (2012); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2015); see also Kian Arash 
Meshkat, The Burden of Economic Sanctions on Iranian-Americans, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 915, 
918-22 (2013) (providing an overview of the history of US sanctioning authority). An 
additional source of sanctioning authority exists under the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (“ISDCA”), under more specific criteria. See 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); 
see also Meshkat, supra, at 922 (discussing the ISDCA as a basis for sanctions). 
201. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012). For the sanctioning powers granted to the President, 
see § 1702; see also Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements in the Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
631, 637-38 (2014) (explaining how the IEEPA works); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 
564, 576 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding these IEEPA powers to be constitutional). 
202. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
203. Meshkat, supra note 200, at 926; see also Basic Information on OFAC and 
Sanctions, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx#basic (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016) (stating OFAC’s role in the administration and enforcement of sanctions). 
2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 877 
implementer, administrator, and enforcer of US sanctions policy.204 
One of OFAC’s main roles is to update and administer the Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (“the SDN list”), 
which contains the names of individuals and entities subject to 
sanctions.205 The SDN list provides an important tool for private 
sector actors to ensure that they do not engage in transactions with 
Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”), which would violate 
sanctions.206 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
President’s IEEPA powers were expanded by a series of 
developments that provided additional tools to OFAC’s arsenal.207 
First, Executive Order 13224, originally meant to target Al Qaeda, 
applied to any actors “who commit, threaten to commit, or support 
terrorism,” effectively declaring such terrorist movements to be an 
ongoing “unusual and extraordinary threat” subject to IEEPA 
sanctions.208 This provided streamlined authority to classify these 
entities as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGTs”), a 
sub-branch of SDNs subject to immediate blocking and asset 
seizure.209 Importantly, the SDGT designation also immediately 
blocks or freezes any US-based assets that engage with such 
designated entities, and may attach civil or criminal liability for any 
                                                                                                             
204. See Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions, supra note 203; Meshkat, supra 
note 200, at 927-30 (providing an overview on OFAC’s role within US sanctions policy). 
205. See Barry E. Carter & Ryan Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial 
Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 905 (2013) (explaining 
OFAC’s responsibilities concerning the SDN list). 
206. See id. 
207. See id. at 903; see also infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text. 
208. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, supra note 146; see also MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459 (explaining the 
evolution of Executive Order 13224’s application toward Al Qaeda to its application toward 
nation-states like Iran). 
209. See Kindhearts v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“The 
[USA PATRIOT Act] permitted the Treasury Secretary to impose all the blocking effects of a 
designation, including freezing an organization’s assets indefinitely and criminalizing all its 
transactions, without designating the organization a SDGT. The Treasury only needs to assert 
that it is investigating whether the entity should be designated.”); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459 (looking at the impact of 
Executive Order 13224 and the USA PATRIOT Act); Foreign Terrorist Organization 
Designation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2010/09/146554.htm (explaining the significance of SDGT designation). 
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transactions that violate these automatic prohibitions.210 This would 
later be used in 2005 as the model for Executive Order 13382, which 
applied the same treatment to proliferators of weapons of mass 
destruction and their supporters.211 
The other powerful tool provided to OFAC following 9/11 
arrived with the passing of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”).212 Title III of the 
USA PATRIOT Act contains a number of instruments to enhance US 
anti-money laundering (“AML”) and counter terrorist financing 
(“CTF”) efforts.213 Specifically, Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act authorizes the US Secretary of the Treasury to designate specific 
entities or jurisdictions as “primary money laundering concerns.”214 
Such classification subjects entities to potentially severe penalties: 
“the institution may be prohibited from maintaining correspondent 
accounts with U.S. financial institutions, thereby cutting off access to 
U.S. dollar payment systems and business in the United States 
generally.”215 Furthermore, Section 319 (a) of the USA PATRIOT 
Act also contains an enhanced jurisdictional mechanism, which 
effectively extends US seizure power over non-US financial 
institutions holding any assets under US jurisdiction.216 By employing 
a legal fiction that deems funds deposited in a non-US account to be 
pooled with funds in US accounts, authorities are empowered to seize 
                                                                                                             
210. See Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation, supra note 209; MALONEY, 
IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459-61 (assessing the 
consequences of SDGT designation). 
211. See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R 38,567 (2005); Ari Kattan, Fact Sheet: Iran 
Sanctions, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://arms
controlcenter.org/fact-sheet-iran-sanctions/ (summarizing Executive Order 13382). 
212. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of the United States Code); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 459; Levitt, Financial 
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 126 (clarifying OFAC’s post-9/11 authority). 
213. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 301-77. 
214. See USA PATRIOT Act § 311; see also Carter & Farha, supra note 205, at 910; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 311 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1056.aspx (providing an overview of section 311). 
215. Carter & Farha, supra note 205, at 910. 
216. See GRAVES, supra note 125, at 9; Michael Gruson, The U.S. Jurisdiction Over 
Transfers of U.S. Dollars Between Foreigners and Ownership of U.S. Dollar Accounts in 
Foreign Banks, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 721, 747-48 (2004) (explaining section 319(a) of 
the USA PATRIOT Act). 
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an entity’s assets in the United States, even if such assets are entirely 
unrelated to those suspected of violating US sanctions policy 
overseas.217 
As the US-Iran sanctions regime evolved over time, this 
extraterritorial dimension of OFAC’s sanctioning policies grew 
considerable teeth against the Islamic Republic.218 By specifically 
targeting international financial institutions, OFAC essentially forced 
the global banking system to choose between conducting transactions 
with the United States or with Iran.219 Because the mere causation of a 
prohibited transaction was all that was required to trigger sanctions, 
an institution beyond US jurisdiction could be subject to penalties for 
transactions as mundane as “dollar clearing” within US jurisdiction.220 
This authorized OFAC to freeze such currency exchanges and seize 
whatever assets might be however remotely entangled within US 
jurisdiction.221 Such financial sanctions had the effect of closing the 
so-called “U-turn transaction” loophole, which had previously 
allowed foreign firms engaging in prohibited transactions to indirectly 
reach US clearing banks and payable-through accounts, via third-
party banks or financial institutions, without triggering sanctions.222 
                                                                                                             
217. See GRAVES, supra note 125, at 9; Gruson, supra note 216, at 747-48 (noting 
section 319(a)’s reliance on a legal fiction). 
218. See generally infra notes 219-85 and accompanying text. 
219. See Xian, supra note 201, at 638 (“given the complexities of foreign financial 
institutions, foreign banks that cause their U.S.-based branch to violate OFAC prohibitions are 
subject to punishment.”); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, 
supra note 28, at 462 (“[o]ver time, the Bush measures began to achieve precisely what 
previous authors of sanctions legislation had sought but largely failed to do: to present firms 
from all over the world with a choice of trading with Iran or with the United States.”). 
220. Dollar clearing involves overseas transactions in a foreign currency that 
momentarily enter US jurisdiction (usually via correspondent banking) in order to facilitate 
payments converted into US dollars. See generally Michael Gruson, supra note 216, at 724-31; 
Andrew Johnson, 5 Things on Dollar Clearing and BNP Paribas, WALL STREET J. BLOG 
(June 30, 2014, 4:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/30/5-things-on-dollar-clearing-
and-bnp-paribas/. 
221. See Xian, supra note 201, at 641-42 (discussing the extraterritoriality of OFAC’s 
financial sanctions); id. at 638 (“[m]oreover, parties are not excluded from IEEPA just because 
their co-conspirators do not fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. If at least 
some physical component of their property, whether it is computer equipment or actual cash, is 
stored in the United States, a defendant may still be liable for conspiring to defraud the United 
States.”); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra 
note 28, at 461. For an explanation of U-turn transactions, see supra note 147. 
222. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 461 (“[OFAC’s revised prohibitions] extended to the exceptionally tangential contacts 
that characterize the movement of capital in the modern international financial system, 
including what are referred to as ‘U-turn’ transactions, which entail only indirect interaction 
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Because of the global reach of the US financial system, the closing of 
the U-turn loophole made it almost impossible for Iran to 
internationally finance any activities OFAC deemed sanctionable.223 
Finally, as one last background matter, both the US President 
and OFAC are provided some degree of waiver power under the 
foundational sanctioning authorities like the IEEPA.224 In the case of 
US-Iran sanctions, this waiver authority is complicated by cumulative 
waves of congressional legislation that have imposed additional 
requirements upon the lifting of sanctions.225 These restrictions 
operate by forcing the President or OFAC to report certain findings to 
Congress, such as the determination that relaxing sanctions will be in 
the national interest of the United States.226 While it is not yet 
established whether Congress may legally oppose the President’s 
determinations and stop the relaxation of sanctions, such 
determination requirements are primarily focused on forcing political 
pressure upon the executive branch.227 At the same time, much of 
Congress’ Iran sanctions legislation is also populated with sunset 
clauses, which, if not renewed, would eventually force the expiration 
                                                                                                             
involving a third-party bank or financial institution.”); Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra note 
147, at 124 (“[The U-turn loophole previously] applied as long as no U.S. bank directly 
debited or credited an account of an Iranian party.”). 
223. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 461. This was particularly powerful given that oil—Iran’s primary revenue source—
trades on international markets in US-denominated petrodollars. See id.; Levitt, Financial 
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 124 (emphasizing the efficacy of Washington’s financial 
coercion). 
224. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(1) (2012) (“[IEEPA sanctions] may continue to be so 
exercised to prohibit transactions involving that property if the President determines that the 
continuation of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims 
involving such country or its nationals.”) (emphasis added); see also RENNACK, supra note 
194, at 4 (“[i]n the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic 
sanctions regime on Iran, the President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and 
relax restrictions.”). 
225. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text. See generally Katzman, Easing US 
Sanctions, supra note 199 (clarifying legislative barriers to sanctions suspension/termination). 
226. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 1245(d)(4)(D), 125 Stat. 1,298 (2012) (containing determination requirements for 
waiving sanctions on financial institutions); see also Larry Hannauer, The Days After a Deal 
With Iran: Congress’s Role in Implementing a Nuclear Agreement, RAND CORP. (2015), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE139.html. 
227. See generally Hannauer, supra note 226; Katzman, Easing US Sanctions, supra 
note 199 (exploring the balance between executive and legislative authority in lifting or 
waiving Iran sanctions). For example, if the President wanted to lift sanctions against a 
terrorist organization, being forced to justify this decision before Congress would likely prove 
too politically controversial to carry out such an action. See Hannauer, supra, at 8. 
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of sanctions.228 Likewise, there is the question of whether US 
domestic courts would actually consent to review challenges related 
to Presidential waiver actions, which theoretically might fall under the 
Political Question Doctrine.229 Finally, OFAC is also authorized to 
issue and monitor licenses that allow a firm’s engagement in 
otherwise prohibited transactions, which could be used and renewed 
indefinitely to circumvent sanctions.230 
Turning more directly to US sanctions targeting Iran, President 
Carter’s initial asset freeze following the US Embassy seizure in 1979 
under Executive Order 12170 was the first example of any 
presidential invocation of IEEPA powers.231 The start of the modern 
sanctions regime under President Clinton’s Executive Orders 12957 
and 12959 were also “pure” IEEPA actions.232 Since declaring a US 
“state of emergency” vis-à-vis Iran under the IEEPA in Executive 
Order 12957, Washington has annually renewed this emergency 
classification.233 As a direct response to the Conoco debacle, 
Executive Order 12957 prohibited US firms from participating in the 
                                                                                                             
228. See Hannauer, supra note 226, at 5; KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 17 (2015) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS] (evaluating 
sanction sunset provisions). 
229. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 274 (“[p]resumably, a court might decline jurisdiction 
under the political question doctrine . . . ”); cf. Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certifications in 
U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 217, 255-57 (1999) (exploring 
the Political Question Doctrine within the analogous subject matter of Presidential 
certifications). The Political Question Doctrine refers to the refusal of US federal courts to 
adjudicate political controversies that should be best left to the executive or legislative 
branches. See generally JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43834, THE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE: JUSTICIABILITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2014); Louis 
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
441 (2004). That said, in today’s polarized environment of partisan politics in every branch of 
the United States Government, declining jurisdiction here seems especially unlikely. 
230. See Meshkat, supra note 200, at 928 (explaining OFAC’s general and specific 
licenses); Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions, supra note 203 (further clarifying 
OFAC’s licensing authority). Indeed, such OFAC licenses play an important role within the 
schema of the JCPOA, presumably allowing the foreign subsidiaries of US firms to indirectly 
access Iran. See infra note 438 and accompanying text. 
231. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Jan. 19, 1981); Meshkat, supra 
note 200, at 922-23 (pointing out that Executive Order 12170 was the first invocation of 
IEEPA powers). 
232. See Exec. Order No. 12,957, supra note 120; Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 
121; see also Meshkat, supra note 200, at 924 (recognizing the Clinton orders’ reliance on 
IEEPA powers). 
233. See Katzman, Easing US Sanctions, supra note 199, at 2 (“President Bill Clinton 
declared a ‘state of emergency’ with respect to Iran in March 1995, and that declaration has 
been renewed each year since.”); Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2443. 
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development or investment in Iranian projects related to the State’s 
petroleum sector.234 This was reinforced by Executive Order 12959, 
which placed a US trade embargo on Iran and further sought to 
sanction foreign firms from facilitating sensitive US goods and 
technologies to Iran.235 
One of the most significant milestones of the sanctions regime 
came with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, which marked a 
shift from unadulterated IEEPA-based executive authority to the 
legislative authority of Congress.236 The stated targets of the ILSA 
were similar to the previous executive sanctions, seeking to target 
investment in Iran’s petroleum sector and to block sensitive weapons 
technologies from reaching the Islamic Republic.237 In effect, the 
ILSA served as a baseline for various future legislative sanctions, 
which tweaked US sanction levers by amending provisions and 
adding additional layers to this original law.238 The ILSA was also 
aspirationally multilateral, seeking to impose sanctions on “foreign 
persons” investing more than US$40 million in Iran’s energy 
sector.239 
In terms of mechanics, the ILSA worked by forcing the 
President to impose at least two options from a menu of six different 
sanctioning methods upon entities that violated the ILSA’s triggering 
thresholds.240 These options included: limitations on US Export-
Import Bank assistance; export sanctions prohibiting the licensing or 
granting of permission to export goods or services to any sanctioned 
                                                                                                             
234. See Exec. Order 12,957, supra note 120; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2443-44 
(discussing Executive Order 12957 and the Conoco episode). 
235. See Exec. Order No. 12,959, supra note 121; Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2444 
(elucidating on further measures under Executive Order 12959). 
236. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 
(1996); see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 267 (describing the shift of sanctions policies from 
the executive branch to the legislative branch). 
237. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 268; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 453 (addressing the purpose of the ILSA). 
238. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 265 (“Overall, Congress strengthened the baseline 
1996 statute no fewer than six times. . . . ”); Clawson, supra note 27, at 166 (outlining the 
subsequent modifications of the ILSA). 
239. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 166; Bhala, supra note 27, at 269 (identifying the 
multilateral ambitions of the ILSA). The law also required various presidential reporting 
mechanisms related to the White House’s efforts to spread Iran sanctioning policies at the 
international level. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§ 
10(a)(1) and 4(e), 110 Stat. 1541 (1996). 
240. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 5(a); Bhala, supra note 27, at 272 (analyzing the 
ILSA sanctioning “menu”). 
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person; restrictions against non-humanitarian loans from US lenders; 
blocking violators from dealing in US government debt instruments 
or serving as a repository of US government funds; blocking violators 
from contracting with the US government; and finally, any additional 
sanctions under the original executive sanctioning authority of the 
IEEPA.241 The ILSA also sought to partially constrain the President’s 
waiver authority, requiring that waivers satisfy two criteria when 
terminating Iran’s liability: the determination that Iran has ceased 
efforts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological, and missile 
technologies; and the determination that Iran is no longer supporting 
acts of international terrorism.242 Along similar lines, the ILSA also 
provided incentivizing waivers for US allies and other third parties, 
which allowed for sanction non-enforcement toward citizens of 
governments that agreed to join Washington’s sanctioning efforts.243 
The ILSA also contained a five-year sunset clause, which was 
originally set to expire on August 5, 2001.244 
By 1997, almost all US investment was banned from reaching 
Iran, and Washington was often clashing with European allies who 
continued to maintain significant business relationships with Iran 
despite US sanctioning policy.245 During the height of Khatami’s 
reform efforts, Congress pushed for further sanctions in the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which authorized the President to 
impose additional sanctions on non-US persons identified as passing 
various nuclear, missile, and dual-use goods or technologies to 
Iran.246 This legislation also forced the President to provide written 
justification for not applying measures to sanctionable entities, and 
                                                                                                             
241. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act §§ 6(1)-(6) (listing sanctions options); Bhala, 
supra note 27, at 272-74 (providing an overview of these different sanctions options). 
242. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 8(a); Bhala, supra note 27, at 275 (observing 
the ILSA’s waiver restrictions). 
243. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 4(c)(1). 
244. See id. § 13(b); Bhala, supra note 27, at 278 (noting the ILSA sunset clause). 
245. See Anderson, Good Grief!, supra note 47, at 134 (discussing the end of US 
investment in Iran); MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra 
note 28, at 454 (detailing the strain on US-European relationships in the aftermath of the 
ILSA). 
246. See Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000). 
More specifically, see id. § 2(a) (providing categories of transactions triggering sanctions); id. 
§ 3(b) (listing sanctioning measures). 
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aimed at targeting Russia for its role in proliferating sensitive 
technologies to Iran.247 
Before the expiration of the ILSA, Congress extended its 
lifespan for another five years with the ILSA Extension Act of 
2001.248 In addition to renewing the ILSA, this legislation also further 
entrenched the US sanctions regime with both a reduced triggering 
threshold (from US$40 million transactions to US$20 million 
transactions), as well as more intensely amending the President’s 
reporting obligations.249 In particular, the President was now required 
to report to Congress the extent to which sanctions were achieving 
their goals, the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and, most 
interestingly, the impact of sanctions on other US national security, 
economic, and foreign policy interests, “including relations with 
countries friendly to the United States, and on the United States 
economy.”250 In effect, within the intense lobbying environment that 
fostered the sanctions regime, these stipulations on relations with 
countries friendly to the United States “allowed for sanctions to be 
evaluated according to Israeli and Gulf Arab interests,” even while 
the effects of sanctions on Washington’s more strategic European 
partnerships went disregarded by Congress.251 As highlighted above, 
2001 also saw the President’s signing of Executive Order 13224, 
which, although premised on post-9/11 counterterrorism efforts, 
would later prove to be a powerful measure against the government of 
Iran.252 
The next significant intensification of the US sanctions regime 
followed the reinstatement of Iran’s nuclear program, with the Iran 
Freedom Support Act of 2006 (“IFSA”).253 Notably, the IFSA 
                                                                                                             
247. See id. § 4 (detailing procedures for non-application of sanctions); id. § 6 (limiting 
US participation in Russia’s space program unless Iran-related conditions are met). 
248. See ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 115 Stat 199 (2001). 
249. See id. § 2(a) (reducing the sanctionable triggering threshold); id. § 3 (updating the 
President’s reporting requirements). 
250. Id. § 3(b); see Bhala, supra note 27, at 278 (assessing the significance of this 
statutory language). 
251.  Bhala, supra note 27, at 278-79; see supra note 125 (illustrating the US sanction 
regime’s alienation of the United States’ European allies). 
252. See supra note 208 and accompanying text; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 461 (stipulating the importance of 
Bush’s post-9/11 expansions of executive sanctioning power). 
253. See Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006); 
see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 280-83 (providing an overview of the Iran Freedom Support 
Act (“IFSA”)). 
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dropped Libya from the ILSA, renaming it the Iran Sanctions Act, 
and extended its provisions for another five years until 2011.254 The 
IFSA also added heightened stipulations for the termination of 
sanctions against Iran, requiring the President to report that Iran 
“poses no significant threat to United States national security, interest, 
or allies” in order for ILSA sanctions to be lifted.255 
The sanctions regime entered a new chapter with the passing of 
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010.256 Citing numerous Congressional findings—Iran’s 
ongoing nuclear program, the threat to the safety of Israel, human 
rights in Iran, and so on—CISADA attempted to aggressively expand 
the sanctions originally imposed on Iran by the ILSA.257 In particular, 
economic sanctions were broadened to resemble a complete embargo 
on the US importation of Iranian goods, as well as the complete 
prohibition of non-humanitarian US goods from even indirectly 
reaching Iran.258 Similarly, sanctions on the development of Iran’s 
petroleum sector were broadened to specifically target Iran’s access to 
refined gasoline.259 Bans on transfers of goods, services, technologies, 
or information that might contribute toward Iran’s ability to refine 
petroleum included a lowered triggering threshold of just US$1 
                                                                                                             
254. See Iran Freedom Support Act § 205 (dropping all ILSA Libya provisions); id. § 
204 (extending the ILSA’s sunset provision to December 31, 2011). 
255. See id. § 203(3). This provision provided further entanglement of US-Iran policy 
vis-à-vis Israel. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 282-83 (“[i]n sum, the third criterion for 
termination of sanctions added by IFSA nearly sub-contracted American policy on Iran to 
Israel. As a practical matter, given the overwhelming influence of Israel through the American 
Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in Congress, it would be difficult to get sanctions 
lifted without Israeli support—and that support looked well nigh impossible.”); Press Release, 
AIPAC, AIPAC Applauds the House Passage of H.R. 282, The Iran Freedom Support Act 
(Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.aipac.org/~/media/Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/Press/
AIPAC%20Statements/2006/04/IFSA_House_Passage.pdf (AIPAC’s celebrating the passing 
of IFSA). 
256. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010). 
257. See id. § 2 (listing Congressional findings justifying enhanced sanctions against 
Iran); Bhala, supra note 27, at 285 (“CISADA ‘expanded significantly’ the original ILSA 
sanctions.”). 
258. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 103 
(providing expanded economic sanctions); Bhala, supra note 27, at 286-87 (overviewing 
CISADA’s trade intensifications). 
259. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1) 
(amending previous ILSA petroleum sanctions); Bhala, supra note 27, at 288-92 (detailing 
measures to restrict Iran’s access to refined petroleum). 
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million valued transactions.260 Meanwhile, restrictions were further 
imposed against exporting refined petroleum to Iran, including 
restrictions on shipping and insurance underwriting that might be 
used in relation to Iran’s import of refined petroleum.261 
CISADA also required US financial institutions to report to 
OFAC any assets falling within the President’s freezing authority 
under the IEEPA, specifically mentioning the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard as an entity possessing freezable assets.262 Likewise, non-US 
financial institutions were cut off from accessing the US financial 
industry if found to have engaged in prohibited transactions 
concerning Iran.263 Any domestic financial institution maintaining a 
US correspondent account or payable-through account on behalf of a 
non-US financial institution was also subject to enhanced reporting 
requirements involving transactions with Iran.264 The effects of 
CISADA’s financial sanctions were dramatic, eventually persuading 
more than 80 international financial institutions to cut ties with 
Iran.265 
Enacted in the aftermath of President Ahmadinejad’s contested 
reelection of 2009, CISADA also included a new category of 
sanctions related to human rights violators in Iran.266 Targeting 
individual human rights violators, these sanctions allowed for new 
categories of individualized sanctions, such as the blocking of visas to 
                                                                                                             
260. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1) 
(amending ILSA § 5(a) to include measures targeting Iran’s refining capabilities at § (a)(2)); 
see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 288-92 (outlining these changes). 
261. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 102(a)(1) 
(amending ILSA § 5(a) to include measures targeting Iran’s ability to import refined 
petroleum, as well as sanctions upon shipping and insurance underwriting at § (a)(3)). 
262. See id. § 103(b)(3); Bhala, supra note 27, at 292-93 (overviewing the updated 
financial reporting requirements). 
263. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 104 
(targeting foreign financial institutions involved in Iran). For many banks, the loss of 
correspondent banking and US dollar clearing services within the US banking system would 
have meant an impossibility of conducting transactions in dollars. See Johnson, supra note 
220;  Cynthia O’Murchu et al., Standard Chartered: The Iranian Connection, CNBC (Sept. 
21, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/standard-chartered-the-iranian-connect
ion.html. 
264. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 104(e) 
(adding new reporting requirements). 
265. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 466 (noting CISADA’s fallout on the world banking industry); cf. KATZMAN, IRAN 
SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 26-27 (stating  CISADA’s impact on Iranian banks).  
266. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 105 
(adopting human rights sanctions). 
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enter the United States.267 Finally, CISADA further expanded the 
ILSA by adding three new measures to the “menu” of sanctions 
discussed above, including: foreign exchange sanctions; banking 
transaction sanctions; and property transaction sanctions.268 If a 
sanctioned entity was found to have “any interest” in transactions 
occurring in these categories, and such transactions were within US 
jurisdiction, then the President could select these sanctions to block 
them.269 Furthermore, whereas under previous legislation the 
President was required to deal with violators by selecting two of the 
six sanctions measures, CISADA now required the President to apply 
at least three of the nine sanction options.270 
With pressure mounting on Iran under the Obama 
Administration and with multilateral sanctions also proliferating, 
2012 brought three additional US congressional measures aimed at 
perfecting the US sanctions regime.271 First, within the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“2012 Defense 
Act”), crippling additional sanctions were imposed on Iran’s financial 
sector.272 Specifically, Congress designated Iran as a “primary money 
laundering concern,” which allowed for special monitoring measures 
and the triggering of money laundering provisions of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001.273 By including Iran’s Central Bank among 
the institutions falling under US sanctions, the 2012 Defense Act 
broadened sanctions against Iran’s energy sector to include basically 
all sectors coming into contact with Iranian finance.274 
                                                                                                             
267. See id. § 105(c) (describing sanctions against human rights violators). 
268. See id. § 102(b)(2)(B) (amending the ILSA to include these new sanctions). 
269. See id.; Bhala, supra note 27, at 295-97 (exploring these new sanction measures). 
270. See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act § 
102(a)(2)(C); Bhala, supra note 27, at 294 (“the 2010 legislation expanded the ILSA list of 
sanctions from six to nine and increased the number of sanctions the President had to impose 
from at least two to three.”). 
271. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
125 Stat. 1,298 (2012); Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1,214 (2012); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2,004 (2012). 
272. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245. 
273. See id. § 1245 (creating measures against such designated entities); 31 U.S.C. § 
5318A (2012) (containing the USA PATRIOT Act’s § 311 money laundering provisions); see 
also Bhala, supra note 27, at 300 (explaining the designation process); Levitt, Financial 
Sanctions, supra note 147, at 126 (noting the impact of § 311 measures). 
274. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 305 (“[o]f significance was that the prohibition vastly 
expanded the architecture of measures against Iran from the energy sector to all sectors. 
Whether payments were made in connection with petroleum or petroleum products did not 
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In August of 2012, Congress further enacted the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”), 
which provided for enhanced enforcement and gap-filling measures to 
address the shortcomings of the existing sanctions regime.275 In 
addition to strengthening each of the various sanctions categories 
discussed above, the ITRSHRA placed increased emphasis on the 
human rights situation in Iran and the government’s censorship 
efforts.276 The targeting of Iran’s financial sector was also 
supplemented with sanctions against any party that knowingly 
“purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance of” Iranian 
sovereign debt.277 Additionally, the ITRSHRA created three more 
options within the ILSA’s “menu” of sanctions, including: equity or 
debt investment sanctions; corporate officer exclusion sanctions; and 
principle executive officer sanctions.278 Under the equity or debt 
investment sanctions, the US President was given the authority to 
block any US person’s investment participation in a sanctioned entity, 
such as an international bank determined to have violated US 
restrictions.279 Likewise, the corporate officer sanction allowed the 
President to block any officers of a sanctioned entity from entering 
the United States, while the principal executive officers sanction 
permitted the President to impose any of the approved sanctioning 
measures on officers of a sanctioned entity.280 Like previous upshifts 
in the US sanctions regime, the ITRSHRA also increased the number 
of sanctions the President was required to impose on a violator, 
jumping from three out of nine to five out of twelve measures.281 
                                                                                                             
matter . . . ”); Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra note 147, at 124 (indicating the power of 
these financial measures). 
275. See generally Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1,214 (2012); Bhala, supra note 27, at 312-13 (“[s]uccinctly put, 
America dubbed more activities with Iran illegal, closed loopholes to behavior it previously 
identified as unlawful, set additional sanctions for transgressions, and increased the difficulty 
of obtaining a waiver of penalties.”). 
276. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 402 (imposing sanctions 
based on the transfer of goods or technologies likely to be used to commit human rights 
abuses); see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 332-34 (discussing ITRSHRA’s human rights 
amendments to CISADA). 
277. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 213; Bhala, supra note 
27, at 328-29 (commenting on ITRSHRA’s new sovereign debt restrictions). 
278. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act § 204(a)(2) (amending the 
ILSA to include these three new measures). 
279. See id. (implementing new presidential powers). 
280. See id. (incorporating these new sanctions options). 
281. See id. § 201(2)(A) (amending the previous sanctions menu). 
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Finally, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
(“IFCA”) represents the final substantive US sanctions development 
before the conclusion of the interim Joint Plan of Action between Iran 
and the P5+1.282 Another expansive revision buried in a defense 
appropriations bill, IFCA went even further than the ITRSHRA in 
stressing the importance of Iranian human rights, stating that Iran’s 
human rights situation threatened US interests and incorporating 
various human rights rationales within the very purpose of US 
sanctions.283 IFCA also sought to plug holes in the existing sanctions 
regime by horizontally expanding to new sectors that reinforced 
already prohibited acts.284 Notably, IFCA placed restrictions on: 
Iranian shipping and shipbuilding; Iran’s access to precious metals; 
insurance and underwriting for prohibited activities; Iran’s State 
media; and the use of Iranian ports.285 
Representing the high water mark of the US sanctions regime, 
IFCA was the last substantive sanctions action adopted before the 
signing of the JPA and the moratorium on some sanctions.286 
However, as negotiations intensified between Iran and world powers 
on the eve of the JCPOA, Congress also managed to pass one last 
legislative act aimed at increasing its reviewing powers over any final 
nuclear deal.287 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 
added new procedural requirements to the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, specifically concerning the lifting of sanctions that target 
Iran.288 By requiring the President to report to Congress upon the 
conclusion of any final nuclear deal and jump through other 
                                                                                                             
282. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 
Stat. 2,004 (2012); see also Katzman, Easing US Sanctions on Iran, supra note 199, at 12; 
Bhala, supra note 27, at 339 (“[t]he Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 was 
the final legislation against Iran before the November 2013 to January 2014 preliminary 
nuclear agreement.”). 
283. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act §§ 1241-95. On the subject of 
human rights in Iran, IFCA specifically cited government oppression, the people’s struggle for 
democracy, access to information, and government censorship. See id. § 1243(a)-(b). 
284. See infra note 285 and accompanying text. 
285. See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act § 1244 (adding restrictions on 
Iranian shipping); § 1245 (precious metals); § 1246 (insurance and underwriting services); § 
1248 (state broadcasting); § 1252 (Iranian ports). 
286. See supra note 282. 
287. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text. 
288. See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201 
(2015); see also The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2012)). The Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act of 2015 added § 135 to the Atomic Energy Act. 
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procedural hoops, Congress made clear its intent not to be sidestepped 
in the lifting of sanctions.289 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
devised a system where Congress would be given the final say on any 
negotiated agreement modifying the statutory sanctions already 
targeting Iran, while the failure to obtain Congressional approval 
would trigger automatic legislation placing an immediate freeze on 
“any action by the United States Government to facilitate the release 
of funds or assets to Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any 
further waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to such 
agreement.”290 Additionally, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
clarified that even in the event of a nuclear deal breakthrough, 
“United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, 
and ballistic missiles will remain in place . . . .”291 In sum, the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act, like much of the wider US statutory 
sanctions regime, sought to create a tangled legal framework that 
would limit the executive’s ability to terminate sanctions at will.292 
However, because the review procedure devised by the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act still required a veto-proof majority in both 
congressional chambers to actually block the JCPOA, the legislation 
ultimately failed to obstruct the deal with Iran.293 
                                                                                                             
289. In particular, the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act notes, “because the sanctions 
regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that 
regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and 
deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the statutory 
sanctions regime imposed by Congress.” Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(c)(1)(E) (as 
amended). 
290. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(e)(2) (as amended) (containing Congress’ 
automatic legislation in the event of an agreement beyond its approval); see also id. § 
135(c)(2) (creating Congress’ approval mechanism in the event of any negotiated nuclear 
deal); RENNACK, supra note 194, at 3 (providing a broad overview of the Congressional 
approval mechanism under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015). 
291. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 135(d)(7)(A) (as amended). 
292. See supra notes 196-291 and accompanying text (tracing the proliferation of the 
Iran sanctions regime). 
293. See Robert Satloff, Clarifying a “No” Vote on the Iran Nuclear Agreement, WASH. 
INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/clarifying-a-no-vote-on-the-iran-nuclear-agreement; Jennifer Steinhauer, Democrats 
Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2015, http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html?_r=0 (recalling the 
workings and failure of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act). 
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2. International Sanctions: Multilateral Resolutions 
There is no question that the United States was the world leader 
in sanctioning Iran, spawning a rich unilateral sanctions regime that 
existed in some form for the majority of four decades.294 However, 
unilateral sanctions—even controversial extraterritorial unilateral 
sanctions—packed little punch in comparison to comprehensive 
multilateral sanctions.295 While even some of Washington’s closest 
allies were hesitant to sanction Iran through much of the US sanctions 
regime, European attitudes soured over the course of the 
Ahmadinejad presidency, especially following the reignition of the 
nation’s nuclear program and the deterioration of Iranian human 
rights in the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s contested reelection.296 
The first truly multilateral resolution concerning Iran occurred as 
a response to its resumption of uranium enrichment in 2005, related to 
the government’s nuclear development program.297 UN Security 
Council Resolution 1696 provided a basis for future rounds of 
multilateral sanctions, promising that the Security Council would 
adopt “appropriate measures” if Iran failed to cease its uranium 
enrichment operations.298 Although Resolution 1696 included no 
sanctions itself, it set a one-month deadline for Iran to comply or be 
subject to further action.299 Such further action came in the form 
Security Council Resolution 1737, passing unanimously in the 
Security Council in late 2006.300 Resolution 1737 advised all UN 
Member States to raise sanctions targeting the transfer of nuclear-
related materials to Iran, including ballistic missile technologies.301 
Additionally, Resolution 1737 demanded Member States freeze the 
                                                                                                             
294. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing US sanctions against Iran). 
295. See generally  Egle, supra note 145 (arguing the inefficacy of unilateral sanctions); 
Clawson, supra note 27, at 116 (questioning whether unilateral sanctions were successful). 
296. See Clawson, supra note 27, at 117; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 349 (asserting the global sanctions consensus by 
late 2010). 
297. See Jason Starr, The U.N. Resolutions, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 119; 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 463 
(identifying the origins of multilateral sanctions against Iran). 
298. See S.C. Res. 1696 (July 31, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (overviewing 
Resolution 1696). 
299. See S.C. Res. 1696; Starr, supra note 297, at 119 (noting Resolution 1696’s one-
month compliance deadline). 
300. See S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (observing the 
adoption of Resolution 1737). 
301. See S.C. Res. 1737; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (explaining Resolution 1737). 
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assets of 22 entities involved in the Iranian nuclear program or the 
IRGC, and urged Member States to limit the travel of anybody 
connected to Iran’s nuclear program.302 Three months later, the 
Security Council followed up with Resolution 1747, another 
unanimous proposal that placed multilateral limitations upon Iran’s 
access to military equipment and purchases.303 In addition to this 
military angle, Security Council Resolution 1747 also targeted Iran’s 
access to international financial institutions, suggesting that States 
limit financial commitments involving Iran to mere humanitarian-
related transactions.304 Additional names and businesses with ties to 
Iran’s nuclear program and/or the IRGC were included on Resolution 
1747’s list of sanctionable entities, and the Resolution further 
stipulated international reporting requirements when any individual 
with ties to Iran’s nuclear program traveled or entered Member State 
territory.305 
Following this first round of multilateral sanctions, there were 
some positive signs that Iran was beginning to comply with its 
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) obligations.306 Still, 
encouraged by the United States and some European allies, the UN 
Security Council further adopted Resolution 1803 in March 2008.307 
While Resolution 1803 was comprised primarily of non-binding 
recommendations, it strongly urged UN Member States to cease any 
involvement with Iranian financial institutions suspected of serving 
Iran’s nuclear program and/or overseas terrorism.308 Fifteen additional 
                                                                                                             
302. See S.C. Res. 1737; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (identifying Resolution 1737’s 
sanction provisions). 
303. See S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (introducing 
Resolution 1747). 
304. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (highlighting the financial 
sanctions within Resolution 1747). 
305. See S.C. Res. 1747; Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (pointing out Resolution 1747’s 
expanded list of sanctioned Iranian entities). 
306. See Starr, supra note 297, at 120 (“ . . . several council members initially questions 
the need for further sanctions against Iran. Libya, South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam were 
especially hesitant to pursue new punitive measures, arguing that Iran had begun to cooperate 
with IAEA inspections.”); Walter Isaacson, A Way Out for Iran’s Nuclear Impassse?, TIME, 
Mar. 14, 2007, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1599725,00.html 
(acknowledging initial hopes for Iranian nuclear compliance). 
307. See S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21 (presenting 
Resolution 1803). 
308. See S.C. Res. 1803; Starr, supra note 297, at 120-21; William Maclean & Andrew 
Quinn, Analysis: Iran Sanctions Push is Test for West Diplomacy, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-sanctions-analysis-idUSTRE80415Q20120105 
(articulating the financial measures of Resolution 1803). 
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entities were subjected to asset freezes, and Member States were 
authorized to seize and inspect any cargo traveling to or from Iran if 
there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that the cargo contained 
previously-banned materials.309 Later that year, the Security Council 
also adopted Resolution 1835, which simply reaffirmed the existing 
multilateral sanctions in light of new evidence related to Iran’s 
ongoing nuclear noncompliance.310 Although the Security Council 
unanimously passed Resolution 1835, growing tensions between 
Washington and Moscow related to further sanctions began to show 
the limitations of the multilateral sanctions regime.311 At the same 
time, however, Iran’s stark noncompliance in the face of both IAEA 
and UN demands helped bring individual European States toward 
adopting their own unilateral measures to target Iran.312 
In response to another major negotiating impasse as well as the 
discovery of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment site at Qom, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1929 in June 2010.313 The 
Resolution demanded that States adopt measures to keep sensitive 
technologies from reaching Iran.314 Likewise, it blocked all Iranian 
commercial access to uranium mining operations and other nuclear 
material production operations outside Iran.315 Further targeted 
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310. See S.C. Res. 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining 
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311. See Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (“[i]n its final U.N. measure on Iran before leaving 
office, the Bush administration was forced to accept a compromise resolution after Russia 
balked at more sanctions.”); Egle, supra note 145, at 45 (noting Russian and other nations’ 
resistance to Washington’s call for intensified sanctions). 
312. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 463 (“the Bush administration began to reap the rewards of a new coordination with 
Europe on Iran, in the form of incipient European and multilateral actions to penalize 
Tehran.”); DINA ESFANDIARY, ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SANCTIONS POLICY: 
IRAN AS A CASE STUDY, 34 EU NON-PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM, 7-10 (December 2013), 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/nonprolif
erationpapers/dinaesfandiary52b41ff5cbaf6.pdf (identifying European unilateral sanctions 
against Iran). 
313. See S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010); Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (introducing 
Resolution 1929); see also Meshkat, supra note 200, at 44 (detailing Iran’s NPT 
noncompliance on the eve of Resolution 1929). 
314. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (explaining Resolution 1929). 
315. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (detailing the further restrictions 
of Resolution 1929). 
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sanctions were aimed at the IRGC, as well as the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”), which was suspected of importing 
goods related to Iran’s nuclear program.316 Perhaps most importantly, 
in light of the simultaneous US efforts under CISADA, Security 
Council Resolution 1929 adopted new sanctions on Iran’s finance 
sector, calling on Member States to block the expansion of Iranian 
banks into their jurisdiction and to require that a State’s domestic 
banks cut all ties to Iran.317 The passage of Resolution 1929 along 
with the United States’ diplomatic resurgence following the election 
of President Obama allowed for even greater proliferation of 
commonly focused unilateral sanctions, which had a major impact on 
Iran’s international image and its domestic economy.318 
In combination with US and other unilateral sanctioning efforts, 
these UN Security Council measures contributed to the most complex 
and aggressive international sanctions regime that the world has ever 
witnessed.319 By the election of President Rouhani in 2013, the 
Islamic Republic was drowning in international coercive pressures.320 
The next Part of this Note will focus on what these pressures actually 
looked like. 
C. The Costs of Sanctioning Iran 
The US and international sanctions regime targeting Iran 
inflicted various costs on Iran and other parties, some of them 
unanticipated.321 As a general matter, these costs may be broken down 
into three categories: economic, political, and humanitarian.322 
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317. See S.C. Res. 1929; Starr, supra note 297, at 121 (emphasizing the importance of 
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318. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
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319. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
320. See infra Part I.C. 
321. See infra Parts I.C.1-3. 
322. See id. 
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Examining these costs in greater detail provides a glimpse at the 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime, along with its shortcomings. 
1. Economic Costs 
As intended, the sanctions regime wreaked havoc on Iran’s 
national economy.323 The Iranian rial has never recovered its value 
preceding the intensification of sanctions under President Clinton’s 
1995 executive orders, and in total, some estimates suggest that the 
overall Iranian economy is twenty-five percent smaller than it would 
have been in the absence of the sanctions regime.324 This economic 
loss has been most severe since the passing of CISADA in 2010 and 
the intensification of multilateral sanctioning efforts, with the Iranian 
State losing an estimated US$133 million daily in revenues 
throughout 2012.325 This period witnessed negative economic growth 
and inflation consistently upwards of thirty percent.326 The Iranian rial 
also plummeted throughout 2012, approximately halving its value and 
dropping as much as fifteen percent on October 1 of that year.327 The 
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IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 470; Anthony 
DiPaola & Isaac Arnsdorf, Iran Loses $133 Million a Day on Embargo, Buoying Obama, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-01/iran-loses-
133-million-a-day-from-sanctions-as-oil-buoys-obama (noting Iran’s daily revenue losses). 
326. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 359; Sabrina M. Peterson, Iran’s Deteriorating Economy: An Analysis of the Economic 
Impact of Western Sanctions, INT’L AFF. REV., http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/428 (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016) (evaluating Iran’s high inflation under sanctions). In fact, US estimates placed 
Iran’s actual inflation rate at approximately 70 percent in 2013. See MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra, at 359; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra 
note 168, at 316. 
327. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 471; Steven Plaut, The Collapse of Iran’s Rial, GATESTONE INST. (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:00 
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additional layer of 2012 sanctions sunk Iran’s economy another ten 
percent by March 2014, compounded by the already staggering harm 
to the State oil sector.328 Whereas Iran had sold its oil to 21 different 
markets prior to 2012, this last wave of sanctions left only six 
international purchasers.329 Some measures show a decline in national 
oil sales from US$100 billion in 2011 to just US$35 billion in 2013, 
while others indicate oil losses of US$1 billion per day after 
Washington’s 2012 sanctions.330 
The sanctions regime also had a devastating impact on 
development in Iran, including the opportunity costs of forsaken 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”), as well as the very real costs of 
international divestment, whereby mounting financial, legal, and 
reputational hazards persuaded non-Iranian firms to exit Iran.331 Iran 
was blacklisted from new World Bank loans since 2005, and was 
denied the benefits of other international economic institutions.332 The 
country’s exclusion from the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications (“SWIFT”) international clearing 
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World, BLOOMBERG (Sep 10, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-
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329. See Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21; Zachary Keck, Asia is Purchasing 
Nearly all of Iran’s Oil, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 05, 2013) (emphasizing the decline of Iranian 
petroleum importing nations). 
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Open for Business: When Sanctions End, Big Oil Will Pounce, NEWSWEEK, 12 (May 8, 2015) 
(estimating Iran’s oil losses to approach US$1 billion daily). 
331. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1; 
Najmeh Bozorgmehr & Monavar Khalaj, Businesses Eye Huge Opportunities in Iran, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/654cbd28-2a2a-11e5-8613-
e7aedbb7bdb7.html#axzz3usB0orCL (mentioning missed FDI opportunities and 
underinvestment under the sanctions regime); see also MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 462; Levitt, Financial Sanctions, supra 
note 147, at 125 (assessing international divestment from Iran). 
332. See Egle, supra note 145, at 44; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE 
THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 458; Clawson, supra note 27, at 115 (noting Iran’s being 
cut off from the World Bank lending). Iran was also prevented from accessing International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”) loans and Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) guarantee dispersals. See Meshkat, supra note 200, at 44-45. 
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system eviscerated Iran’s ability to issue bonds overseas or transfer 
money in or out of the national economy, causing a severe credit 
crunch.333 Meanwhile, Iran’s trade balance declined by approximately 
30.1% from 2010 to 2014, and the State’s increasing reliance on 
barter flooded domestic markets with cheap Chinese goods.334 
Combined, these trends took a major toll on Iran’s private sector.335 
Additionally, smuggling ran rampant throughout the late sanction 
years, with US$25 billion of commodities and consumer goods 
illegally entering the country in 2013, while State-subsidized gasoline 
was illegally exported.336 There were also other problematic economic 
distortions: from the concentration of wealth in the IRGC, to the 
necessity-born development of an entire domestic weapons 
industry.337 
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consumer-goods (considering the consequences of Iran’s resorting to barter). 
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Of course, the sanctions regime also incurred economic costs 
beyond the borders of Iran. Within the United States, economic self-
harm from sanctioning Iran totaled billions of dollars annually.338 
Private US firms were required to develop various reporting 
mechanisms and sanctions compliance systems irrespective of costs, 
and the tangled web of the sanctions regime carried severe penalties 
for noncompliance, with billions of dollars in fines accumulating from 
sometimes-unintentional violators.339 Numerous business sectors also 
faced cumbersome artificial costs, such as US airlines being required 
to shell out millions a year for air traffic control services when flying 
over Iran.340 Additionally, US firms racked up a growing list of 
opportunity costs, sometimes bypassing deals valued in billions of 
dollars and losing such projects to European competitors.341 Despite 
the clear competitive advantage congressionally granted to Europe, 
US companies routinely indicated their desire to open up shop and/or 
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find a way to return to Iran.342 In the end, such proposals were usually 
outweighed by the legality risks that sanctions implied.343 Finally, 
beyond the United States, the sanctions regime inflicted broad and 
obvious damage to global oil supplies as well as global free trade.344 
2. Political Costs 
The sanctions regime also carried numerous political costs, both 
in Iran and elsewhere.345 First, at the outset, it merits recognition that 
sanctions were never inevitable or preordained: rather, sanctioning 
policy was always itself a political choice.346 Furthermore, for the 
United States, adopting such policies often entailed a problematic 
one-way road: while sanctions could be easily made, they could not 
be easily unmade.347 Thus, in employing sanctions toward Iran, there 
was always a real risk of Washington painting itself into a political 
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corner, unable to shift course as circumstances changed.348 Sanctions 
also often had an obfuscating effect on US foreign policy, resulting in 
Washington’s allowing tactical economic pressure to stand in the 
place of actual strategy—whether concerning Iran’s nuclear program 
or other foreign policy issues.349 Such an absence of strategy often led 
to confusing results.350 Thus, while sanctions toward the Islamic 
Republic were usually premised on targeting the Iranian government 
and helping the people of Iran, a Gallup poll from 2013 found that 
forty-seven percent of Iranians blamed the United States for their 
nation’s economic turmoil, against just ten percent who blamed the 
regime in Tehran.351 
Such polling is indicative of a wider political cost of the 
sanctions regime: the “rally around the flag” mentality that resulted 
from sanctions.352 With a history extending back to numerous pre-
Islamic Persian empires, Iranians are often described as a “notoriously 
proud” people.353 To think that they might have surrendered their 
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sovereignty to the economic coercion of foreigners seems somewhat 
disingenuous.354 Ayatollah Khamenei often met Washington’s threats 
with his own nationalist retorts.355 Likewise, US sanctions were often 
used as a scapegoat to undermine the regime’s own genuine 
problems, such as the economic mismanagement under 
Ahmadinejad.356 It is probably also true that sanctions left Iran feeling 
threatened and cornered, a trend hardly constructive toward 
dissuading it from seeking nuclear weapons.357 There is also ample 
evidence to suggest that international coercion undermined moderates 
like President Khatami within Iranian domestic politics.358 
Another political consequence of the sanctions regime has been 
the gradual empowerment of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which has 
played an increasing role in Iran’s economy throughout the past 
decade.359 With close ties to Khamenei and an important economic 
player since Iran’s post-Iraq War reconstruction, the IRGC has been 
strengthened by Washington’s sanction policies.360 Increased business 
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www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2007-03-01/time-d-tente-iran (connecting Iran’s national 
security fears to the desire for nuclear weapons). 
358. See Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2457–58; MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 479 (evaluating the impact of sanctions 
on Iran’s domestic politics). 
359. See IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, at 10; MALONEY, IRAN'S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 342 (theorizing on the rise of 
the IRGC). 
360. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 479; Alireza Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 
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costs for their local and foreign competitors resulting from sanctions 
have presented the IRGC with a strong upper hand within the 
domestic economy.361 At the same time, the award of massive energy 
development contracts to the IRGC’s construction arm represent 
projects that likely would have gone to international players, were it 
not for the limitations of sanctions.362 While privatization efforts 
benefiting the IRGC under President Ahmadinejad were in part 
politically motivated, here too sanctions weighed heavy, as the 
government later admitted that numerous spin-offs to IRGC-affiliated 
firms were inspired out of the need to shore up confidence in the 
nation’s sanctions-straddled economy.363 In this light, much of the 
shadow economy awarded to the IRGC was a direct consequence of 
Washington’s economic coercion.364 
                                                                                                             
59; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315 (establishing the link between sanctions and the 
rise of the IRGC). The relationship between Khamenei and the IRGC extends back to his first 
days as Supreme Leader and his need to establish a domestic powerbase following the death of 
Khomeini. See Milani, The Green Movement, supra note 105, at 42; Ali Alfoneh, All the 
Guard’s Men: Iran’s Silent Revolution, WORLD AFF. J. (Sept./Oct. 2010), 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/all-guards-men-irans-silent-revolution. For the 
IRGC’s economic role in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, see Nader, The Revolutionary 
Guards, supra, at 60. 
361. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315; Milani, The Green Movement, supra 
note 105, at 42 (noting the competitive advantage within Iran possessed by the IRGC). 
362. See, e.g., MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra 
note 28, at 340 (“[i]n 2009, the fund reportedly disbursed $1 billion to [the IRGC] to help fund 
projects that the IRGC’s construction wing had been awarded in the development of the South 
Pars gas reservoir.”); see also CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 315 (“[g]overnment 
contracts were preferentially allocated to such [IRGC] firms, especially after the US embargo 
prevented foreign firms from operating in Iran.”); FREDERIC WEHREY ET AL., RAND 
CORPORATION, THE RISE OF THE PASDARAN: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC ROLES OF IRAN’S 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS 71 (2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf (“[a]s an economic organization more interested 
in monopoly rather than open competition, the IRGC may wish to keep Iran’s economy closed 
off and under its tight control. If this is the case, U.S. and international sanctions may not 
weaken the IRGC, but instead enhance its formal and illicit economic capabilities”). 
363. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 347 (classifying some high-profile contract awards as merely “for show”); Bijan 
Khajehpour, Iran Shifts to Lower Gear in Privatization, AL-MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iran-privatization-organization-new-
focus.html# (“Assadollah Asgaroladi, a leading businessman, describes the privatization 
performance in the Ahmadinejad era as a ‘farce’ and believes that the economy’s resources are 
not at the disposal of the real private sector.”). 
364. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 343; Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note 360, at 59 (detailing the extent of the 
IRGC’s role across Iran’s economy). It is also relevant that Iran’s various smuggling channels 
were administered and operated by individual members of the IRGC, leading to corrupt private 
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Additionally, the steady intensification of sanctions provided 
significant alteration of Iran’s political ties over time.365 In some cases 
this resulted in the direct empowerment of US adversaries like Russia 
and China, with China in particular benefiting from the late sanctions 
regime as European players were pressured to exit the country.366  
Likewise, Iran’s turn to “alternative allies” in Africa and South 
America represents an interesting new challenge for US foreign 
policy.367 While such a development is not problematic in itself, the 
zero-sum nature of sanctions provide for a conflict of influence, 
whereby future US efforts to cooperate with these States will be 
required to overcome the Iranian interests that such close friendships 
have generated.368 Finally, perhaps one of the most destructive trends 
of the sanctions regime, US economic coercion has indirectly 
contributed to wider regional tensions between the Middle East’s 
Sunni and Shi’ite communities.369 Although from Damascus to Sana’a 
such conflicts are often couched in sectarian explanations, much of 
the ongoing proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be 
attributed to the shifting power dynamics and divergent oil politics of 
these two massive petroleum-exporting governments.370 This 
divergence itself has been spurned by international sanctions.371 
                                                                                                             
enrichment. See Correspondent in Tehran, supra note 336; WEHREY ET AL., supra note 362, at 
64–66 (suggesting the IRGC’s participation in Iran’s smuggling networks). 
365. See infra notes 366–67 and accompanying text. 
366. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 407–09; John W. Garver, China’s Iran Policies, Testimony before the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission on China’s Current and Emerging Foreign Policy 
Priorities (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.13.11Garver.pdf, 8–11 
(reviewing China’s increased economic participation in Iran, following the exit of Europe). 
367. See Steven Heydemann, Iran’s Alternative Allies, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 
12, at 193; Joseph Hammond, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s African Safari, DIPLOMAT (June 18, 
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/mahmoud-ahmadinejads-african-safari/; Ely Karmon, 
Iran in Latin America: President Rouhani’s Era, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (Oct. 
21, 2014), http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1234/Iran-in-Latin-America-President-Rouhanis-Era 
(considering Iran’s refocus to non-traditional economic partners). 
368. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
369. See infra note 370–72 and accompanying text. 
370. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 479; Molavi, supra note 149, at 161 (distinguishing the role of oil politics in tensions 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia). 
371. See Mohsen M. Milani, Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off: The Growing Rivalry 
Between Tehran and Riyadh, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/middle-east/2011-10-11/iran-and-saudi-arabia-square (explaining how the relative 
elevation of Saudi Arabia has spurned wide Iranian countermeasures); Reza Sanati, The Saudi 
Oil War on Iran, NAT’L INTEREST (Mar. 13, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-
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Furthermore, the isolation of Iran from the international community 
has both increased the stakes of these proxy conflicts and undermined 
any possibility of a political solution in brutal crises like the current 
civil war raging in Syria.372 
3. Humanitarian Costs 
Finally, the costs of sanctions on Iran have also involved a 
troubling human dimension.373 At the academic level, sanctions often 
entail unanticipated humanitarian costs, even when narrowly targeted 
upon a problematic regime.374 Under any sanctions policy, access to 
food, medicine, education, and the prosperity of a target-nation’s 
middle class are all vulnerable grounds for collateral damage.375 In 
fact, sanctions toward Iran have witnessed emergencies in each of 
these categories.376 Iranian food security was on occasion 
compromised by sanctions, particularly during periods of high 
inflation, when the costs of chicken and other meat outpaced Iranians’ 
ability to afford these basic staples.377 Although approximately ninety 
percent of Iranian pharmaceutical demand is manufactured 
domestically, sanctions also restricted the importation of required 
                                                                                                             
saudi-oil-war-iran-8214 (recounting Saudi Arabia’s history of strategic interference with Iran’s 
oil capabilities). 
372. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 480 (demonstrating the escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions in Syria); Laurence Norman, 
Saudi Arabia – Iran Talks Needed for Syria Breakthrough, Says United Nations Envoy, WALL 
STREET J., Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-talks-needed-for-
syria-breakthrough-says-united-nations-envoy-1441900196 (citing the need for Iranian 
cooperation in order to solve the Syria catastrophe). 
373. See infra notes 374–89 and accompanying text. 
374. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12 (“[t]he chain reaction triggered by the imposition of 
economic sanctions sends shockwaves throughout the target nation’s economy causing 
undesired humanitarian costs. Sanctions are not effective unless they impose costs to the 
targeted nation, but the effects on the public of the targeted nation are vast, extending far 
beyond the intended harm.”); see also David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: 
Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING 
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 13–14 (2002) (noting the humanitarian costs of even extremely 
focused travel sanctions). 
375. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12–14; MANUEL BESSLER ET AL., SANCTIONS 
ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, U.N. INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE 63 (2004) (assessing 
the many ways that sanctions may jeopardize target nation civilians). 
376. See infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text. 
377. The “Chicken Crisis” of 2012 provides a glimpse at one such episode. See 
MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 1–4 
(illustrating the Chicken Crisis); cf. Wolfe, supra note 29, at 19 (contextualizing such 
sanctions-related food shortages). 
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medicinal ingredients, resulting in drug shortages.378 As wealthy 
Iranians faced with market insecurity stockpiled medication, such 
drug shortages were further compounded.379 Iranian students studying 
abroad were particularly affected by Washington’s financial 
sanctions, which created a firewall between them and their bank 
accounts.380 Across the wider economy, shortfalls in the availability 
of spare parts also harmed ordinary Iranian citizens, a trend especially 
true within Iran’s airline industry.381 
Another disturbing consequence of international sanctions has 
been the disempowerment of Iran’s middle class.382 Considering the 
historical role played by this demographic in mobilizing Iranian social 
and political change, this consequence should strike Washington as 
counterproductive.383 Periods of high inflation resulting from 
sanctions fell especially hard on Iranian wage earners.384 At the same 
time, lack of access to credit within Iran’s private sector emaciated 
the ability of small firms to meet their ongoing business needs.385 
                                                                                                             
378. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 20; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 143–51 
(emphasizing the costs of sanctions on Iranian medicine). 
379. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 20; Marcus George & Zahra Hosseinian, Sanctions, 
Government Blamed for Iran’s Drugs Shortage, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iran-medicine-idUSBRE8B40NM20121205 (noting the effects of medicine 
stockpiling consumer behavior). 
380. See generally Meshkat, supra note 200 (assessing the overall impact of sanctions on 
Iranian-Americans and Iranians within the United States); see also Tara Bahrampour, 
Sanctions Squeeze Iranian Students Abroad, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2013, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/sanctions-squeeze-iranian-students-abroad/2013/01/26/f4069604-
5f1d-11e2-b05a-605528f6b712_story.html (considering the damage of sanctions on Iranian 
international students). 
381. Whereas Iran Air was rated the second-safest airline in the world before the 
Revolution, approximately 1,700 Iranians have been killed in aviation disasters since 1979. 
See Maysam Bizær, Even Without Sanctions, Iranian Aviation Faces Turbulent Future, AL-
MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-aviation-
revival.html; Thomas Erdbrink, Iran’s Aging Airliner Fleet Seen as Faltering Under U.S. 
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/world/middleeast/
irans-airliners-falter-under-sanctions.html (reviewing the death toll from Iranian aviation 
crashes). 
382. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 261; Wolfe, supra note 29, at 14 (asserting the 
sanctions regime’s role in undermining Iran’s middle class); see also Harris, The Bazaar, 
supra note 50, at 109 (examining Iran’s Bazaari class in particular). 
383. See Anderson, Good Grief!, supra note 47, at 145–46; FISK, supra note 45, at 110 
(distinguishing the role of Iran’s middle class in past movements for social change). 
384. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 114; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, 
at 99 (characterizing the impact of inflation on Iranian wages). 
385. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 5; 
Abigail Fielding-Smith, Iran’s credit crunch, NEWSTATESMAN (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.
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And, like in any economy, the idea that targeted sanctions might 
eviscerate key revenue generating sectors without systemically 
impacting aggregate demand represents shoddy economics and naïve 
idealism.386 In this sense, removing sales from Iran’s petroleum sector 
implied reduced domestic consumption across the economy; the same 
consumption that comprises the income of ordinary Iranian small-
businesses and shopkeepers.387 Finally, as noted above, the sanctions 
regime has intensified regional conflict throughout the whole Middle 
East.388 Considering the vast humanitarian destruction caused by these 
regional conflicts, it is apparent that the human costs of sanctioning 
Iran have extended well beyond the Persian Plateau.389 
D. The JPA 
Considering the costs of the sanctions regime highlighted in Part 
I.C, it is not surprising that a moderate, perhaps even reform-minded 
conservative like President Hassan Rouhani was looking for serious 
change upon his election in 2013.390 Already in February of that year, 
negotiations were taking place between the P5+1 and Iran, with secret 
bilateral talks simultaneously occurring between the United States and 
Iran.391 Upon Rouhani’s election in July, President Obama shared a 
rare telephone conversation with the new Iranian President, 
                                                                                                             
newstatesman.com/asia/2009/04/iran-credit-ahmadinejad-crisis (overviewing Iran’s credit 
crunch). 
386. See generally DAVID A. MOSS, A CONCISE GUIDE TO MACROECONOMICS 72–83 
(2007); Aggregate Demand, EXPERIMENTAL ECON. CTR., http://www.econport.org/content/ 
handbook/ADandS/AD.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (explaining aggregate demand’s role 
in a market’s wider economy). 
387. See Wolfe, supra note 29, at 13–14; Beheshteh Farshneshani, In Iran, Sanctions 
Hurt the Wrong People, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and-failures/in-iran-sanctions-hurt-the-wrong-people (arguing 
that sanctions have devastated the livelihoods of ordinary Iranians). 
388. See supra notes 369–71 and accompanying text (noting how sanctions increased 
regional tensions). 
389. See Islam’s Old Schism: Sunnis v Shias, Here and There, ECONOMIST (June 29, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21580162-sectarian-rivalry-
reverberating-region-making-many-muslims; Charlotte Alfred, Explosions Hurt More 
Civilians in Yemen than in Syria This Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/yemen-war-statistics_5605a0e1e4b0af3706dc4104 (assessing the 
horrific casualties resulting from current sectarian tensions). 
390. See supra Part I.C (assessing the costs of the sanctions regime). 
391. See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 109 (providing an overview of the 
JPA’s foundations); see also Bradley Klapper et al., Secret US-Iran Talks Set Stage for Nuke 
Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/secret-us-iran-talks-
set-stage-nuke-deal (detailing the secret negotiation process between Washington and Tehran). 
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representing the first direct communication between leaders on both 
sides since 1979.392 
Eventually, the result of the ongoing negotiating efforts between 
the P5+1 and Iran, and the separate bilateral talks between the United 
States and Iran, was the Joint Plan of Action, signed on November 24, 
2013.393 At its broadest level, the JPA promised a six-month freeze on 
Iran’s nuclear development program, in exchange for limited 
sanctions relief and voluntary commitments not to seek new sanctions 
against Iran.394 Within this six-month window the parties envisioned 
further negotiations in hopes of achieving a permanent, final-status 
nuclear deal.395 Notably, everything agreed upon in the JPA consisted 
of non-binding “voluntary measures,” which allowed for continued 
good faith negotiations and flexibility in the event that a legal 
technicality might prohibit a party from fulfilling its obligations under 
the JPA.396 
In total, the JPA consisted of approximately US$7 billion of 
sanctions relief.397 However, the interim agreement also retained most 
                                                                                                             
392. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 109; President Barack Obama, 
Statement by the President, The White House (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/09/27/statement-president (detailing Obama’s phone conversation with 
Rouhani). 
393. See JPA, supra note 182. 
394. See JPA, supra note 182; see also Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110 
(providing an overview of the JPA). For a detailed table highlighting the JPA’s agreed terms, 
see Bhala, supra note 27, at 347–52. 
395. See JPA, supra note 182; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 110 (“The 
goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution 
that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.”). 
396. See JPA, supra note 182; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 112 (“The 
Joint Plan of Action does not appear to be binding as a matter of international law.”). Say, for 
example, that the US State Department promises to lift all sanctions related to a particular 
Iranian industry, but then finds that Congressional action has made the executive branch 
unable to do so without legislative approval. The softness of the JPA’s nonbinding measures 
seem to encourage ongoing negotiations, whereas a more rigid system might have resulted in a 
deal-killing formal breach. See id. 
397. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 113. In regards to the sanctions regime, 
the JPA requested that the P5+1 voluntarily undertake the following measures: to pause all 
efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales; to suspend sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical 
industry, precious metals and gold, and Iran’s auto industry; to license the supply and 
installation of spare parts related to Iran’s civil aviation program; to promise against new 
nuclear-related sanctions in either the EU or the UN Security Council; to promise against new 
nuclear-related sanctions in the United States, “acting consistent with the respective roles of 
the President and the Congress;” to establish a financial channel to allow for humanitarian 
trade supporting Iran’s domestic needs, to be paid from Iranian frozen assets held abroad; and 
finally, the unfreezing of an unspecified amount of Iranian oil revenues locked up overseas. 
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of Washington’s unilateral sanctions, including its extraterritorial 
financial sanctions, keeping approximately US$30 billion out of the 
hands of the Islamic Republic over the course of its six-month 
negotiating period.398 Still, in releasing some of the coercive power 
that had been constructed throughout previous decades, the JPA 
represented a major shift in the sanctions regime, indicating a new 
possibility of the end of the sanctions era.399 After intense and 
protracted ongoing negotiations, and various extensions of the JPA’s 
initial negotiating deadline, Iran and the P5+1 finally reached a final-
status deal on July 14, 2015.400 Following the signing of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna, Iran would officially 
transition into the post-sanctions era.401 The next Part of this Note will 
explore this transition, and what it means for international investment 
within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
II. IRAN’S POST-SANCTIONS TRANSITION 
After almost forty years of increasingly limited international 
investment in Iran under the sanctions regime, the signing of the 
JCPOA in July 2015 opens a new horizon for parties seeking to invest 
in Iran.402 To understand the magnitude of this change, one must look 
first to the JCPOA itself and what it allows, and then to the emerging 
investment environment in Iran.403 This Part of the Note will explore 
these issues. 
                                                                                                             
See JPA, supra note 182; see also Bhala, supra note 27, at 347 (cataloging the sanctions to be 
lifted under the JPA). 
398. David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Dec. 12, 
2013), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/12/20131212288869.html#
axzz2nO6bGXbS (noting the US$30 billion of sanctions still in effect within the JPA’s six-
month negotiating period); Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 181, at 113. 
399. Compare supra Part I.B, with supra notes 393–98. 
400. See JCPOA, supra note 185; see also Ishaan Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal 
with Iran: How It Works, WASH. POST, July 14, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2015/07/14/the-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-how-it-works/ (summarizing 
the JCPOA). 
401. See JCPOA, supra note 185. 
402. Compare supra Part I.B (examining the legal framework of the sanctions regime), 
with infra Part II.A (summarizing the JCPOA). 
403. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
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A. The JCPOA 
As noted above, the JCPOA has been nothing short of 
controversial, in terms of what the deal means for stake-holding 
parties concerned with Iran’s nuclear capabilities and its wider role in 
the Middle East region.404 Although scrutiny of the JCPOA’s 
restrictions on Iran’s nuclear development is not the focus of this 
Note, the deal’s sanctions-lifting provisions are crucial to 
understanding the opportunities and limitations of international 
investment in post-sanctions Iran.405 This Part examines the contents 
of the JCPOA.406 
1. The Agreement 
At its broadest level, the JCPOA, like the JPA preceding it, seeks 
to impose restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for 
international sanctions relief.407 In terms of structure, the JCPOA is 
comprised of a short main body text and five more specific 
annexes.408 Annex I deals with nuclear-related provisions, placing 
monitoring and development restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear 
program.409 Annex II deals with sanctions-related commitments, 
detailing the specifics of the lifting of sanctions.410 Annex III involves 
civil nuclear cooperation, providing measures related to ongoing 
international involvement in Iran’s domestic nuclear program.411 
Annex IV creates an institutional Joint Commission, which is tasked 
with overseeing the deal’s implementation and ensuring ongoing 
compliance.412 Finally, Annex V is procedural, dealing with the 
JCPOA’s implementation plan and how different phases of the 
agreement will be adopted and triggered.413 
Under the JCPOA’s preamble and general provisions, the deal 
promises to “produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security 
Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions 
                                                                                                             
404. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.  
405. See infra notes 407–45 and accompanying text. 
406. Compare infra notes 408–27, and accompanying text, with supra Part I.D. 
407. See generally JCPOA, supra note 185; Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with 
Iran: How It Works, supra note 400 (summarizing the JCPOA). 
408. See JCPOA, supra note 185. 
409. See id. at Annex I. 
410. See id. at Annex II. 
411. See id. at Annex III. 
412. See id. at Annex IV. 
413. See id. at Annex V. 
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related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in 
areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.”414 As detailed in 
Annex V, this process is to occur in separate phases.415 Of note, 
“Adoption Day” is the date set ninety days after the JCPOA’s 
endorsement by the UN Security Council, at which point all parties 
“will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the 
implementation of their JCPOA commitments.”416 Upon the IAEA’s 
determination that Iran is complying with its nuclear commitments, 
“Implementation Day” triggers the lifting of sanctions by the EU and 
United States.417 Eight years after Adoption Day, or upon the IAEA’s 
determination that all of Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively 
peaceful, “Transition Day” triggers further sanctions relief, requiring 
the United States to “seek such legislative action as may be 
appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of” 
various military-related statutory sanctions, specified within Annex 
II.418 Finally, ten years after Adoption Day, “Termination Day” 
provides further EU sanctions relief, and sunsets the JCPOA thereby 
freeing Iran and all parties from its provisions.419 
The terms of the JCPOA were made binding via Security 
Council ratification on July 20, 2015.420 In the event that any party 
deviates from its commitments under the nuclear deal, the JCPOA 
contains a dispute resolution procedure detailed in Paragraphs 36 and 
37 of the main body.421 In the event that a dispute is not resolved, the 
JCPOA triggers a “snapback procedure,” which forces the Security 
Council to automatically re-impose the multilateral sanctions initially 
                                                                                                             
414. Id. § v. 
415. See infra note 416 and accompanying text. 
416.  JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(ii). Adoption day occurred on October 18, 2015. See 
Press Statement, John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (Oct. 18, 2015), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/10/248311.htm. 
417. JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(iii); see id. at Annex V §§ 16-17. Implementation 
Day officially occurred on January 16, 2016. See John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on 
Implementation Day (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/01/ 
251336.htm; David E. Sanger, Iran Complies with Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are Lifted, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-
lifted-nuclear-deal.html. 
418.  JCPOA, supra note 185, § 34(iv), at Annex V § 21; see id. at Annex II §§ 4.1–.5, 
.7, .9 (listing the US statutory sanctions that should be terminated under the deal). 
419. See id. § 34(v). 
420. See S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015). 
421. See JCPOA, supra note 185, §§ 36–37. 
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lifted by the JCPOA.422 This in effect enables any permanent member 
of the Security Council to block sanctions relief without allowing 
such members to veto the re-imposition of sanctions.423 
For international investors that have long been eyeing Iran, the 
JCPOA’s “comprehensive lifting” of sanctions language will likely 
inspire enthusiasm.424 However, taking a closer look at what the 
JCPOA actually accomplishes, for many investors such enthusiasm 
remains premature.425 This is especially true for US investors, who 
may find themselves uniquely bound by the remaining relics of 
Washington’s four-decades unilateral sanctions regime, with no easy 
escape route in sight.426 The JCPOA itself anticipates this inability for 
the United States government to comprehensively lift sanctions, 
detailing tailored US sanctions-lifting procedures.427 
2. US Sanctions Lifting Under Section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA: 
The “Footnote Six” Issue 
Washington’s JCPOA sanctions-lifting commitments are spelled 
out in Section 4 of Annex II.428 In addition to the limited sanctions 
relief previously provided under the JPA, the JCPOA mandates that 
the United States waive specified nuclear-related sanctions 
concerning Iran’s financial and banking sectors; insurance and 
underwriting; Iran’s energy and petrochemicals sectors; shipping, 
shipbuilding, and Iranian ports; gold and other precious metals; 
software and metals; and Iran’s automotive sector.429 Additionally, 
the United States is required to remove specified entities from its lists 
of blocked persons, curtail extraordinary nuclear non-proliferation 
measures targeting Iran, and commit itself to granting various trade 
                                                                                                             
422. See id.; Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with Iran: How It Works, supra note 
400 (“If Iran violates any terms of the deal, sanctions could be snapped back within 65 days.”). 
423. See Michele Kelemen, A Look at How Sanctions Would ‘Snap Back’ If Iran 
Violates Nuke Deal, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/20/
424571368/if-iran-violates-nuke-deal-a-look-at-how-sanctions-would-snap-back (explaining 
the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism); Ankit Panda, How the Iran Deal’s ‘Snap Back’ 
Mechanism Will Keep Tehran Compliant, DIPLOMAT (July 15, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/
2015/07/how-the-iran-deals-snap-back-mechanism-will-keep-tehran-compliant/. 
424. See infra Part II.B. 
425. See infra Part II.A.2. 
426. See infra Part II.A.2. 
427. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4. 
428. See id. 
429. See id. at Annex II §§ 4.1–.7. 
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licenses for US-owned subsidiaries doing business in Iran.430 
Furthermore, the JCPOA commits the United States to end its practice 
of enforcing secondary nuclear-related sanctions, previously applied 
to international entities that engage in or indirectly facilitate 
prohibited transactions with the US sanction regime’s direct targets.431 
Indeed, in OFAC’s initial guidance following the publication of the 
JCPOA, the agency stated, “[United States] sanctions relief will be 
provided through the suspension and eventual termination of nuclear-
related secondary sanctions, beginning once the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that Iran has implemented key 
nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA (Implementation 
Day).”432 
Foremost, it is crucial for all international investors to realize 
that the US sanctions being lifted apply only to those related to Iran’s 
nuclear program, and not to sanctions involving Iran’s support for 
terrorism, ballistic missile and conventional arms proliferation, or 
Iranian human rights abuses.433 As highlighted above, parsing out the 
sanctions regime into these distinct categories is a messy endeavor.434 
But perhaps more crucially, investors in the United States need to 
realize that even under the JCPOA’s nuclear-related sanction waivers, 
US entities will remain bound to the existing US sanctions regime. 
Buried deep within the JCPOA, footnote six of Annex II provides in 
part: 
                                                                                                             
430. See id. at Annex II § 4.8 (detailing the delisting of specified entities); id. at Annex II 
§ 4.9 (noting nuclear proliferation-related measures); id. at Annex II § 5 (dealing with other 
trade measures, including the US granting of trade licenses). 
431. See id. at Annex II § 7; see also KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 59 
(“The U.S. sanctions that are to be suspended are primarily those that sanction foreign entities 
and countries for conducting specified transactions with Iran (so-called ‘secondary 
sanctions’).”). 
432. Trope, supra note 339, at 2. 
433. See Ellie Geranmayeh, Explainer: The Iran Nuclear Deal, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN 
REL. (July 17, 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/article/iran_explainer3070 (“US sanctions on Iran 
targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remain.”); see also KATZMAN, IRAN 
SANCTIONS, supra note 228, at 60 (“The JCPOA does not commit the United States to suspend 
U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism or human rights abuses, and on proliferation-sensitive 
technology.”). 
434. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (overviewing the complexity and 
overlapping rationales for the sanctions regime); see also Trope, supra note 339, at 3 
(“However, the more one rereads the JCPOA (and multiple re-readings are a necessity), the 
more one realizes that implementation of sanctions relief by the United States will be difficult 
to map out and challenging to explain.”). Fortunately, experts and analysts have provided 
helpful guidance on this task. See generally RENNACK, supra note 194; Katzman, Easing US 
Sanctions on Iran, supra note 199 (exploring the unwinding of sanctions). 
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The sanctions that the United States will cease to apply, and 
subsequently terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination 
of, pursuant to its commitment under Section 4 are those directed 
towards non-U.S. persons . . . U.S. persons and U.S.- owned or 
-controlled foreign entities will continue to be generally 
prohibited from conducting transactions of the type permitted 
pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authori[z]ed to do so by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC).435 
Thus, footnote six discriminates between US and non-US 
investors.436 The same exact rules and enforcement measures being 
waived for international players are, under footnote six, still in full 
force for US investors interested in exploring the investment 
opportunities of post-sanctions Iran.437 Whereas US-owned or 
controlled foreign subsidiaries are still provided an alternative path to 
Iran via waivers in JCPOA Annex II Section 5, US firms lacking 
foreign subsidiaries appear to remain barred from investing in Iran.438 
                                                                                                             
435. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4 n.6. 
436. See id.; see also Trope, supra note 339, at 1 (“Lawyers who have closely analyzed 
the JCPOA reacted, in many instances, with incredulity on seeing this distinction and 
understanding its impact on U.S. businesses. Clients informed by counsel of the distinction 
have responded, ‘You can’t be serious.’”). 
437. See generally Trope, supra note 339. 
438. See JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 5.1.2 (“[The United States commits to 
[l]icense non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities 
with Iran that are consistent with this JCPOA”); Trope, supra note 339, at 3–4 (noting OFAC’s 
discrimination between US firms and foreign firms in regards to post-sanctions Iran). Indeed, 
following Implementation Day, OFAC carried out part of this commitment in the form of 
General License H, which carves a path for US-owned foreign subsidiaries to legally conduct 
deals in Iran. See JOHN E. SMITH, IRANIAN TRANSACTIONS AND SANCTIONS REGULATIONS 31 
C.F.R. § 560, GENERAL LICENSE H, OFAC (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_glh.pdf. However, even for US-owned foreign 
subsidiaries, General License H sets extremely limited parameters that will actually shield US 
parents from sanctions. The license provides US parent companies with a one-time waiver to 
conduct initial corporate decision-making aimed at directing a US corporation’s foreign 
subsidiaries to set up shop in Iran. Beyond this initial period, General License H requires that 
fully automated systems are in place between the parent and subsidiary, which do not involve 
any interaction between US persons and ongoing Iran-related transactions. See id.; see also H 
Stands for “Holy Moly!”: JCPOA Implementation Day and Breaking Down OFAC General 
License H, ARENT FOX (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/h-stands-
%E2%80%9Choly-moly%E2%80%9D-jcpoa-implementation-day-and-breaking-down-ofac-
general-license#.VtiVS5MrLdc; Will McAuliffe & Sarah Weber, Understanding the Changes 
to the Iran Sanctions Regime: OFAC Issues Guidance, General Licenses on JCPOA 
Implementation Day, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/3322106/20jan16alert.pdf (dissecting OFAC’s General 
License H). 
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The effect of footnote six is to situate OFAC as the primary 
license-granting gatekeeper for any US-based investment seeking to 
enter Iran.439 As an initial matter, this procedural construction is 
logical.440 Considering the precarious navigation of somewhat 
malleable executive sanctions and more rigid legislative sanctions that 
any US investment in Iran would have to traverse, it makes sense for 
OFAC to ensure that each business relationship being initiated 
complies with its own rules as well as the rules beyond the 
executive’s control to manipulate, on a case-by-case basis.441 
Likewise, this license-granting mechanism for US-owned foreign 
subsidiaries does in theory allow for some semblance of government 
oversight, ensuring—at least at the contracting phase—that US 
subsidiaries outside the US enter relationships in Iran consistent with 
Washington’s wider foreign policy interests.442 However, by limiting 
US participation in Iran only to multinational corporations with non-
US subsidiaries, footnote six bars the participation of a great deal of 
US investors potentially capable of fostering better US-Iran relations 
and wider advancements of US foreign policy goals.443 Whereas the 
distinction between US entities and non-US entities (in a way that 
includes US foreign subsidiaries) is artificial in terms of effect, this 
distinction is bound to ensure the survival of both US reputational 
hazards involved in Iranian investment, as well as the wider ethos of 
mistrust existing between both nations and their populations.444 
                                                                                                             
439. See supra note 230 (noting OFAC’s role in the licensing process). Compare 
JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II § 4 n.6 (clarifying restrictions against US firms from 
operating in Iran), with Annex II § 5.1.2 (indicating the licensing option that will allow the 
foreign subsidiaries of US firms to access Iran).  
440. See infra notes 441–42 and accompanying text. 
441. See supra notes 224–29 and accompanying text (noting competing waiver authority 
between the US executive and legislative branches). 
442. On this note, OFAC’s decision to opt for a general license—as opposed to a specific 
license—in the form of General License H seems counterproductive. See SMITH, supra note 
438; see also H Stands for “Holy Moly!”, supra note 438 (“Because [General License] H is a 
general license it does not require any application for a specific license. In other words, now 
that [General License] H is in effect, US-owned or -controlled foreign entities can use it BUT 
must comply with its terms and not engage in any prohibited transactions.”). 
443. See infra Part III. 
444. This point is best demonstrated by a hypothetical. If, for example, “US Corporation 
X” really desires to serve Iranian consumers, nothing in the JCPOA schema prevents the 
corporation from forming “Foreign Subsidiary Y” and seeking an OFAC license to do so. 
Economically, there is no material difference between this corporate structure and US 
Corporation X directly bringing operations to Iran. However assuming such a license is 
granted, one might ask what is lost in Iranian consumers interacting and forming relationships 
with this detached subsidiary, as opposed to its US parent company. Likewise, such a schema 
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Whatever might be said for footnote six and the US sanctions-
lifting procedures of the JCPOA, European and other international 
investors are now, since Implementation Day, largely freed to engage 
with Iran.445 To understand the impact of this development, one must 
first appreciate the investment opportunities present in post-sanctions 
Iran. The following Part provides a survey of these opportunities. 
B. Investor Opportunities 
Since the deal’s signing in Vienna, the international business 
community has overwhelmingly welcomed the JCPOA.446 Despite the 
fact that the JCPOA falls short of comprehensive sanctions relief, the 
relaxation of UN and European sanctions, as well as the non-
enforcement of US secondary sanctions toward non-US persons, is 
certain to change the investment landscape of modern Iran. 
International investors looking to enter the country will be met with a 
rich panorama of investment opportunities.447 Indeed, the sanctions 
regime itself has transformed Iran into a rare untapped investment 
arena, entailing all the potential awards (and risks) of a frontier FDI 
destination.448 
At the macroeconomic level, Iran boasts an economy of 
approximately US$406 billion, making it the second-largest economy 
in the region and the twenty-ninth largest in the world.449 Regionally 
                                                                                                             
seems to prohibit ongoing US regulation and oversight of Foreign Subsidiary Y’s operations, 
beyond the contracting and license-granting phase, in that ongoing operations will be carried 
out not by a US corporation but by a foreign subsidiary beyond the direct jurisdiction of US 
regulators. 
445. See supra notes 435–38 and accompanying text (dealing with the JCPOA’s 
discrimination between US and other international investors). 
446. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732 (noting the international business 
community’s positive reaction to the JCPOA); Everett Rosenfeld et al., Iran Deal: Corporate 
Winners from the Nuclear Agreement, CNBC (July 14, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2015/07/14/iran-deal-corporate-winners-from-the-nuclear-agreement.html (“[W]hile U.S. and 
Iranian leaders have heralded the deal as a victory, the real winners could be corporations 
across the globe.”). 
447. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
448. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
449. See Vivienne Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, FORTUNE (Aug. 24 2015) 
(sizing Iran’s economy at US$406 billion); Iran Overview, WORLD BANK,  http://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (noting Iran’s second 
largest economy in the Middle East-North Africa region);  Jana Marais, Iran: Opportunity 
Beckons, FINWEEK, July 30, 2015, at 12; Iran to Work with WB at Own Pace, FIN. TRIB., 
(Aug. 16, 2015), http://financialtribune.com/archive/2015/09/13/articles/economy-business-
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ranking in size behind only Egypt, the country’s population of 
seventy-eight million inhabitants is young, educated, cosmopolitan, 
and has money to spend.450 Additionally there is “a sizeable middle 
class” in Iran, which in spite of the sanctions regime has seen rising 
per capita incomes and improved standards of living over previous 
decades.451 The nation also poses geo-strategic advantages for 
international investors looking to set up shop in Iran.452 Existing rail 
and highway linkages to neighboring States provide potential for Iran 
to become the “key transit point for East-West trade” on a global 
scale.453 Both inflation and unemployment have fallen since the 
signing of the JCPOA, and international trade is expected to rebound 
in the absence of multilateral sanctions.454 As part of the JCPOA, 
roughly US$120 billion of Iranian assets frozen overseas are in the 
process of being repatriated.455 Although there are concerns that this 
                                                                                                             
and-markets/23474/iran-work-wb-own-pace (ranking the Iranian economy as the 29th largest 
in the world). 
450. See Iran Overview, supra note 449; Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, 
at 6 (establishing the size of Iran’s population); see also Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to 
Iran, supra note 449; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 95 
(characterizing Iran’s population). 
451. See Marais, supra note 449, at 12 (noting Iran’s “sizeable middle class”); Clara 
Brandi & Max Büge, A Cartography of the New Middle Classes in Developing and Emerging 
Countries 13 (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspoltik, Discussion Paper 35, 2014), https://
www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_35.2014.pdf  (“Iran has had a higher share of middle-class 
citizens than poor ones in its population since 2002”); see also IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 
14/93, supra note 168, at 1; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 311 (recognizing the Iran’s 
“dramatic improvements in a variety of human development indicators” since the 1979 
Revolution). 
452. See McCary, supra note 119, at 275–76; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 391 (characterizing Iran as a geostrategic regional 
market); see also Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, at 6 (emphasizing Iran’s 
geostrategic location from the lens of international politics). 
453. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 13; see also 
IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 1–2  (further noting Iran’s geostrategic trade 
significance). 
454. See Bijan Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran’s Economy, AL-
MONITOR (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/economic-
impact-iran-nuclear-deal.html; With Sanctions Lifting, What’s in Store for Iran’s Economy?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 27, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/with-
sanctions-lifting-whats-in-store-for-irans-economy/ (predicting a sizeable post-sanctions boost 
to Iranian trade). 
455. See Gary Clark et al., Iran’s Golden Loophole, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF 
DEMOCRACIES, 5 (May 13, 2013), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/ 
documents/FDD_RGE_Iran_Gol_Report__May_2013_FINAL_2.pdf; Bijan Khajehpour, 
What Will Happen Once Iran’s Asset’s Are Unfrozen?, AL-MONITOR (May 26, 2015), http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/iran-import-sanctions-investment-consumer-
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cash influx may crowd out some foreign investment, in reality Iran 
will be best served by actively attracting international investment in 
order to tap into foreign management and technology skill sets.456 
Still, despite these promising economic trends, there are definite 
problems in the Iranian economy. The World Bank notes that, “The 
Iranian State continues to play a key role in the economy with large 
public and quasi-public enterprises dominating to some extent the 
manufacturing and commercial sectors.”457 However, the Rouhani 
Administration appears to recognize these drawbacks, and has 
directed State efforts at shoring up investor confidence in Iran, 
notably by fighting internal corruption. 458 
Taken as a whole, there are attractive opportunities in Iran for 
both market seekers and raw material seekers.459 Generally speaking, 
Iran’s years under sanctions have created an economy starving for 
foreign investment, with certain sectors saturated with pent-up 
demand.460 Well before Implementation Day, President Rouhani was 
actively courting international investors.461 Although Washington 
continues to talk tough about unilateral US sanctions remaining in 
place, this is unlikely to prevent the flow of international investment 
                                                                                                             
foreign-assets.html (valuing Iranian assets to be repatriated at US$120 billion). For 
comparison, Iran’s total trade volume in 2014 was approximately US$160 billion. Id. 
456. See Khajehpour, What Will Happen Once Iran’s Asset’s Are Unfrozen?, supra note 
455, at 1; Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Prepares to Lure Foreign Investors After Nuclear Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES , Aug. 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/22/world/middleeast/after-nuclear-
deal-with-west-iran-gears-up-to-cash-in.html?_r=0 (arguing Iran’s need for foreign 
investment). 
457.  Iran Overview, supra note 449. 
458. See Najmeh Bozrogmehr, Rouhani Confronts Iran’s Hardliners on Corruption, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ae48de4-7edf-11e4-a828-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3v995GkSv; Bijan Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract 
Private Investors?, AL-MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ 
originals/2015/02/iran-escalates-fight-corruption.html (evaluating Rouhani’s anticorruption 
efforts from the perspective of foreign investment attraction). 
459. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 9; Deloitte on Africa: Resource-seeker or Market-
seeker?, DELOITTE, 1-2 (2012),  http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/ 
Documents/international-specialist/deloitte-au-aas-resource-seeker-market-seeker-12.pdf 
(introducing the investment concepts of market seekers and raw material seekers). 
460. See IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 11; Walt, Picking 
Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449 (pointing out Iran’s pent up demand).  
461. Even before the signing of the JCPOA, Rouhani made a personal appearance at the 
World Economic Forum at Davos following the striking of the initial JPA. See IRAN COUNTRY 
FORECAST, supra note 157, at 14; Jill Treanor & Larry Elliott, Davos 2014: Iran Ready to 
Engage with the World, Says Rouhani, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/jan/23/davos-iran-ready-engage-world-rouhani (considering Rouhani at 
Davos). 
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back to Iran, and will not preclude the interest of US firms seeking to 
enter Iran via foreign subsidiaries.462 While footnote six of Annex II 
of the JCPOA may restrict US participation in Iran’s emerging 
investment landscape, the following key opportunity areas will prove 
important to the wider international investment community.463 
1. Key Investment Sectors: Oil, Natural Gas, and Automotive 
Some of the most profound destinations for foreign investment 
in Iran are likely to be among the nation’s traditionally dominant 
economic sectors.464 These include Iran’s massive carbon-based 
energy sector—both oil and natural gas—as well as the Iran’s large 
automotive sector.465 Each of these industries stands to gain various 
benefits from foreign investment, and each holds the potential to 
reward investors with impressive returns. 
Within the carbon-based energy sector, Iran is considered by 
some accounts to contain the largest combined reserves of oil and 
natural gas in the entire world.466 This sector forms the backbone of 
the Iranian economy, driving an estimated thirty percent of Iran’s 
GDP and eighty-five percent of government revenues.467 Yet from 
1979 through the Iran-Iraq War through the intensification of the 
sanctions regime, Iran’s energy sector has yet to recover its pre-
revolution output levels.468 Meanwhile, the Western exit from Iran’s 
                                                                                                             
462. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732, 1785; Ron Bousso & Timothy Gardner, 
Exclusive: U.S. Warns Governments, Bankers Iran Sanctions Still in Place, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN0S32O720151010 
(repeating government warnings that sanctions are still in effect); Andrew Critchlow, Iran is a 
Once in a Lifetime Opportunity for Brave Investors, TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2015), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/11732669/Iran-is-a-once-in-a-lifetime-
opportunity-for-brave-investors.html (anticipating wide investor return to Iran). 
463. See infra Part II.B. 
464. See infra notes 465–517 (highlighting opportunities in Iran’s oil, natural gas, and 
automotive sectors). 
465. See infra notes 466–82 (looking at Iran’s carbon-based energy sector as a whole); 
infra notes 483–89 (oil); infra notes 490–506 (natural gas); infra notes 507–17 (automotive). 
466. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1732; Mohsen M. Milani, Iran’s Persian Gulf 
Policy in the Post-Saddam Era, in CONTEMPORARY IRAN: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, POLITICS 349 
(Ali Gheissari ed., 2009) (exploring Iran’s combined oil and gas reserves). 
467. COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 315; IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra 
note 157, at 1 (estimating the extent Iran relies on the state’s oil sector). Alternatively, other 
sources cite figures of 10 percent and 65 percent, respectively. Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 
100. 
468. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 368; Maloney, The Revolutionary Economy, supra note 12, at 95 (noting that Iranian oil 
output has yet to recover to its pre-revolution levels). 
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energy sector through the late sanctions era has largely provided a 
vacant market for firms considering reentry.469 With the signing of the 
JCPOA, Iran is expected to be capable of rehabilitating approximately 
400,000 barrels per day within the short term.470 Yet, Iran will require 
approximately US$170 billion in development for its oil and gas 
sectors to reach their output potentials.471 This investment has to come 
from somewhere, and there are many reasons for Iran to prefer 
outside capital.472 For example, Iran’s oil fields are some of the oldest 
in the world, and the sector’s aging technology is limiting current 
production capacity.473 FDI would conveniently allow Iran to leverage 
international technology competencies.474 
From the other side, investors too should view Iran’s energy 
sector as an attractive location for FDI.475 Current forecasts indicate 
                                                                                                             
469. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 412; Parisha Hafezi, Iran Invites Foreign Firms to Develop its Oil, Gas Industry, 
REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-usa-oil-
idUKKCN0RV4JL20151001 (recalling the exit of foreign firms under the late sanctions era). 
But see Benoît Faucon & Bill Spindle, Western Oil Firms Will Find Tough Competition in 
Iran, WALL STREET J., July 21, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/western-oil-firms-will-find-
tough-competition-in-iran-1437518798 (arguing that sanctions have resulted in a competent 
domestic industry, at some phases of oil production). 
470. See Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran's Economy, supra note 454; 
Sanctions Lift to Boost Iran’s Oil Sales by 400,000 bpd: IEA, TEHRAN TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), 
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=250846 (mentioning Iran’s short term 
capacity to expand oil output). 
471. Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran 
Nuclear Agreement and Iranian Energy Exports, the Iranian Economy, and World Energy 
Markets, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/iran-
nuclear-agreement-and-iranian-energy-exports-iranian-economy-and-world-energy-marke 
(stating the need for US$170 billion for Iran’s oil and gas sectors to meet their output 
potential). 
472. See Philips & Motevalli, supra note 328, at 21 (explaining how reduced Iranian 
domestic investment and capital shortfalls have resulted in the need to pursue FDI); Cyrus 
Amir-Mokri & Hamdi Biglari, A Windfall for Iran?, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov.–Dec. 2015), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-10-20/windfall-iran (articulating Iran’s wider need 
for foreign investment). 
473. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 421; IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 12 
(characterizing Iran’s old oil fields). 
474. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 422; Laying Groundwork for FDI, FIN. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2015), http://financialtribune
.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/28579/laying-groundwork-fdi (evaluating the 
role of FDI in infrastructure development). 
475. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 1 
(noting Iran’s potential for international energy companies); Anjli Raval, Iran Prepares to 
Open up to Foreign Oil Companies, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
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that Iranian energy consumption will outpace production capacity, 
forcing Iran to import much of its refined gasoline needs.476 Such 
inefficiencies have fostered a realized need for refinery expansion, 
which will likely be best served by international investment.477 
Furthermore, the fact that twenty-eight of Iran’s oil and gas fields are 
shared with contiguous States highlights a real sense of urgency as 
Iran’s immediate neighbors exploit these limited resources.478 Already 
Iran has invited representatives from various international energy 
firms to discuss future energy projects.479 Likewise, the industry’s 
recently revised contractual framework—which allows for adjustable 
rates of return for investors, as opposed to the fixed rates of Iran’s 
previous buy-back model—serves as another incentive to attract 
international companies.480 Furthermore, the reinstatement of Bijan 
Namdar Zangeneh to Iran’s Oil Ministry will be a welcome signal for 
firms that profited in Iran throughout Rafsanjani’s presidency.481 In 
sum, although much of the sector is still tangled in State-owned 
enterprises and their subsidiaries—many of which remain troublingly 
connected with the IRGC—both privatization demands and a robust 
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AGENCY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://en.trend.az/iran/2112759.html (comparing Iran’s extraction 
rates with the nation’s neighbors). 
479. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 14; Hafezi, supra note 469, (looking at 
Iran’s outreach to international oil companies). 
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Sanctions, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
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service-oriented private sector make Iran’s energy industry an 
attractive location for foreign investment.482 
Within Iran’s oil sector, the nation holds an estimated ten 
percent of the world’s petroleum reserves.483 However, with one of 
the world’s oldest oil sectors and declining developed reserves, Iran 
will be increasingly forced to rely on undeveloped reserves.484 
Reaching these resources will require massive investment.485 In fact, 
Iranian officials will seek billions of dollars in investment in this 
industry alone..486 With enough investment, Iran’s oil sector is 
expected to finally outpace its pre-revolutionary output levels at six 
million barrels per day; comparable, for example, to Saudi Arabia’s 
capacity of roughly 10.5 million barrels per day.487 In the short term, 
some estimates forecast Iranian exports to reach 1.8 million barrels 
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7, 8 (2014) (positing that despite state involvement, Iran’s energy sectors are not 
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proven reserves at 10 percent of the world’s total). 
484. See Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101; Anthony H. Cordesman et al., U.S. and 
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but undeveloped reserves). 
485. See Cordesman et al., supra note 484; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101 (stating 
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per day by the end of 2016.488 Oil Minister Zangeneh has provided an 
even more optimistic assessment, estimating exports of 3.8 million 
barrels per day following the lifting of sanctions.489 
Meanwhile, Iran’s natural gas sector is also expected to continue 
along its impressive historical growth path.490 Iran possesses the 
second-largest gas reserves in the world, behind only Russia.491 
However, rising domestic consumption has had a dramatic impact on 
Iran’s ability to export natural gas.492 This implies the important role 
gas serves within the State’s wider economic strategy: by increasingly 
using the nation’s gas supplies to power the country and meet Iran’s 
domestic energy needs, the government seeks to free up Iranian crude 
for export, boosting overall revenues.493 Additionally, natural gas will 
be increasingly needed for reinjection into Iran’s aging oil fields.494 
However, even as Iranian gas consumption rises internally, this sector 
is posed to gain international importance throughout future 
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decades.495 Despite rising consumption, Iran managed to achieve a 
gas surplus in 2012, and more currently, one economic outlook report 
has stated that the sector “remains underdeveloped despite significant 
improvements in recent quarters, and there is considerable room to 
maximize this source of revenue.”496 Indeed, with the needed 
technology transfers, Iran’s gas production could nearly double by 
2024.497 Here, too, urgency is required.498 An estimated forty-seven 
percent of Iran’s recoverable gas reserves are located offshore in the 
Gulf within the huge South Pars field, territorially shared with 
Qatar.499 Sanctions have placed Iran at a severe disadvantage in 
comparison to its tiny southern neighbor when it comes to extracting 
wealth from South Pars.500 According to former head of the Majles 
Energy Commission Hamidreza Katouzian, “Twenty years after 
discovering this gas field, we are behind Qatar in projects, 
investments, and exploitation . . . While Qatar has completed the 
building of refineries and drilling, Iran has not even reached halfway 
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through its development projects. We are losing because whoever 
exploits more will gain more.”501 
In addition to the potential at South Pars and wider secular 
growth trends, international investors will likely also be attracted to 
the potential of developing liquid natural gas (“LNG”) and 
compressed natural gas (“CNG”) projects in Iran.502 Before the 
intensification of sanctions in 2010, Iran was on its way to developing 
massive LNG export programs.503 However as FDI departed Iran, 
these projects were shelved.504 Finally, Iran’s natural gas sector may 
also become crucial for European consumers, who currently depend 
on Russian gas exports.505 With recent events in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine raising suspicions over Russia’s long-term intentions, 
Europeans will welcome Iranian pipeline and floating liquid natural 
gas (“FLNG”) projects seeking to reach EU markets.506 
Beyond the Iranian energy sector, international investors are also 
bound to find attractive options within Iran’s historically large 
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automotive industry.507 The automobile manufacturing industry 
represents Iran’s second-largest economic sector, following energy.508 
In the years preceding the sanctions regime, Iran was ranked as the 
eleventh largest automobile producer in the world.509 However under 
sanctions, increased parts shortages and rising production costs placed 
crippling restraints on Iranian automakers.510 With the lifting of 
sanctions, Iranian firms will be enabled to serve a booming domestic 
demand for cars, in a market with few remaining international auto 
dealers.511 These conditions have resulted in incredible growth 
forecasts for Iran’s auto sector, which expects approximately seventy-
five percent annual growth through 2018.512 
These trends will be reinforced by President Rouhani’s calls to 
diversify the national economy and to increase the country’s non-oil 
exports.513 In fact, President Rouhani has highlighted the automotive 
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sector as a strategic industry for economic revival, with a push to 
produce three million cars per year by 2021 and hopes to eventually 
serve neighboring markets.514 Beyond Iran’s own car manufacturing 
sector, international carmakers are likely to find a promising market 
for operations in Iran.515 Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot, Renault, and 
others have all declared plans to serve Iran’s massive automobile 
market, and are bound to find success there.516 For Peugeot 
specifically, Iran represented the company’s largest market outside 
France until 2011.517 
2. Alternative Sectors: Aviation, Finance, Consumer Goods, 
Tourism, and Renewable Energy 
Beyond Iran’s traditionally dominant industrial sectors, 
international investors will find unique opportunities across various 
alternative industries.518 Domestic economic conditions, combined 
with the long impact of sanctions, have fostered rare opportunities for 
international investment.519 For example, the average commercial 
aircraft in Iran is currently twenty-three years old, and airliners find 
themselves in dire need of new fleets.520 Iran plans to spend 
approximately US$20 billion on new aircraft purchases over the next 
ten years.521 While established aircraft manufacturers will satisfy such 
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sales, these new fleets should open a new secondary-servicing market 
rife with opportunities for foreign investors.522 Likewise, in the 
absence of sanctions, pressures are likely to mount toward revising 
domestic Iranian aviation’s inefficient and subsidized price models, 
which should make passenger airlines operating in the country more 
profitable.523 
Another sector posed to rebound upon the lifting of sanctions is 
Iran’s finance industry. As explained above, Iran’s banks were 
crippled through the late sanctions regime.524 Additionally, 
government-sponsored lending programs and poor lending practices 
throughout the Ahmadinejad era distressed Iranian banks, leaving 
them with poor asset portfolios and uncertain prospects through at 
least 2017.525 At the same time, Iranian banks have also been rocked 
with various high profile corruption scandals in recent years, while 
some of the largest players have been active participants in Iran’s 
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nuclear development program and regional terrorist financing.526 With 
domestic banks still reeling from the Ahmadinejad era, foreign banks 
could provide an important service to underserved Iranian 
consumers.527 Furthermore, despite the current outlook of the local 
banking scene, analysts predict various post-sanctions benefits to this 
sector within the short term.528 President Rouhani has promised to 
reform Iran’s broken finance sector, and there are expectations that 
this area of the economy will liberalize in upcoming years.529 
Additionally, the Tehran Stock Exchange (“TSE”) provides an 
attractive equity market for international portfolio investors as Iran 
climbs out of sanctions.530 International fund managers are already 
                                                                                                             
526. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 363; Ben Brumfield & Shirzad Bozorgmehr, Epic Bank Scandal Investigation Hits 
Ahmadinejad, CNN (Oct. 5, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/05/world
/meast/iran-bank-scandal/ (detailing the Bank Arya scandal); see also IRAN COMMERCIAL 
BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 35 (noting that Bank Melli Iran has been 
“repeatedly accused . . . of being a secret financial channel for the Iranian government’s 
nuclear weapons programme”); id. at 37 (stating that Bank Saderat has been “most often 
singled out among Iranian banks by the US Treasury Department and the UK for alleged 
involvement in the Iranian government’s nuclear programme and terrorist group financing”). 
527. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 9; Iranian 
Banks on Shaky Ground, supra note 525 (noting that Iran’s high domestic inflation will 
continue to eat into banks’ deposit growth). Likewise, foreign banks that maintain 
correspondent accounts in the United States will still need to ensure they comply with US 
Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorist Financing, and other compliance requirements. See 
generally Ian Allison, Iran Economic Explosion: Which Banks Will be First to Take the 
Plunge?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-economic-
explosion-which-banks-will-be-first-take-plunge-1510784 (providing various considerations 
for international banks returning to Iran); Henry Balani, Iran Nuclear Agreement’s AML 
Policy Implications, BANKING EXCH. (Sept. 4, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://www.bankingexchange.
com/compliance/bsa-aml/item/5726-iran-nuclear-agreement-s-aml-policy-implications. 
Additionally, there may be constitutional prohibitions in place that limit any significant 
participation of foreign banks in Iran. See infra Part II.D.1. 
528. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 15; Shadia 
Nasralla, Update 2- Iran Eyes Return to SWIFT System, Foreign Stakes in Privatisations After 
Sanctions, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-economy-
idUSL5N10425C20150724 (highlighting the benefits that will likely occur as Iranian banks 
reenter the SWIFT banking system). 
529. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 9; Rachel 
Williamson, Iranian Bankers Look to Rouhani Reforms to Save Industry, MIDDLE EAST 
MONITOR (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:01 PM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-
east/7653-iranian-bankers-look-to-rouhani-reforms-to-save-industry (discussing Rouhani’s 
liberalizing reforms to Iranian banking). 
530. See generally Sadakova, supra note 158; Morteza Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms 
Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private Equity Market, AL-MONITOR (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/iran-equity-market-deal.html 
(summarizing Iran’s equity markets). 
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surveying the TSE and will likely embody the first wave of foreign 
investment to return to Iran.531 In fact, even before Implementation 
Day, some international funds had already opened operations in the 
nearby United Arab Emirates, hoping to get a head start upon the 
lifting of sanctions.532 In July, 2015, the TSE traded at a 
comparatively low average price-to-earnings ratio (‟P/E ratio”) of 5.3, 
while less than three percent of TSE trading volume was conducted 
by international investors.533 The TSE is forecast to reach new highs 
as Iranian banks rejoin the SWIFT banking system.534 While not 
without risks, the TSE could represent an attractive destination for 
international investors and capital funds seeking to open up 
                                                                                                             
531. See Sadakova, supra note 158 (detailing the international scoping out of Iranian 
markets); Danielle Myles, Funds Will be the First to Enter Iran, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Aug. 17  
2015), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3475365/Funds-will-be-first-to-enter-Iran.html (noting that 
institutional funds will be among the first to reenter Iran). 
532. See Stephen Kalin, Iran Deal Stirs Wary Optimism in Dubai Trading Hub, 
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-uae-idUSL5N0JA39U
20131125 (describing the UAE’s role as a staging post for capital seeking to enter Iran). 
533. Generally, a low P/E ratio is attractive to investors, as it indicates that a stock or 
portfolio may be purchased for a low price in comparison to the asset’s earnings power, thus 
indicating the asset is undervalued. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 
159–60 (2006); P/E Ratio: An In-Depth Guide, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/peratio/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (explaining the role of P/E ratios in portfolio 
investing); see also Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative 
Private Equity Market, supra note 530 (listing Iran’s P/E ratio at 5.3); cf. Sadakova, supra note 
158 (describing the TSE as “large, liquid and cheap” with less than 3% trading volume 
stemming from international investors). For sake of comparison, the Saudi Arabian investment 
company Aljazira Capital calculates the Saudi Tadawul All Shares Index (“TASI”) to trade at 
an eight year average P/E ratio of 17.1. Exploiting Market Anomalies in the Saudi Stock 
Market, AL JAZIRA CAPITAL (Sept. 2014), http://www.aljaziracapital.com.sa/report_file/ess/
SPE-176.pdf; cf. Judith Evans, Fund Managers on the Iranian Frontier, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1, 
2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7de6a358-b798-11e4-8807-00144feab7de.html#axzz
3vSvjxrhx (favorably comparing the TSE’s P/E ratio and dividends yield to the MSCI Frontier 
Markets index). 
534. See Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private 
Equity Market, supra note 530; Adrian Nizzola et al., Iran: Understanding the Nuclear Deal 
and its Effect on Sanctions, SIMMONS & SIMMONS, http://www.simmons-simmons.com/~
/media/Files/Corporate/External%20publications%20pdfs/Iran%20%20Understanding%20
the%20nuclear%20deal%20and%20its%20effect%20on%20sanctions.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2016) (noting the positive influence rejoining SWIFT will have on the TSE). For a description 
of the SWIFT banking system, see supra note 333. Iran began reconnecting to SWIFT in early 
2016. See Andrew Torchia, Iranian Banks Reconnected to SWIFT Network After Four Year 
Hiatus, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSK
CN0VQ1FD; SWIFT Return to International Bank Transfers for Iran’s Banks, EURONEWS 
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.euronews.com/2016/02/01/swift-return-to-international-bank-
transfers-for-iran-s-banks/. 
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operations within Iran.535 Finally, the lifting of sanctions will open up 
Iranian firms to various merger and acquisition opportunities likely to 
be structured by international funds.536 
Iran’s consumer goods sector is also suited to provide numerous 
international investment opportunities following the lifting of 
sanctions.537 As noted above, Iran’s population of seventy-eight 
million is young, educated, and consumer friendly, providing an 
attractive market for international corporations and retailers.538 
Despite their government’s history of pariah-State policies, many 
Iranians are culturally sophisticated and internationally aware, given 
that “accessibility to international markets and media outlets such as 
satellite television, and later the Internet, have buttressed consumerist 
culture amongst urban Iranians.”539 Such consumerist culture has been 
growing steadily since the 1990s.540 Iran is the seventh top consumer 
of cosmetics in the world, and the nation with the highest per capita 
number of rhinoplasty procedures.541 Even during the most restrictive 
                                                                                                             
535. In particular, major risks include poor accounting transparency and archaic equity 
custodianship methods, partly due to past sanctions and the lack of a global custodian capable 
of securely managing transactions. However international banks reentering Iran could serve 
this exact role. See Sadakova, supra note 158; Bill Spindle & Dan Keeler, Nuclear Deal Could 
Drive Foreign Investors to Iranian Stocks, Wall Street J., Mar. 30, 2015, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/nuclear-deal-could-drive-foreign-investors-to-iran-stocks-1427750282. Other 
risks include cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles, and ongoing legal/reputational risks from 
equity transactions involving firms still designated by the United States as sponsors of 
terrorism. See Sadakova, supra note 158; Myles, supra note 531 (assessing risks within the 
Tehran Stock Exchange). 
536. See Ramezanpour, Foreign Firms Prepare to Dive into Iran’s Lucrative Private 
Equity Market, supra note 530; Golnar Motevalli & Matthew Martin, Iranian Investment Bank 
Amin Introduces M&A Advisory Service, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-30/iranian-investment-bank-amin-plans-mergers-and-
acquisitions-unit (evaluating M&A trends in Iran). 
537. See infra notes 538–44 and accompanying text. 
538. See supra note 450 and accompanying text; see also Myles, supra note 531; Harris, 
The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109 (looking at the foundations underlying strong Iranian 
consumerism). 
539. Shima Houshyar & Behzad Sarmadi, A Fashionable Revolution: Veiling, Morality, 
and Consumer Culture in Iran, AJAM MEDIA COLLECTIVE (Mar. 11, 2014), 
http://ajammc.com/2014/03/11/a-fashionable-revolution/; see Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 
50, at 110 (reinforcing the sophistication of Iran’s consumer culture). 
540. See Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539; Thomas Erdbrink, Lavish Malls 
Sprouting up to Attract Iranian Elite, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/01/19/world/middleeast/lavish-malls-sprouting-up-to-attract-iranian-elite.html 
(acknowledging the rise of consumerism in Iran). 
541. See Correspondent in Tehran, Billion Dollar Smuggling Industry Drains Iran’s 
Economy supra note 336; Mehrnaz Samimi, Cosmetics Boom in Iran, AL-MONITOR (Dec. 17, 
2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/makeup-iran-women-boom-
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years of the sanctions regime, Iran was home to approximately 6.5 
million banned, authentic iPhones.542 As in various other sectors, 
Iranian consumer tastes for Western products have been largely 
unsatisfied through the late sanctions era, resulting in unusual and 
potentially lucrative pent-up demand.543 McDonald’s began seeking 
local Iranian franchise partners in July 2015, exemplifying a symbolic 
corporate giant recognizing this particularized demand.544 
The Iranian tourism sector is also staged to attract significant 
attention from international investors. Iran possesses natural 
advantages well suited to a dynamic tourism industry, including 
“natural, religious, cultural and historical attractions.”545 Iran has 
nineteen current World Heritage Sites, with approximately fifty 
further sites tentatively listed.546 Yet, in 2012, tourism accounted for a 
mere two percent of Iran’s GDP.547 As such, tourism represents one of 
                                                                                                             
counterfeit-plastic-surgery.html (ranking Iran’s cosmetics market at the seventh largest in the 
world); Sadakova, supra note 158 (noting that Iran has the highest per capita number of 
rhinoplasty); The Beauty Obsession Feeding Iran’s Voracious Cosmetic Surgery Industry, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/mar/01/beauty-
obsession-iran-cosmetic-surgery (noting Iran’s unparalleled practice of rhinoplasty). 
542. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Dick Simon, The 
Biggest Myths about Doing Business with Iran, CNBC (July 14, 2015, 1:25 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/14/the-biggest-myths-about-doing-business-with-iran.html 
(pointing out Iran’s 6.5 million iPhones). Although these sorts of indicators are often 
overblown in the West to stand in for everything from Iranian political attitudes to gendered 
perceptions of Islam, at a more basic level such trends certainly bode well for international 
businesses seeking to operate within Iran. See generally Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539 
(explaining the oppressive fallacies inherent in attempting to find social meaning in the 
interpretation of these sorts of consumerist trends). 
543. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Scott & Bryan, 
supra note 521 (explaining wide Iranian pent-up demand). 
544. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Heather Long, Will 
Iran Get McDonald’s Now?, CNN MONEY (Jan. 19, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/
investing/iran-sanctions/ (citing McDonalds’ interest in serving Iran). 
545. Ali Khaksari et al., Religious Perceptions and Hegemony on Tourism Development: 
the Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 INT’L J. TOURISM RES. 97, 98 (2014); see 
Farahmand Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, AL-
MONITOR (May 1, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-hotels-
tourism-esfahan-shiraz.html (summarizing the state of Iran’s tourism industry). 
546. See World Heritage Sites in Iran, WORLD HERITAGE SITE, http://www.
worldheritagesite.org/worldheritagelist.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016); UNESCO Sites, 
DESTINATION IRAN, http://www.destinationiran.com/unesco-list (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) 
(listing Iran’s world heritage sites). 
547. See Marais, supra note 449, at 14; Maria Sheahan & Victoria Bryan, Iran Tourism 
Sector Aims to Rebuild as International Tensions Thaw, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-tourism-idUSKBN0M220L20150306 (assessing Iran’s 
dismal tourism levels). 
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Iran’s most underdeveloped economic sectors, with some 
optimistically noting its potential to bring in more revenue than the 
State’s oil sector.548 While the Shah pushed for increased tourism 
development before his ousting in 1979, the revolution and 
subsequent Iran-Iraq War stalled further development.549 Today few 
international hotels operate in Iran, and there is a shortage of hotel 
rooms throughout the country.550 In fact, according to one Iranian 
travel agent, in the past three decades, only two new hotels have been 
constructed in the Iranian capital.551 Concerns over the cultural impact 
of international tourism have historically prevented the Islamic 
Republic from formally adopting tourism development as a serious 
goal for Iran’s economy.552 However in recent years, there are some 
signs that the regime’s attitude may be shifting.553 Plans are in place 
to construct between 200 and 400 three- and four-star hotels in the 
country.554 The government seeks to quadruple Iran’s tourist intake 
from five million to twenty million visitors per year, translating to a 
jump from US$6 billion in annual tourism revenue to between 
US$25-30 billion.555 The Iranian government has also taken measures 
                                                                                                             
548. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 98 (noting the potential for Iranian tourism 
revenue to outpace that of oil); cf. Tourism Can Help Iran Move Away From Oil, FIN. TRIB. 
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://financialtribune.com/articles/travel/11133/tourism-can-help-iran-move-
away-oil (providing a wider assessment of Iran’s tourism potential). 
549. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 99–100; Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry 
Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note 545 (recalling the history of Iran’s tourism 
industry). 
550. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Alipour, Iran’s 
Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note 545 (addressing the 
insufficient infrastructure comprising Iran’s contemporary tourism sector). 
551. Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra note 
545. 
552. See Khaksari et al., supra note 545, at 99 (evaluating the regime’s attitude 
concerning tourism development); cf. Steve Inskeep, ‘You Are Invited’: Isolated Iran Seeks 
Foreign Tourists, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 18, 2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/parallels/2015/02/18/387149018/you-are-invited-isolated-iran-seeks-foreign-tourists 
(“Since Islamist clerics took power in 1979, they have limited the people’s contact with the 
outside world. The government has controlled information and granted very few visas to 
would-be visitors.”). 
553. See infra notes 554–57 and accompanying text. 
554. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra 
note 545; COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 14 (forecasting new hotel constructions 
in Iran). 
555. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch up with Demand, supra 
note 545; Maria Gallucci, Iran Could See a ‘Tsunami’ of Tourists as Iran Nuclear Deal Takes 
Hold, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-could-see-
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to open tourism offices abroad in China, Italy, Malaysia, Spain, and 
Switzerland, with forty-four more offices slated to open in the 
future.556 Already, international investors are breaking ground in Iran, 
with the French hotel chain Accor having opened its first Iranian 
branch in October, 2015.557 
Finally, one last interesting frontier sector in post-sanctions Iran 
could be the nation’s budding alternative energy industry.558 As noted 
above, Iran faces real challenges related to domestic energy 
consumption and the erosion of export revenues as both oil and gas 
are diverted internally.559 With ninety-seven percent of Iran’s energy 
use coming from carbon-based resources as recently as 2007, the 
alternative energy space represents an especially strategic focal point 
for Iran’s development goals.560 Indeed, the expansion of this space 
could be the primary means of addressing Iran’s internal energy 
consumption.561 While the State’s renewable energy development 
goals remain unmet, the government has put incentives in place to 
encourage investment within the renewable energy sector.562 
                                                                                                             
tsunami-tourists-iran-nuclear-deal-takes-hold-ap-report-2145730 (citing future Iranian tourism 
revenue targets). 
556. See Alipour, Iran’s Tourism Industry Scrambles to Catch Up with Demand, supra 
note 545; Iran to Establish 20 More Tourism Offices Overseas by March 2016, TEHRAN 
TIMES (May 18, 2015), http://www.tehrantimes.com/PDF/12271/12271-5.pdf (looking to 
Iran’s 44 slated international tourism offices). 
557. See Walt, Picking Winners in the Race to Iran, supra note 449; Foreign Investment 
in Iran: France’s Accor Hotels Opens Two Hotels in Tehran, Novotel Ikia and Ibis Ikia, 
PERSIANESQUE, (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.persianesquemagazine.com/2015/10/22/foreign-
investment-in-iran-accorhotels-opens-two-hotels-in-tehran-novotel-ikia-and-ibis-ikia/ 
(recognizing Accor’s new hotels in Iran). 
558. See infra notes 559–67 and accompanying text. 
559. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text (examining Iran’s subsidy policies 
and domestic energy consumption). 
560. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 7; Koen Groot, The Geopolitical Impact of 
the Increasing Trade and Investment Relations between the National Oil Companies of China, 
Iran and Russia 62 (July 19, 2010), http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=190628 
(unpublished thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam) (noting that ninety-seven percent of Iran’s 
energy consumption stems from carbon-based sources). 
561. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 8; Bijan Khajehpour, Iran’s Renewable 
Energy Sector Poised for Growth, AL-MONITOR (July 26, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/ 
pulse/originals/2013/07/renewable-energy-iran-development.html# (suggesting renewable 
energy development as a solution to Iran’s subsidy crisis). 
562. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 8 (“only 38% the goals of Iran’s fourth 
national development plan in RE have been achieved [as of 2014]”); see also Opportunities to 
Construction Renewable Energy Power Plants in Iran, MINISTRY OF ENERGY: RENEWABLE 
ENERGY ORG. IRAN (SUNA), http://www.suna.org.ir/en/opportunitiestoconstruction/ 
opportunities (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 14 tabl. 1 
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Meanwhile, according to one study, conditions in Iran are suitably 
aligned at every stage of renewable energy supply chains.563 In 
particular, Iran’s vast surface area and sunny climate make the nation 
an attractive location for solar power generation.564 Additionally, 
there are various marketable models for off-plant solar use that could 
help move Iranians away from internal gas consumption.565 
Hydropower and wind energy present two other viable renewable 
energy subsectors.566 International expertise from established 
renewable energy players would help advance Iran’s goals in this 
industry. In fact, German firms have already signed massive contracts 
to develop ambitious solar and wind projects within Iran.567 
C. Investor Risks in Iran 
Considering the numerous opportunities that post-sanctions Iran 
provides for international investors, it is important for foreign entrants 
to remain cognizant of the many risks of investing in Iran.568 Broadly, 
these risks fall within two categories: commercial risks, dealing with 
economic and market forces that impact a firm’s ability to generate 
                                                                                                             
(summarizing Iran’s renewable energy goals and measures currently in place to incentivize 
renewable energy production). 
563. These stages include the resource stage, the generation stage, the transmission 
stage, distribution, and finally consumption. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 13; see also 
Amory B. Lovins, Iran’s Invisible Opportunity, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://thebulletin.org/iran%E2%80%99s-invisible-opportunity8774 (assessing Iran’s favorable 
conditions for renewable energy). 
564. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 9; Alok Jha, Tehran Looks to the Skies for 
Cheap Power from the Sun, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/blog/2009/jan/06/alternative-energy-solar-power (pointing out Iran’s natural 
capacity for solar power). 
565. See Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 10 (“In addition to power plant-based 
functions of solar energy, off plant thermal functions are considered as hot water supply by 
solar water heaters for washing and bathing, heating-cooling and solar air conditioning, solar 
desalination, solar drier, solar ovens, and solar furnaces.”). See generally Solar Heating & 
Cooling, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASSOC. (May 17, 2013), http://www.seia.org/sites/default/
files/Solar%20Heating%20and%20Cooling%206.18.13.pdf (providing an overview of solar 
cooling and heating). 
566. See  Aslani & Feng, supra note 482, at 10–11; Lovins, supra note 563 (noting 
Iran’s potential for wind and hydropower). 
567. See Nicholas Brautlecht & Stefan Nicola, Iran’s Thirst for Energy Draws in Wind 
Developers, BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-07-29/nuclear-deal-opens-market-as-big-as-france-for-iran-wind; German Firm Licensed 
to Set up Solar Power Plants in Iran, FARS NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 30, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://
en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940909001551 (summarizing German-Iranian 
renewable energy deals). 
568. See infra notes 569–619 (assessing risks to international investors in Iran). 
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returns; and political risks, which involve the rights of investors and 
the political forces that effect their investments.569 Generally 
speaking, commercial risks faced by investors in Iran are likely to 
involve conditions beyond the control or influence of the investment 
community.570 Therefore, such risks will be best mitigated by sound 
business judgment and prudent economic decisions.571 To the 
contrary, while political risks might also exist beyond the direct 
control of investors, their pitfalls may be mitigated through the 
application of established international investment law.572 
1. Commercial Risks 
Throughout the foreseeable future, the Iranian economy will be 
subject to numerous challenges likely to effect investor returns.573 The 
early post-sanctions era will be marked by macroeconomic 
uncertainties ranging from exchange rate uncertainty to inflation 
uncertainty.574 Inflation in particular is a cause for concern.575 
Likewise, the World Bank notes that high unemployment will also 
continue to plague Iran’s economy, especially for young Iranians, for 
whom unemployment is estimated at approximately thirty-five 
                                                                                                             
569. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12; Vladan S. Perišić et al., Foreign Direct 
Investment and Non-Commercial Risks, 23 ANNALS ORADEA U. FASCICLE OF MGMT. & 
TECH. ENGINEERING 93, 93-96 (Aug. 2014) (differentiating commercial risk and political 
risk). 
570. See infra Part II.C.1. 
571. See infra Part II.C.1; see also SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12 (defining commercial 
risk). 
572. See infra Part II.C.2; see also SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“A fundamental 
purpose of investment treaties and political risk insurance . . . is to provide foreign investors 
and their investments with a level of protection against political risks.”). 
573. See infra notes 574–89 and accompanying text. 
574. See generally Z. Rozeei et al., The Study of the Effective Factors on Investment in 
Private Sector in Iran (With Emphasis on Uncertainty), 6 INT’L J. INDUS. MATHEMATICS 255, 
256–57 (2014) (investigating the role of commercial uncertainty on investment in Iran); 
MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 506–07 
(evaluating the economic adversity currently faced by Iran). 
575. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 114; Alireza Ramezani, Is Iran on the Right 
Track to Managing Inflation?, AL-MONITOR (June 11, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2015/06/iran-inflation-management-debt-banking.html# (addressing inflation 
in Iran). Although inflation has fallen since the signing of the JCPOA it is forecast to remain 
high, and is likely to be further fueled by the government’s ongoing subsidy reforms. See 
Khajehpour, How the Nuclear Deal Will Help Iran’s Economy, supra note 454 (noting the fall 
of inflation after the JCPOA, but also citing structural inflation concerns within Iran’s 
economy); see also IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 27; 
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 6 (explaining the relationship between 
inflation rates and the unwinding of Iran’s fuel/food subsidies.). 
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percent.576 For investors, high unemployment limits the Iranian 
population’s consumption potential, and further reduces the quality of 
Iran’s labor pool as highly skilled Iranians leave the country to seek 
employment abroad.577 Domestic labor laws that make it difficult to 
terminate hired employees further compound these trends.578 At a 
more structural level, an inefficient State sector and distortions from 
government involvement in the economy will also continue to 
undermine investor-led growth.579 The State’s subsidy programs 
represent a major area of market distortion, and although these 
concerns are being addressed, volatility remains likely in this space 
throughout the immediate future.580 Additionally, the government 
demands a burdensome registration and ownership process for firms 
operating within Iran.581 Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, stand 
at twenty-five percent, an improvement from the past tax rate of fifty-
four percent.582 
                                                                                                             
576. See Iran Overview, supra note 449 (discussing unemployment in Iran); CAMMETT 
ET AL., supra note 41, at 315 (highlighting unemployment among the Iranian youth). Even 
before the intensification of the sanctions regime, young Iranians searched for employment for 
an average of three years before landing a job. Omid Memarian & Tara Nesvaderani, The 
Youth, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at, 50. 
577. See PRS GROUP, IRAN COUNTRY CONDITIONS 1 (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with 
author) (further exploring the New Privatization Act); Farshad Mohammadi, Can Iran 
Convince its Brainiacs to Return?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 17, 2014 8:06 AM), http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/can-iran-convince-brain-drain-2014415115753960
687.html (noting Iran’s “brain drain” problem). 
578. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (“labor law in Iran, generally speaking, makes 
it difficult for employers to lay-off employees.”); cf. ROUZNAMEH RASMI [LABOUR CODE] 
Tehran [1990], §§ 21–33 (Iran), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/21843/64830/ 
E90IRN01.htm. 
579. See COUNTRYWATCH, IRAN, supra note 168, at 329; Iran Overview, supra note 
449 (explaining the public sector’s burden on private sector-led growth). 
580. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text; see also IMF COUNTRY REPORT 
NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 17; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE 
REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 475 (addressing the impact of subsidies on Iran’s economy). 
581. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (summarizing the “special process” involved 
in foreign nationals owning real property in Iran). The most recent World Bank comparisons 
rank Iran 118th out of 189 nations in ease of doing business. See Ease of Doing Business in 
Iran, Islamic Rep., WORLD BANK GRP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/ 
iran/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
582. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749; Iran Tax: Country Briefing, AM. INT’L GRP., 
http://www.aig.com/_2590_379141.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (placing Iran’s corporate 
tax rate at 25 percent). Additionally, the Iranian government has ushered a series of tax 
holidays, seeking to attract foreign investment. See A Review of the Iranian Tax System, ORG. 
INV. ECON. & TECH. ASSISTANCE OF IRAN, http://www.investiniran.ir/en/whyiran1/tax (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2016); Leila Piran, Iran Releases Plan to Attract Foreign Investment, 
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International investors should also remain wary of various 
accountability risks scattered throughout the Iranian economy.583 The 
past practices of Iran’s financial institutions leave much to be desired 
for firms conducting monetary transactions within Iran, and the lack 
of custodianship safeguards within the Tehran Stock Exchange raises 
questions concerning wider Iranian accounting practices.584 Lax 
intellectual property protections raise further concerns.585 Iran’s 
massive bureaucracy provides ample threats of government 
interference, and only recently has the depth of the previous 
administration’s corruption been discovered.586 Past investors in Iran 
have undertaken both financial and reputational damage from similar 
corruption scandals.587 In light of these discouraging threats to foreign 
investment, President Rouhani has initiated a major push to combat 
these practices.588 Whether his reforms will be effective remains to be 
seen.589 
                                                                                                             
MUFTAH (Sept. 25, 2014), http://muftah.org/iran-releases-plan-attract-foreign-
investment/#.VoGvMBorJ-U. 
583. See infra notes 584–89 and accompanying text. 
584. See supra note 526 and accompanying text (discussing Iranian bank scandals); see 
also supra note 535 (highlighting custodian issues in the Tehran Stock Exchange). 
585. See IRAN COMMERCIAL BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 14; Benoît 
Faucon, U.S. Firms Prepare for End to Iran Sanctions, WALL STREET J., Dec. 23, 2015, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-firms-prepare-for-end-to-iran-sanctions-1450896958 (noting Iran’s 
lax intellectual property protection). 
586. See Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract Private Investors?, supra 
note 458; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 
363 (discussing Iran’s recent corruption scandals). 
587. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 388–89 (“The companies considered doing business in Iran’s contentious political 
environment frustrating and several found themselves enmeshed in costly corruption scandals 
that damaged both their profile within Iran as well as their international reputation.”); see, e.g., 
Guy Chazan, Total Agrees Penalty to Settle US Bribes Charge Over Iran Deal, FIN. TIMES 
(May 29, 2013), https://next.ft.com/content/c372b0d0-c878-11e2-acc6-00144feab7de 
(recalling Total’s entanglement with Iranian corruption). 
588. See supra note 458 and accompanying text (mentioning Rouhani’s current fight 
against corruption in Iran). 
589. See Khajehpour, Will Iran’s Corruption Fight Attract Private Investors?,  supra 
note 458 (“the real campaign against corruption will be the one that addresses legal, political 
and structural issues so that future cases can be prevented. It remains to be seen if the Rouhani 
administration will generate the political will to approach the issue from this perspective”); 
IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 5–6 (“The new administration that took 
office in August 2013 earned a strong mandate and has already made significant progress in 
improving the external environment and confidence in the outlook. The administration’s 100-
day report confirmed how well aware the authorities are of the economic challenges ahead and 
many of the reforms needed. But the task of advancing reforms ahead will be difficult, not 
least due to a highly complex institutional set-up and a difficult socio-political context.”). 
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2. Political Risks 
Considering the history of international investment in Iran from 
the 1979 Revolution throughout the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, the nation holds an intimate relationship with the subject of 
political risk.590 However its political risk profile has seen dramatic 
changes since 1979.591 In post-sanctions Iran, the primary political 
risk entails the “snapback” provisions of the JCPOA, which are 
cocked and loaded to reintroduce sanctions in the event of Iran’s (or 
the P5+1’s) noncompliance.592 Such a development would have a 
devastating impact on international investors within Iran, 
complicating the lawfulness of such operations.593 Furthermore, the 
weak “advisory” dispute resolution procedures under Section 36 of 
the JCPOA facilitate the possibility of turning minor interpretive 
differences into full-blown noncompliance.594 In the event that any 
individual party to the JCPOA (except perhaps Germany) seeks the 
deal’s termination, there seem to be no meaningful safeguards in 
place to prevent the initiation of snapbacks.595 
                                                                                                             
590. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing the US investment 
experience in Iran between the Revolution and the IUSCT). 
591. See infra notes 592-619 (surveying today’s political risk profile in Iran). 
592. See supra notes 422-423 and accompanying text; JCPOA, supra note 185, §§ 36-
37; see also Tharoor, The Historic Nuclear Deal with Iran: How It Works, supra note 400; 
Sadakova, supra note 158 (detailing the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism). 
593. While snapbacks would have no retroactive effect on the lawfulness of most 
contracts signed within the timeframe of the JCPOA’s lifespan, which become grandfathered 
in, they would raise numerous hurdles to a firm’s ability to conduct ongoing operations. See 
JCPOA, supra note 185, § 37 (“[Snapback] provisions would not apply with retroactive effect 
to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the 
date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such 
contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council 
resolutions.”). 
594. See JCPOA, supra note 185, § 36 (containing the JCPOA’s dispute resolution 
procedures). 
595. In fact, this is the very point of the snapback provisions. See JCPOA, supra note 
185, §§ 36-37 (“If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their 
commitments under this JCPOA Iran could [initiate dispute resolution procedures]; similarly, 
if any of the E3/Eu+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, 
any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same.”) (emphasis added). Upon the exhaustion of these 
dispute resolution mechanisms, snapbacks are triggered via a party’s referral to the UN 
Security Council. The risk here is potentially greater than first meets the eye. Say, for example, 
that Russia wishes to terminate the JCPOA, not because of actual Iranian noncompliance but 
because its own national interests mandate such a decision. Moscow jumps through the dispute 
resolution hoops of Section 36, then refers the claimed breach to the Security Council. The 
default to sanctions under the snapback provisions of Section 37 would seemingly be 
automatic (after 30 days), unless the Security Council votes otherwise. But in such a case, 
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Considering this snapback vulnerability, there are significant 
risks to foreign investors emanating from domestic politics within the 
parties of the JCPOA.596 This is especially true in Iran, where the 
Islamic Republic is subject to deep and enduring political 
cleavages.597 Given the economic challenges highlighted above, both 
the Rouhani Administration and likeminded reformists face an uphill 
battle to meet the needs and demands of the Iranian people.598 
Different segments of the population hold differing expectations of 
post-sanctions conditions.599 Iran’s February 26, 2016 elections, 
which produced gains for the moderate camp in both the Majles and 
the Assembly of Experts, were certainly a positive step for 
Rouhani.600 However, for this trend to continue, the Iranian 
                                                                                                             
Russia’s permanent member veto in the Security Council would effectively block the blocking 
of sanctions renewal. Thus, in this hypothetical, Russia has weaponized a mere bad faith 
noncompliance accusation, and essentially hijacked the Security Council to unilaterally 
recreate binding multilateral sanctions. While there is a vague potential escape hatch from such 
abuse in Section 36’s requirement that states include a “description of the good-faith efforts 
the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA” when 
handing noncompliance issues over to the Security Council, this seems a flimsy line of defense 
considering the costs such action could entail across the globe. States could alternatively just 
refuse to implement the Security Council’s new sanctions, but in doing so would seem to 
undermine the credibility of international law. Presumably, Germany is the one party that 
would not be enabled to unilaterally trigger multilateral snapbacks, in light of their lack of a 
veto. But see Jeremy Bender & Brett LoGiurato, The World is Already Weakening One of the 
Key ‘Checks’ on the Iran Deal, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.
com/snap-back-sanctions-problems-in-iran-deal-2015-8; Jennifer Rubin, James Baker is 
Wrong: The Iran Deal Can’t Be Fixed, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/04/17/james-baker-is-wrong-the-iran-deal-cant-
be-fixed/ (arguing that even with a snapback, sanctions against Iran can never meaningfully be 
reimposed). 
596. See infra notes 597-603 and accompanying text. 
597. See CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 312 (“The regime still rests on an uneasy 
alliance of two very different sets of interests: populist lower and lower-middle classes and 
prosperous clergy and business associates.”); IRAN: COUNTRY RISK REPORT, supra note 161, 
at 11 (detailing the rifts between Iran’s youth and powerful clerics). 
598. See Arash Karami, Iranians Look to Post-Deal Economic, Political Changes, AL-
MONITOR (July 6, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/contents/articles/originals/ 
2015/07/iran-economy-and-politics-after-nuclear-deal.html; Saeid Jafari, Rouhani Faces 
Ballooning Expectations at Home in Post-Sanctions Era, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 28, 2015), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/rouhani-post-sanctions.html (examining 
Iran’s post-sanctions expectations). 
599. See Karami, Iranians Look to Post-Deal Economic, Political Changes, supra note 
598; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 
499–501 (looking at how ideology shapes future Iranian outlooks). 
600. See Thomas Erdbrink, Iranian President and Moderates Make Strong Gains in 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/world/ 
middleeast/iran-elections.html?_r=0; Ted Regencia, Moderates Dominate Council of Clerics in 
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population will need to see ongoing benefits related to the lifting of 
sanctions.601 Otherwise, Rouhani’s compliance with the JCPOA could 
be undercut by a rightward shift in Tehran.602 Similarly, across the 
Atlantic, the United States is not without its own partisan struggles. 
US voters may also need to see some positive results from the nuclear 
deal in order for the JCPOA to outlive the Obama Presidency’s 
expiration in January 2017, regardless of which party inherits the 
White House.603 
Finally, both domestic and regional instability are each 
significant components of Iran’s political risk profile.604 On the 
domestic front, international policymakers have long predicted the 
collapse of the Islamic Republic and subsequent regime change in 
Iran.605 While such predictions have yet to materialize, events like the 
2009-10 Green Revolution reveal there are at least cracks in the 
regime’s grip on power.606 Although many Western governments and 
investors alike would welcome regime change in Iran, any mass 
                                                                                                             
Iran Elections, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/ 
moderates-dominate-council-clerics-iran-elections-160229091044340.html (assessing the 
victory of moderates in Iran’s February 2016 elections); see also Akbar Ganji, Iran’s Moment 
of Truth: Don’t Worry About the Nuclear Deal, Worry About the Elections, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-09-24/irans-moment-truth; 
Mehdi Khalaji, Iranian Moderates Face Tall Obstacles in 2016 Elections, WASH. INST. NEAR 
E. POL. (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-
moderates-face-tall-obstacles-in-2016-elections (highlighting what was at stake in Iran’s 2016 
elections). 
601. See Nader Habibi, After Sanctions, Rouhani’s Economic Agenda Faces Challenges 
in Iran, WORLD POL. REV. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/ 
17861/after-sanctions-rouhani-s-economic-agenda-faces-challenges-in-iran; Ladane Nasseri & 
Golnar Motevalli, Economy Remains No. 1 Focus for Rouhani Emboldened by Polls, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-28/economy-
remains-no-1-focus-for-rouhani-emboldened-by-iran-polls (detailing the reform challenges 
ahead for Rouhani). 
602. See Habibi, supra note 601. 
603. See Peter D. Feaver & Eric Lorber, Long View on Iran: The Real Work Will Start 
after the Nuclear Deal is Signed, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-24/long-view-iran; Gerald F. Seib, Iran Nuclear Deal Lands 
in the Middle of 2016 Debate, WALL STREET J., Sept. 14, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
iran-nuclear-deal-lands-in-the-middle-of-2016-debate-1442245305 (exploring the JCPOA 
within the context of the US presidential race). 
604. See infra notes 605–14 and accompanying text. 
605. See, e.g., Benjamin Weinthal, Analysis: Still Hope for Regime Change in Iran, 
JERUSALEM POST (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ANALYSIS-Still-
hope-for-regime-change-in-Iran-417827; Ray Takeyh, Islamism: R.I.P., WASH. INST. NEAR E. 
POL’Y (Spring 2001), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/islamism-r.i.p 
(anticipating the collapse of the Islamic Republic). 
606. See supra notes 172-73 (discussing Iran’s Green Movement).  
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uprising would entail severe disruptions to business operations in the 
country. In fact, even a more Western-friendly government in Tehran 
would probably be pressured to rescind some contracts previously 
granted by the outgoing regime.607 International investors should 
ensure they have contingency plans in place to respond to these types 
of scenarios.608 Furthermore, on the regional side, Iran faces 
significant threats from its neighbors that could do irreparable damage 
to the JCPOA.609 The intensification of proxy conflicts with Iran’s 
Sunni rivals in places like Syria and Yemen holds the inherent 
potential of escalating into outright war between these regional 
powers, in some shape or form.610 Likewise, the Israeli Knesset has 
made it clear that it is no fan of the nuclear deal.611 Three-quarters of 
Jewish Israelis continue to view Iran as an existential threat following 
the signing of the JCPOA, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu has made routine threats of unilateral military action 
                                                                                                             
607. Periods of sudden political transition, even toward investment-friendly 
governments, are still often forced to contend with the economic disturbances and the 
instability of rapid political change. In the short term, such conditions can be bad for investors. 
To take one recent example: the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution—which pivoted Kiev away from 
Russia and toward the EU—was still witness to numerous contract breaches, some of which 
were valued in billions of dollars. See Roman Olearchyk, Chevron Pulls Out of Shale Gas 
Project in Ukraine, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://next.ft.com/content/76b41d9c-847e-
11e4-ba4f-00144feabdc0; Sergei Kuznetsov, Ukraine Crisis Unsettles Shell and Chevron, FIN. 
TIMES (Jun. 24, 2014), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/06/24/ukraine-crisis-unsettles-
shell-and-chevron/. 
608. See, e.g. SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 245-73 (providing an overview of political 
risk insurance, as one method of protecting against potential expropriation). 
609. See infra notes 610–19 and accompanying text. 
610. This is not to minimize the bloodshed of current Iran-Saudi proxy wars, such as 
Syria (where Saudi Arabia is supporting Sunni insurgents against the Alawite, Iranian backed 
regime) or Yemen (where Iranian support for Shia Houthi rebels has led Saudi Arabia to 
conduct a direct military intervention on their own Arabian Peninsula). See Diana Alghoul, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia Move Beyond Proxy Conflict, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/21528-iran-and-saudi-arabia-move-
beyond-proxy-conflict (noting the intensification of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s proxy conflicts); 
Eric Ham, ISIS v. Iran v. Saudi Arabia: The Worst-Case Scenario, WASH. TIMES, July 28, 
2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/ 
jul/28/isis-v-iran-v-saudi-arabia-worst-case-scenario/ (explaining ISIS’ opportunistic goading 
of Saudi Arabia toward war with Iran). 
611. See, e.g., Louis Charbonneau & Hugh Bronstein, Israel’s Netanyahu Launches All-
Out Assault on Iran Deal at U.N., REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2015/10/01/us-un-assembly-israel-idUSKCN0RV57K20151001#8WXeDPKvRMBHrmsJ.97; 
Joel B. Pollak, Israeli Opposition Puts Aside Hatred of Netanyahu to Oppose Iran Deal, 
BREITBART (July 15, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/15/israeli-
opposition-puts-aside-hatred-of-netanyahu-to-oppose-iran-deal/ (emphasizing Israel’s 
opposition to the JCPOA). 
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against Iran in the past.612 In fact, the likelihood of an Israeli strike 
often makes its way into investment outlook reports concerning 
Iran.613 Under such a scenario, Israeli action would “almost certainly 
disintegrate” the JCPOA, representing a major blow to foreign 
investors with going concerns in the country.614 
In addition to these Iran-specific risks, investors should also be 
mindful of all of the traditional risks of international investment, from 
expropriation to regulatory hurdles that threaten the profitability of 
business operations abroad.615 In light of the investor experience of 
1979, the risks of expropriation and nationalization will be at the front 
of the minds of many investors.616 However, such forms of political 
risk are suited to mitigation through legal innovations and the 
protections of law. Iran’s experience since the Islamic Revolution has 
mandated a shift in attitudes concerning foreign investment, contrary 
to the widespread suspicions and mistrust of 1979.617 In fact, Iran’s 
dynamic participation in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
combined with the liberalizing forces of globalization, have resulted 
in a level of Iranian sophistication concerning international 
investment law.618 These processes have resulted in a sort of cross-
pollination, whereby many of the international norms of investment 
law have managed to find their way into Iranian law at the national 
                                                                                                             
612. See JTA, Most Israeli Jews Say Iran Deal ‘Existential Threat’, TIMES OF ISRAEL 
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/most-israeli-jews-say-iran-deal-existential-
threat-poll/; Majority of Jewish-Israelis Agree Iran Deal Poses ‘Existential Threat,’ Poll 
Finds, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.jta.org/2015/09/10/ 
default/majority-of-jewish-israelis-agree-iran-deal-poses-existential-threat-poll-finds 
(considering the Israeli view that Iran poses an existential threat); see also Israeli PM 
Threatens to Strike Iran, AL JAZEERA (July 17, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 
middleeast/2013/07/2013714214528446397.html; Jodi Rudoren, Netanyahu Says He’d Go It 
Alone on Striking Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/ 
world/middleeast/netanyahu-uses-tough-tone-on-possible-iran-strike.html?_r=0 (illustrating 
Netanyahu’s unilateral threats against Iran). 
613. See, e.g., IRAN COUNTRY UPDATE, supra note 333, at 2; IRAN COMMERCIAL 
BANKING REPORT Q3 2015, supra note 339, at 11 (addressing the risk of an Israeli strike 
within Iran’s economic forecasts). 
614. Feaver & Lorber, supra note 603; see Eric Pianin, After Obama’s Nuke Deal, What 
Happens If Israel Attacks Iran?, FISCAL TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.
com/2015/07/16/After-Obama-s-Nuke-Deal-What-Happens-If-Israel-Attacks-Iran 
(contemplating the consequences of an Israeli strike against Iran). 
615.  See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 12-13 (summarizing political risk). 
616. See supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text (discussing expropriation in Iran 
following the 1979 Revolution). 
617. See infra Part II.D. 
618. See, e.g., infra notes 642-67 (FIPPA). 
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and international level.619 This legal framework is the focus of the 
following Part. 
D. Iranian Investment Law 
The benefits of clear legal rules and procedures governing 
international investment are that such innovations soften the inherent 
uncertainties of investment beyond one’s own borders.620 
International investment law allows for protections and safeguards in 
the face of uncertainty, laying the groundwork and boundaries within 
which investors and States may be expected to operate.621 
International law scholar Jeswald W. Salacuse identifies three layers 
of international investment law: law at the contractual level, governed 
by the terms negotiated between parties; law at the national level, 
ruled by the national legislation of host States; and law at the 
international level, centered around the international treaties by 
which, through ratification, a State party agrees to be bound.622 While 
a review of Iranian investment contracts will be best left to ad hoc, 
case-by-case analyses, Iranian investment law at the national and 
international levels involves important protections with which 
investors eyeing Iran should familiarize themselves.623 
1. National Investment Law 
Iran’s treatment of international investment is grounded 
foremost in the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.624 Initially drafted in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, Iran’s Constitution 
contains many restrictive provisions aimed at preventing the repeat of 
the economic exploitation experienced under the Pahlavi regime.625 
                                                                                                             
619. See infra notes 642–67. 
620. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 25–28; Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and 
International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 491–92 (2014) (observing 
the ability of international investment law to reduce investor uncertainty). 
621.  See Yackee, supra note 620, at 491–92.  
622. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10 (explaining the three layers of international 
investment law). 
623. See infra Part II.D.1 (examining Iranian investment law at the national level) and 
Part II.D.2 (overviewing Iranian investment law at the international level).  
624. See infra notes 625-26.  
625. For a background on the history and ideology behind Iran’s constitution, see Iran 
After the Victory of 1979’s Revolution, supra note 63; Francis Fukuyama, Iran, Islam and the 
Rule of Law, WALL STREET J., July 27, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529
70203946904574300374086282670. 
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These constitutional underpinnings form a problematic starting point 
for international investors seeking to enter Iran. Specifically, Article 
44 of the Constitution divides the national economy between three 
sectors: the State sector; the cooperative sector; and the private 
sector.626 The State sector includes all State enterprises and an 
expansive collection of industries presumably deemed to be within 
Iran’s national security interests.627 The cooperative sector includes 
“cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with production 
and distribution, in urban and rural areas;” and finally, the private 
sector broadly includes, “those activities concerned with agriculture, 
animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the 
economic activities of the State and cooperative sectors.”628 These 
provisions in Article 44 make clear that the Constitution envisions a 
strong, centrally planned economy, where private participation works 
in tandem with the State’s primary role in economic activities.629 This 
places limits on both privatization efforts and foreign investment 
encouragement, which, at least within Iran, seek to liberalize the 
economy without directly challenging the Islamic Republic.630 
Article 81 of Iran’s constitution also contains problematic 
language, stating that: “The granting of concessions to foreigners or 
the formation of companies or institutions dealing with commerce, 
industry, agriculture, service, or mineral extraction, is absolutely 
                                                                                                             
626. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44(1) (dividing Iran’s economy into three legal 
categories). 
627. See id. art. 44(2) (“The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother 
industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and 
large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, 
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and 
administered by the State.”). That said, Article 44 was amended in 2004 in order to soften the 
rigid divisions between the provision’s economic categories, thereby allowing, for example, 
privately owned banks and other privatization efforts. See Public Information Notice, Int’l 
Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 27, 2006); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1747. 
628.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44 (3)–(4). 
629. See supra notes 626–28 and accompanying text (assessing Article 44 of Iran’s 
Constitution). 
630. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1747; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 193 (demonstrating the character of Iranian 
liberalization efforts); see also infra notes 635–41 and accompanying text (discussing 
privatization in Iran); infra notes 642–67 and accompanying text (summarizing FDI-
encouraging national Iranian investment law). 
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forbidden.”631 On its face such a provision appears especially stifling, 
however subsequent legislation at the national level has narrowly read 
“concessions” to mean “special rights, which place the Foreign 
Investors in a monopolistic position.”632 Another constitutional 
restriction occurs in Article 139, which seeks to create a State 
gatekeeping procedure in all disputes involving investor-State 
arbitration.633 In the case of a valid arbitration clause between 
disputing parties, however, it seems unlikely that Article 139 would 
be enforceable.634 
Because these constitutional provisions have vested much of the 
economy within Iran’s State sector, ongoing privatization legislation 
at the national level is also important for international investors 
exploring future opportunities within Iran.635 To this day, Iran’s 
private sector is comprised predominately of small firms and family-
run operations.636 As previously discussed in this Note’s treatment of 
Iranian history, past administrations under Khatami and Ahmadinejad 
have made controversial attempts at further privatizing the 
economy.637 The New Privatization Act of 2008 was notable in this 
regard, as a robust attempt to bring various industries under Article 44 
                                                                                                             
631.  QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 81. 
632. Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 2(c) (Iran) 
(narrowly defining “concessions”).  
633. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 139 (“The settlement of claims relating to public and 
state property or the referral thereof to arbitration is in every case dependent on the approval of 
the Council of Ministers, and the Assembly must be informed of these matters. In cases where 
one party to the dispute is a foreigner, as well as in important cases that are purely domestic, 
the approval of the Assembly must also be obtained.”); see Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1748 
(describing the gatekeeping procedure); id. at 1756–57 (questioning whether such a provision 
is actually enforceable). 
634. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1756–57 (“As long as there is an unambiguous 
consent to arbitration, contrary domestic legal rules cannot constrain it. . . . Therefore, it does 
not seem that the barrier of Iran’s Constitution can hinder the jurisdiction of the arbitration 
body.”). Theoretically, even at the stage of enforcement, Iran’s ratification of the New York 
Convention would seem to mandate domestic recognition of arbitration decisions. See 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also infra note 678 and accompanying text 
(discussing Iran’s obligations under the New York Convention). 
635. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 110–20. See generally Ravi Ramamurti, Why Are 
Developing Countries Privatizing?, 23 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 225 (1992) (exploring 
privatization’s role in attracting FDI). 
636. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 4; 
IRAN COUNTRY CONDITIONS, supra note 577, at 1 (characterizing Iran’s private sector). 
637. See supra Parts I.A.3-4 (providing a history of the Reform and Ahmadinejad eras). 
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of the Constitution under private control.638 Yet, to this day, a great 
deal of this privatization has either fallen short or spun off into the 
hands of State-affiliated parties like the IRGC.639 The IMF has noted 
that the Rouhani Administration recognizes these failures, and is 
committed to taking steps toward enhanced privatization.640 It remains 
to be seen whether effective privatization will finally be implemented 
under President Rouhani.641 
More favorable to international investors, Iran’s principal 
legislation governing international investment in the country is the 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2002.642 FIPPA 
evidences both economic pragmatism and a certain level of 
sophistication among Iranian parties, who have perhaps learned from 
decades of international investment disputes.643 Comprised of twenty-
five articles, FIPPA sets the ground rules for all foreign investors in 
                                                                                                             
638. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 20 (“Specifically, the decree set 
a target of selling off 80% of state-owned assets (excluding firms in the upstream oil sector, 
crucial infrastructure, and some banks) over a period of 10 years.”); Atai, Investor Protection 
in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 3; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL 
ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 333–37 (reflecting upon attempts at 
privatization under Ahmadinejad). 
639. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 20–21; MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 334 (evaluating the results of 
the Ahmadinejad era privatization push). 
640. See IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 14/93, supra note 168, at 23 (“[Government 
authorities have] also explained that past privatizations failed to effectively transfer ownership 
to the private sector and tighten budget constraints, and therefore, have taken steps to improve 
the privatization process.”); cf. Privatization Shrouded in Controversy, FIN. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/8322/privitization-shrouded-
controversy (reinforcing the IMF’s assessment of Rouhani’s privatization goals). 
641. Sam Wilkin, Iran Must Privatize Car Industry, President Says, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-autos-idUSKCN0W33K1; Rouhani Says 
Privatization of Priority for Iran in Post-JCPOA Era, TREND NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2492168.html. 
642. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002; see also 
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1744–46; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy 
Approach, supra note 157, at 5-13 (discussing FIPPA and its significance to foreign 
investment in Iran). 
643. See Bizær, Amid Slump in Oil Prices, Iran Focuses on Mining, supra note 513 
(“[FIPPA] gives foreigners 100% ownership rights, residence visas valid for three years and 
the opportunity to transfer their profits out of the country in foreign currencies. It also offers a 
number of tax exemptions that, in some conditions, can rise to 100% of an enterprise’s profits. 
In an effort to reassure investors even further, the act guarantees that the government will pay 
compensation for any investments in projects that are nationalized or expropriated.”); see also 
The Set Up, BUS. YEAR, https://www.thebusinessyear.com/iran-2013/the-set-up/review (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2016) (reviewing FIPPA’s protections). 
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Iran.644 All international investment in Iran formally begins with an 
application to The Organization for Investment, Economic, and 
Technical Assistance of Iran, which is then reviewed by the Foreign 
Investment Board.645 The Foreign Investment Board is allotted one 
month to review the investment application, before it must submit a 
final decision in writing.646 Presumably, this review process should be 
based around FIPPA Article 2, which provides the scope, goals, and 
requirements of foreign investment in Iran.647 More specifically, all 
investment must: bring specified benefits to the Iranian economy; not 
pose a threat to the State, population, environment, or economy; not 
amount to a concession; and not result in more than twenty-five 
percent of an economic sector or thirty-five percent of an economic 
subsector falling under foreign control, measured at the start of the 
investment seeking approval.648 
Upon approval, international investors are presented a choice 
concerning how they wish to structure their investment in Iran.649 The 
first option, under Article 3(a), involves equity-based FDI within the 
constitutionally approved private sectors.650 Because FIPPA places no 
additional limitations on such equity forms, investors are free to 
structure their FDI in a manner consistent with Iran’s Commercial 
                                                                                                             
644. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002 
(introducing the law’s general impact on foreign investors). A party’s status as a “Foreign 
Investor” under FIPPA is defined by either citizenship or the use of “capital with foreign 
origin.” See id. art. 1. 
645. See id. arts. 5-6 (overviewing the application procedures for foreign investment in 
Iran); Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 5. 
Although an investor could hypothetically bypass this application process, such investments 
will not be protected by FIPPA. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 
10, 2002, art. 1 (defining “Foreign Investment” as the “Employment of Foreign Capital in a 
new or existing economic enterprise after obtaining the Investment License.”). 
646. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 6 n.1 
(establishing the application review process). 
647. See id. art. 2 (containing rules guiding foreign investment in Iran); see also 
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1745; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, 
supra note 157, at 5-6 (further clarifying these rules). 
648. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 2 (a)-
(d) (listing the obligations of foreign investment in Iran); see also Atai, Investor Protection in 
Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 6 (“The ceiling on the percentage [within 
FIPPA Article 2(d)] applies only at the time of the issuance of the investment license, and 
thereafter no limitations are placed on foreign investors for their market shares.”). 
649. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3 
(providing a basic choice concerning the structure of foreign investment in Iran). 
650. See id. art. 3(a) (defining FIPPA’s equity-based FDI option); see also QANUNI 
ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 
1358 [1980], art. 44(4) (listing Iran’s investment-permitted economic sectors). 
948 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 
Code, broadly including: the incorporation of a new company; the 
purchase of shares in an existing Iranian company; the opening of an 
Iran branch or representative office of a multilateral corporation; or 
participation in a joint venture with an Iranian national.651 However, 
other laws and regulations at the national level may place unexpected 
hardships upon international investors, and should therefore be 
reviewed and considered when deciding upon an FDI form.652 The 
second option for structuring an investment in Iran concerns non-
equity contracts, falling under FIPPA Article 3(b).653 Because the 
“foreignness” of non-Iranian investment under FIPPA may be 
measured by the source of capital, all private debt-investment to 
Iranian firms falls under this subcategory.654 Additionally, Article 
3(b) mentions three frameworks: Civil Partnerships; Buy-Backs; and 
Build-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) schemes.655 The lack of ownership 
rights in these contract-based investment structures allows for 
                                                                                                             
651. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 7 
(“FIPPA guarantees investors the right to set up an Iranian company without any restriction as 
to the percentages of shareholding. Therefore, investors with an investment license are 
authorized to establish a company in Iran with majority ownership, management, and 
control.”); Bizær, Amid Slump in Oil Prices, Iran Focuses on Mining, supra note 513 
(“[FIPPA] gives foreigners 100% ownership rights”). See generally Atai, Investor Protection 
in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 7-9 (walking through various equity 
structures permitted under FIPPA Art. 3(a).). 
652. See, e.g., Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (mentioning restrictions upon a foreign 
national’s ability to own real property in Iran); On Registration of Branches and 
Representative Offices of Foreign Companies in Iran, IRANO-BRITISH CHAMBER COM. INDUS. 
& MINES, http://www.ibchamber.org/en/useful-information/laws-and-regulations/on-registr
ation-of-branches-and-representative-offices-of-foreign-companies-in-iran/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2016) (detailing additional rules on the registration of foreign branches). 
653. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b) 
(defining FIPPA’s non-equity investment option); see also Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A 
Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 9-10. 
654. See supra note 644 (discussing FIPPA’s definition of “foreign investor”); see also 
Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 9. 
655. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b). 
Civil Partnerships involve contractually based (non-equity) partnerships under Iran’s Civil 
Code. SEE QANUNI MADANI [CIVIL CODE] Tehran 1314 [1935], arts. 571–606 (Iran). Buy-
backs entail “long-term investment agreements providing the exchange of goods or services 
between parties usually with no monetary exchange.” McCary, supra note 119, at 302. For 
example, a foreign oil company might provide exploration and drilling services in exchange 
for a specified percentage of the oil produced. See MALONEY, IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 375; Mohamedi, supra note 108, at 101. Finally, 
BOTs involve “construction projects in which a sponsoring foreign investor or consortium of 
investors and lenders supervises the construction and operation of an infrastructure facility… 
for a determined length of time, and subsequently transfers ownership and control of the 
facility to the host government.” SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 291. 
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investment in industries reserved to the State sector under Article 44 
of the Constitution.656 Indeed, buy-backs in particular have been used 
extensively by past investors seeking returns from the State’s energy 
sector.657 Under Article 3(b), the Iranian government is not permitted 
to guarantee the returns and profitability of such contracts.658 
Article 8 of FIPPA entitles international investors to national 
treatment protection, providing that foreign investments “shall enjoy 
the same rights, protections and facilities available to domestic 
investments in a non-discriminatory manner.”659 Article 9 deals with 
expropriation and nationalization protections, entitling investors to 
compensation.660 More specifically, Article 9 prohibits expropriation 
“unless for the public interest, through a legal process, in a non 
discriminatory manner, and against payment of appropriate 
compensation based on the real value of that investment immediately 
before the expropriation.”661 Investors should be mindful that claims 
for compensation must be filed within one year of the date of 
expropriation, and that “appropriate compensation” may not mean full 
protection, or the actual value of the property taken.662 At the same 
time, FIPPA includes no language on regulatory takings, or what level 
of loss might trigger compensation.663 Articles 11 through 18 all deal 
                                                                                                             
656. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 44 (dividing the Iranian economy between 
different legal categories). 
657. See McCary, supra note 119, at 302-04 (highlighting the importance of buy-backs 
within Iran’s oil sector). Historically, foreign firms have received approximately 15 to 20 
percent of the oil produced from such contracted projects. Id. at 302. However, buy-back 
contracts involve many downsides to foreign investors, and are thus highly criticized. See id. at 
305 (explaining buy-back sensitivities to fluctuations in oil price); MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 375 (discussing buy-back 
flaws generally); id. at 400 (explaining the high upfront capital costs borne by buy-back 
investors). In light of the realized need to attract foreign investment, Iran has recently amended 
its buy-back system. See supra note 480 and accompanying text. 
658.  Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 3(b) (“the 
return of principal and profit . . . does not rely on any guarantee by the government or banks or 
government companies.”). 
659. Id. art. 8. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 391-92 (explaining the 
importance of national treatment protection). 
660. See infra notes 661-62 and accompanying text. 
661.  Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 9. 
662. See id. art. 9 n.1  (stating the one year statute of limitations); Atai, Investor 
Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 12 (noting that appropriate 
likely means less than full). 
663. See Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 
11 (“[FIPPA] excludes protection against constructive, creeping, indirect, de facto and 
‘measures equivalent and tantamount’ to expropriation. Therefore, the foreign investor is not 
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with the admission, importation, and repatriation of non-Iranian 
capital, generally providing liberal standards for investors to collect 
their returns in full after satisfying their tax obligations.664 Finally, 
Article 19 provides rules related to dispute resolution.665 Disputes are 
referred first to negotiations between the parties, and then to Iran’s 
national courts. However, if the dispute falls within the scope of a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty between Iran and the investor’s home 
State, then the BIT will control dispute resolution procedures.666 
Although Article 19 provides no language related to arbitration 
contracted between the parties, for the same reasons discussed above, 
it is unlikely that Iran could quash a valid arbitration clause agreed at 
the contractual level.667 
2. International Investment Law 
In addition to Iran’s national layer of investment law, the Islamic 
Republic is also subject to a range of agreements and obligations 
drafted at the international level.668 Through the course of the 
sanctions regime Iran has concluded over 50 BITs with various 
governments, hailing from both the developed and developing 
world.669 Treatification efforts were central to Iran’s economic 
strategy throughout the Reform Era, and could gain popularity once 
                                                                                                             
entitled to claim compensation for regulatory expropriation.”). However, compensation will 
likely be afforded if changes in national law erode the profitability of non-equity projects 
under Article 3(b). See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, 
art. 17 n.2, 17(b). 
664. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, arts. 11–
18; Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 11 
(establishing FIPPA’s liberal capital controls). 
665. See Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of Mar. 10, 2002, art. 19 
(containing FIPPA’s dispute resolution provisions). 
666. See id. (“[disputes]… which can not be settled through negotiations, shall be 
examined by domestic courts of law, unless another mode of settlement of disputes has been 
agreed upon within a law on bilateral investment agreement with the government of the 
Foreign Investor.”). 
667. See supra note 634 and accompanying text (explaining Iran’s obligations under the 
New York Convention). 
668. See infra notes 669-81 and accompanying text. 
669. See Atai, Iranian Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 127, at 398; Ghodoosi, 
supra note 28, at 1733 (noting Iran’s prevalent BIT signing). By comparison, according to the 
Department of State, the United States has signed 47 BITs as of 2015. See United States 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/ 
117402.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
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more upon the lifting of multilateral sanctions.670 Pursuant to Article 
77 of the Constitution, Iran is a dualist country on the subject of treaty 
agreements, requiring treaty ratification by Iran’s Majles in order for 
international agreements to become domestically binding.671 The 
nation adopted its first model BIT in 2002, which is comprised of 15 
articles and a short preamble.672 Notably, Iran’s model BIT contains 
provisions related to the encouragement and admission of investment, 
most favored nation provisions, expropriation protections, repatriation 
and transfer provisions, and dispute resolution agreements.673 Unlike 
under FIPPA at the national level, Iran’s model BIT provides direct 
reference to arbitration proceedings.674 Article 13 lays out arbitration 
procedures for disputes related to interpretation of the BIT itself, 
while Article 12 details arbitration obligations stemming from actual 
investment disputes.675 Article 12(5) of Iran’s model BIT provides 
default procedures for the selection of arbitrators, and Article 12(6) 
defaults to the UNCITRAL rules.676 
At the multilateral level, Iran has demonstrated a scattered 
participation in different international investment treaties.677 The 
country’s signing of the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) in 2001 is a milestone for 
                                                                                                             
670. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting the explosion of BITs during 
Iran’s Reform Era). 
671. See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 77 (“International treaties, protocols, contracts, 
and agreements must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”); see also 
Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1755. 
672. See Iran Model BIT, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2861 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Iran Model 
BIT]; see also Atai, Investor Protection in Iran: A Bankruptcy Approach, supra note 157, at 13 
(discussing the model BIT’s origins); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1758-61 (explaining the 
model BIT’s structure). Investors should realize, however, that Iran’s Model Bit is just that: a 
model. It has no binding authority by itself, and BITs actually negotiated with other states 
could deviate significantly from the protections the Model envisions. 
673. See Iran Model BIT, supra note 672, arts. 2-3 (encouragement and admission of 
investment); id. arts. 4-5, 7 (most favored nation provision); id. art. 6 (expropriation 
protections); id. art. 8 (repatriation and transfer provisions); id. arts. 12-13 (dispute resolution 
procedures). 
674. See infra notes 675-76 and accompanying text. 
675. See Iran Model BIT, supra note 672, arts. 12-13 (containing the Model BIT’s 
dispute resolution stipulations). 
676. See id. art. 12(5)-(6) (further establishing the Model BIT’s dispute resolution 
procedures). For the UNCITRAL Rules, see G.A. Res. 31/98, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976). 
677. See infra notes 678-81 and accompanying text. 
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international investors doing business in Iran, obligating domestic 
courts to enforce valid arbitration awards issued by non-Iranian 
tribunals.678 Iran is also a member of the World Bank Group, the IMF, 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”).679 
Although not a member of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (‟ICSID”), the government has concluded 
numerous BITs that list ICSID as an approved method of dispute 
resolution.680 Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization, 
and is the largest economy in the world not within the WTO.681 
Taken as a whole, the JCPOA represents a landmark shift for 
international investment in Iran. The end of multilateral sanctions 
opens the nation’s doors to the international capital that will be 
crucial in order for Iran to emerge from hardship and reach its 
economic potential.682 This presents numerous potentially lucrative 
investment opportunities across various industry sectors.683 While not 
without risks, Iranian investment law at the national and international 
level has come a long way in protecting investors and moving away 
                                                                                                             
678. See Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, UNCITRAL,  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConv
ention_status.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (noting Iran’s ratification of the New York 
Convention); Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1749 (explaining the significance of Iran’s New 
York Convention ratification). 
679. See Member Countries, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/ 
leadership/members (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (documenting Iran’s World Bank 
membership); Islamic Republic of Iran and the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.
org/external/country/IRN/index.htm (last updated Mar. 21, 2016) (establishing Iran’s IMF 
membership); MIGA Member Countries (181), MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, 
http://www.miga.org/who-we-are/member-countries/ (last updated Aug. 26, 2015) 
(recognizing Iran’s membership within MIGA). 
680. See Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1763. Specifically, Iran’s BITs with Austria, 
France, Italy, Greece, and Korea all list ICSID among other methods for arbitration. Id.; see, 
e.g., Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between the 
Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Austria-Iran, art. 11(2)(d), Feb. 15, 2001, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/193 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (listing 
ICSID as an approved means of dispute resolution). 
681. See generally Danial Arjomandy, Iranian Membership in the World Trade 
Organization: An Unclear Future, 47 IRANIAN STUD. 933 (2014); Allison Carnegie, Here’s 
What Will Happen if Iran Joins the WTO, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/24/heres-what-will-happen-if-iran-joins-
the-wto/ (articulating Iran’s status as the world’s largest non-WTO member). 
682. See supra Part II.A (discussing the JCPOA). 
683. See supra Part II.B (explaining the JCPOA’s footnote six issue). 
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from the restrictive provisions of Iran’s constitution.684 As a broad 
class of stakeholders with their own goals and interests, international 
investors are posed to rank among the JCPOA’s primary 
beneficiaries.685 
However, the ultimate survival of the JCPOA will also depend 
on the deal’s impact on other stake-holding parties, including parties 
with traditionally diametrical interests such as the governments of the 
United States and Iran.686 As such, international investment’s role in 
post-sanctions Iran cannot be isolated from the interests and goals of 
these sovereign parties.687 Furthermore, because investment entails an 
ongoing package of business relationships, aligned interests, 
economic incentives, and wealth transfers, investment itself might be 
seen as a catalyst that either advances or weakens the positions of 
these other stakeholders.688 For Iran, it seems intuitive that increased 
investment will benefit the government of the Islamic Republic.689 
But whether this implies a zero-sum blow to the United States and 
Iran’s other traditional adversaries depends in part on how investment 
is put to work there, and what is done with its results.690 Under 
footnote six of Annex II of the JCPOA, the United States is uniquely 
situated amongst the rest of the world, in the restrictions remaining in 
place for US investors.691 How this might impact the United States’ 
own foreign policy interests is the focus of the final Part of this 
Note.692 
III. IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY 
The United States has an interest in future developments 
involving the Islamic Republic of Iran.693 How Iran behaves has the 
                                                                                                             
684. See supra Part II.C (exploring investment opportunities in post-sanctions Iran); 
supra notes 620-81 and accompanying text. 
685. See supra Part II.B (assessing investment law applicable to Iran). 
686. See generally supra Part I.A (illustrating the different interests that have emerged 
through the history of investment in Iran). 
687. See generally supra Part I.A. 
688. See infra Parts III.A-C. (exploring engagement). 
689. See supra Part II.B (surveying emerging investment opportunities in Iran). 
690. See infra Part III (assessing potential implications of increased investment to Iran). 
691. See supra Part II.A.2 (identifying the envisioned discrimination against US 
investment under the JCPOA. 
692. See infra Part III (surveying the potential impact of US-Iran investment on US 
foreign policy interests). 
693. See generally infra Part III.D (illustrating various ways Iran’s future will interesect 
with US foreign policy interests). 
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ability to either advance or impair various US foreign policy interests, 
and following the JCPOA, international investment will comprise an 
important component of the rationale that governs the Islamic 
Republic’s behavior.694 The final Part of this Note advocates for a US 
investment-based engagement strategy toward Iran as the best means 
of informing Iran’s post-sanctions rationale, thereby securing a broad 
array of US foreign policy advancements going forward.695 
As discussed above, post-sanctions opportunities will attract 
profit-seeking international investors to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.696 However, under footnote six of Annex II of the JCPOA, most 
US-based investors will be left on the sidelines while other 
international players enter this competitive space.697 Until OFAC and 
other relevant administrative bodies revise the restrictions reflected in 
footnote six, most US international investors will remain precluded 
from seizing the JCPOA’s wide range of new opportunities.698 
On the one hand, the Obama Administration’s logic behind 
footnote six likely results in part from the tangled web of statutory 
and administrative authority that comprised the four-decade sanctions 
regime.699 In this sense, the United States executive branch must 
cautiously ensure that it unwinds sanctions in a manner that does not 
exceed its constitutional authority, while simultaneously ensuring it 
does not invite US investors to openly conduct unlawful deals in 
Iran.700 From this perspective, some short-term over-caution is 
prudent.701 On the other hand, one might explain the approach in 
footnote six as characteristic of the same decades-long trend in US-
Iran relations, which tends to focus exclusively on downside risks 
without any serious appraisal of upside opportunities.702 In this light, 
footnote six represents the same trapped line of pre-JCPOA thinking, 
incorporating fallacies that underlie much of the sanctions regime: 
conducting foreign policy toward Iran solely out of Washington’s 
                                                                                                             
694. See generally infra Part III.D. 
695. See infra notes 696-1085 and accompanying text (surveying US foreign policy 
issues that would benefit from increased US investment in Iran). 
696. See supra Part II.B (identifying the broad investment opportunities that will attract 
foreign capital). 
697. See supra Part II.A.2 (summarizing the JCPOA’s footnote six issue). 
698. See supra Part II.A.2. 
699. See supra Part I.B.1 (tracing an abridged development of the US sanctions regime). 
700. See supra Part I.B.1. 
701. See supra Part I.B.1. 
702. See supra note 346 (highlighting the limited perspective of US sanctioning logic). 
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fears, without recognizing the shortcomings of isolation as a means of 
eliciting cooperation.703 The fact that OFAC has the power to grant 
exemption licenses to US foreign subsidiaries, but refuses to 
distribute this power to US investors more broadly, indicates that 
Washington is still trapped in this exact state of mind.704 
There are, of course, moral arguments and legitimate policy 
reasons for keeping US investors from freely exporting capital to 
Iran.705 From terrorist financing concerns to the regime’s 
reprehensible human rights record, there is no shortage of reminders 
that international investment in Iran is likely to reach some of the 
“bad guys” currently entrenched among the Iranian investment 
landscape.706 However the United States government decides to move 
forward in implementing the JCPOA, individual policymakers—from 
within OFAC on up—will be forced to contend with these serious 
moral hesitations.707 But setting morality aside for a moment and 
approaching this problem through the harsh lens of realpolitik, it 
becomes clear that if the United States is truly focused solely on the 
downside in its dealings with Iran, then the opportunity costs of 
restricting investment under footnote six might be greater than our 
moral blinders allow at first glance.708 
                                                                                                             
703. See supra note 346; see also Ghodoosi, supra note 28, at 1765-66; Suzanne Nossel, 
It’s Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 9, 2015), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/its-time-to-kill-the-feel-good-myth-of-sanctions-russia-iran/ 
(questioning the efficacy of isolating coercion as a foreign policy tactic). 
704. See supra notes 439-44 and accompanying text (examining OFAC’s limited 
licensing under the JCPOA). 
705. See infra note 706 and accompanying text. 
706. See Felicia Schwartz, U.S. Says Iran’s Support of Terrorism ‘Undiminished’, WALL 
STREET J., June 19, 2015, 6:45 PM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-report-finds-35-rise-in-
global-terror-attacks-in-2014-1434720328 (noting U.S. concerns over Iran’s connections to 
terrorism); Shaheed, supra note 173 (reporting on the human rights situation in Iran). 
707. See generally Schwartz, supra note 706; Shaheed, supra note 173. 
708. Often colloquially used in a manner synonymous with pure Machiavellianism, 
realpolitik actually refers to a specific methodological approach to international affairs, first 
theorized in the mid-nineteenth-century by German journalist August Ludwig von Rochau. 
History and Foreign Policy scholar John Bew provides a helpful, crude definition: “According 
to Rochau, successful statecraft depended on an appreciation of the historical circumstances in 
which the statesman operated. Just as important, however, was the ability to anticipate, and 
adjust oneself to, the changing conditions of modernity. Ideas were important in politics . . . 
but their importance was to be judged by their political force rather than their purity or 
elegance.” JOHN BEW, REALPOLITIK: A HISTORY 6 (2016). See generally I LUDWIG VON 
ROCHAU, GRUNDSÄTZE DER REALPOLITIK, ANGEWENDET AUF DIE STAATLICHEN ZUSTÄNDE 
DEUTSCHLANDS [FOUNDATIONS OF REALPOLITIK, APPLIED TO THE CURRENT STATE OF 
GERMANY] (Karl Göpel ed., 1859). 
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An alternative strategy, based on a more nuanced balancing of 
potential risks and rewards, would be for the United States to deal 
with Iran within the severely underutilized framework of 
engagement.709 A broad strategy that reached its apex in the US-
Soviet détente of the Cold War, engagement entails “a foreign policy 
strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to 
achieve its objectives.”710 In practice, engagement strategies today are 
largely centered on “facilitated entry into the global economic arena 
and the institutions that govern it,” whereby international investment 
plays an obvious role.711 If the United States could craft a strategic 
engagement platform targeting Iran, rather than the universal 
restrictions imposed on US investors under footnote six, the unique 
investment landscape of post-sanctions Iran would provide a powerful 
array of ready investors and profit-seeking capital at Washington’s 
disposal.712 Capitalizing on these pre-existing market forces could 
demonstrate a potent means of influencing Iranian behavior and even 
improving US-Iran relations over time.713 
Engagement always poses certain risks, and in the case of Iran 
these risks should be weighed seriously.714 Washington would need to 
caution that such a strategy would not amount to naked appeasement, 
nor result in moral hazards that might inspire rogue nation behavior 
elsewhere in the world.715 But these risks could be mitigated by the 
                                                                                                             
709. See Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Introduction, in HONEY AND 
VINEGAR: INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 94, at 1 (explaining 
engagement as a means of foreign policy); James Dobbins, Engaging Iran, in THE IRAN 
PRIMER, supra note 12, at 203-05 (overviewing US engagement within the context of Iran). 
710. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 1; see also EDWARD 
MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DÉTENTE: ARMS CONTROL, EUROPEAN 
SECURITY, AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION ix (1978); Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, 
supra, at 8-9 (noting the engagement strategy’s prominence during the Cold War). 
711. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 11; see also SALACUSE, supra 
note 10, at 10 (“The identity of who owns and controls a country’s enterprises has important 
political implications because assets and enterprises endow their owners with both political 
and economic power.”). 
712. See infra Parts III.C–D. 
713. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 22 (emphasizing international investment’s ability 
to foster improved relations between states); Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, How and Why to 
Promote US-Iran Rapprochement, MIT INT’L REV. (June 1, 2009), http://web.mit.edu/mitir/ 
2009/online/us-iran.pdf (assessing the potential benefits of US engagement toward Iran). 
714. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4. 
715. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4; MIROSLAV NINCIC, 
THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT 40-42 (2011) (summarizing arguments surrounding the 
dangers of appeasement). 
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wide variety of tactics available within the engagement toolbox.716 
For example, the United States could strategically employ some 
composition of both conditional and unconditional engagement 
policies.717 The former, which involve a “narrow . . . tit-for-tat 
process,” would contractually premise certain incentives upon 
specific Iranian behavior.718 Under such a policy, key Iranian 
concessions could be strategically highlighted and specifically 
sought.719 In contrast, unconditional engagement policies would 
demand no prerequisite Iranian action for the United States to begin 
seeking greater influence there.720 
Foreign policy scholars Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. 
O’Sullivan identify two branches of unconditional engagement, 
consisting of reciprocal or nonreciprocal incentive platforms.721 
Reciprocal unconditional engagement would generally amount to 
broad goodwill gestures offered by the United States, which, if unmet, 
would be abandoned for their failure to yield meaningful positive 
results.722 Nonreciprocal unconditional engagement, on the other 
hand, would mobilize broad long-term incentives in the absence of 
any formal expectations of positive counteraction.723 These incentives 
would be left on the table for individual Iranian actors including 
members of civil society, even if little change can be expected from 
the government.724 While international investment often plays a major 
role in each of these engagement categories, it need not be the only or 
even the primary means of employing engagement.725 “Funding 
nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances . 
. . and promoting the exchange of students, tourists, and other 
                                                                                                             
716. See infra notes 718-27 and accompanying text. 
717. See infra notes 718-20 and accompanying text. 
718. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 5; see also Raymond Tanter 
& Meghan O’Sullivan, Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Mar. 
13, 2001), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sanctions-and-u.s.-
foreign-policy (further explaining conditional engagement). 
719. See supra note 718 and accompanying text. 
720. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 3; see also ROBERT S. 
LITWAK, REGIME CHANGE: U.S. STRATEGY THROUGH THE PRISM OF 9/11 116–17 (2007) 
(expounding on the idea of unconditional engagement). 
721. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 4 (summarizing reciprocal 
and nonreciprocal unconditional engagement). 
722. See id. (discussing reciprocal unconditional engagement). 
723. See id. (detailing nonreciprocal unconditional engagement). 
724. See id.; LITWAK, supra note 720, at 117 (theorizing on unconditional engagement’s 
interplay with a target-nation’s civil society). 
725. See infra notes 726-27 and accompanying text. 
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nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the 
incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural 
engagement.”726 By strategically and cautiously assembling some 
combination of these above tactics, the United States could develop 
an Iran policy attuned to both engagement’s inherent, and Iran’s 
specific, risk profiles.727 
Considering recent developments, a US-Iran engagement 
strategy would hardly entail some radical foray into uncharted 
territory.728 In fact, footnote six issues aside, various commentators 
have classified the JCPOA itself as a form of constructive 
engagement: a regrettable term associated with US President 
Reagan’s controversially lenient policies towards apartheid South 
Africa, which were tangled in all the usual foreign policy knots of the 
Cold War.729 Lexicon issues aside, the actual substance of 
engagement within the JCPOA represents a fertile starting point from 
which a broader US-Iran engagement strategy might grow.730 By 
lifting or licensing around the technical restrictions faced by US 
investors under footnote six, the United States government could 
choose to continue in the spirit of the JCPOA, and use engagement 
with Iran as a means to achieve an array of US foreign policy goals.731 
                                                                                                             
726. Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 6. 
727. Although consistently outdated, various policy proposals using some combination 
of the incentive packages discussed supra have been produced in the past. See, e.g., 
Shoamanesh, supra note 713; Suzanne Maloney & Ray Takeyh, Engage Iran, DEMOCRACY 
(Fall 2007), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/6/engage-iran/. 
728. See infra notes 729-31 and accompanying text. 
729. See, e.g., Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; James Goodby 
& Kenneth Weisbrode, A Middle East, Whole and Free, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 3, 
2015), http://www.usnews.com/ 
opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/09/03/iran-deal-can-be-the-first-step-toward-a-peaceful-free-
middle-east (characterizing the JCPOA as a form of “constructive engagement”); see also 
Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 1; Sanford J. Ungar & Peter Vale, South 
Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed, FOREIGN AFF. (Winter 1985-1986), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1985-12-01/south-africa-why-
constructive-engagement-failed (highlighting the shortcomings of Constructive Engagement in 
South Africa, against the backdrop of the wider Cold War). 
730. See generally supra Part II.A (overviewing the JCPOA). 
731. See infra Part III.D (considering how to steer investment in Iran toward various US 
foreign policy interests). 
2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 959 
A. Engagement Generally: The Post-WWII European Engagement 
Model 
In at least the last century, the most commonly cited and 
successfully executed engagement strategy is the expansive series of 
international incentive networks adopted in the aftermath of World 
War II.732 The horrors of global war and total economic destruction, 
particularly amongst countries in war-ravished Europe, momentarily 
provided a rare alignment of international peace-seeking priorities 
that has not occurred since.733 In this light, the entire corpus of 
contemporary international law is heavily steeped in the logic of 
engagement.734 The United Nations, in its organization of the world 
into sovereign and equal States, is one obvious construct aimed at 
fostering the principles of dialogue and cooperation in the place of 
coercive isolation.735 Likewise, the Bretton Woods Institutions, set up 
to reconstruct Europe and eventually the rest of the world in the wake 
of World War II, explicitly prioritized international economic 
integration as one of the primary preventative means of combating 
national militarism and the outbreak of conflict between States.736 
                                                                                                             
732. See OLAV STOKKE, THE UN AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM AID TO COOPERATION 
xvii-xviii (2009) (noting the link between peace and security and economic integration, 
especially following World War II); see also NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75 (discussing the 
logic of the United States’ post-War Marshall Plan). 
733. See Rama Mani, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 300 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 
2007) (“In the aftermath of the Second World War and the Holocaust, the founders of the 
United Nations focused on reorienting international affairs away from aggression and 
unilateralism toward cooperation and multilateralism.”); cf. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
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734. See supra note 733 and accompanying text. 
735. See U.N. Charter art. 1 (introducing the purposes of the United Nations); see also 
STOKKE, supra note 732, at 41 (“Both the United Nations and the League of Nations were 
created with the primary objective of securing and maintaining peace after wars that had 
originated in Europe but had come to involve most of the world. . . .”); ALISON DUXBURY, 
THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE ROLE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 60–63 (2011) (summarizing the initial goals of the UN). 
736. See BOB REINALDA, ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
FROM 1815 TO THE PRESENT DAY 279–80 (2009) (“[Bretton Woods’] purpose was to provide 
a new, stable and predictable international monetary regime. . . . The US expected that a 
decrease in trade tariffs, combined with this monetary regime, would lessen the economic 
nationalism of the interwar period.”); see also The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944, U.S. 
DEP’T STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 
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These economic engagement strategies were matched by remarkable 
national policies of engagement, such as the US Marshall Plan, which 
devoted unprecedented appropriations to the post-War reconstruction 
and economic development of Europe.737 This widespread 
engagement can also be witnessed in the post-war proliferation of 
international treaties, from international human rights covenants to 
investment treaties and dispute resolution agreements.738 
As a whole, these global engagement efforts comprise an 
outstanding success story.739 Although not without shortcomings, the 
postwar international system has proven resilient in preventing 
massive armed conflicts and the types of large and destabilizing wars 
that cripple regional and/or the global economy.740 When economic 
integration is achieved most successfully, such as among the 
European Union nations, the idea of war between States today seems 
farfetched.741 This is remarkable, considering that less than a century 
ago it was the conflicts between these exact States that launched 
globe-spanning destruction.742 Sixty years of economic engagement 
between EU Member States has nurtured an astonishing alignment of 
national interests and common policy objectives.743 Furthermore, the 
wealth-building capacity of economic engagement has, across the 
                                                                                                             
2016) (“[The Great Depression and World War II] led international leaders to conclude that 
economic cooperation was the only way to achieve both peace and prosperity, at home and 
abroad.”). 
737. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75-78; STOKKE, supra note 732, at 42 (providing an 
overview of the Marshall Plan). While the Marshall Plan was undoubtedly inspired out of 
national US interests in containing the spread of Soviet communism, the point here is that such 
goals were pursued (and eventually obtained) in Europe through powerful positive incentives, 
as opposed to intimidation or pressure. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 75. . 
738. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 338-41; LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13-
20 (1990) (examining post-World War II treatification). 
739. See infra notes 740-48 and accompanying text. 
740. See Steven Pinker, Violence Vanquished, WALL STREET J., Sept. 24, 2011, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180 (elucidating on the global decline in 
world violence). 
741. See generally John S. Duffield, Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The 
Contributions of Regional Security Regimes, 20 REV. INT’L STUD. 369 (Oct. 1994); Peace in 
Our Time, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/3194365 (assessing 
peace in Europe since World War II). 
742. See supra note 741 and accompanying text. 
743. See Duffield, supra note 741; REINALDA, supra note 736, at 406-35 (summarizing 
the process of Europe’s post-World War II integration). 
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world, resulted in inspiring leaps in global living standards.744 The 
postwar international system has also provided a foundational forum 
for States to pursue and negotiate extended engagement policies.745 
One might seriously question how differently the world could have 
fared through the Cold War, had it not been for the nuclear non-
proliferation efforts and arms control treaties born out of the 
institutional engagement platforms within the UN and elsewhere.746 
As alluded to above, the US-Soviet détente of the 1970s might 
represent the most important bilateral engagement policy, which 
resulted in positive consequences that rippled throughout the world.747 
Since the close of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council 
has also provided an effective (if structurally flawed) means of 
curbing the behavior of individual bad actors.748 Broadly, all of this 
background bodes well for an investment-based US engagement 
platform targeting Iran.749 
Yet despite these successes of the postwar international system, 
it is important to also recognize the limitations in transferring their 
lessons to any alternative fact pattern.750 As mentioned, these global 
engagement policies were born out of an unreplicated alignment of 
global priorities and international interests, specific to the aftermath 
of World War II’s large-scale destruction.751 Furthermore, the total 
victory over fascism at the end of the War provided an imperial 
means of imposing this international system, and literally forcing 
engagement policies from States that might have otherwise remained 
                                                                                                             
744. See Daniel Griswold, The Blessings and Challenges of Globalization, CATO INST. 
(Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/blessings-challenges-globalizati
on (noting globalization’s impact on rising standards of living); STOKKE, supra note 732, at 
40–41 (explaining the importance of the UN as an international platform for development 
goals). 
745. See infra notes 746-47 and accompanying text. 
746. See REINALDA, supra note 736, at 373-87; Disarmament Treaties Timeline, U.N. 
OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/timeline/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2016) (providing an overview of the UN’s role in peaceful coexistence and nuclear 
arms control throughout the Cold War). 
747. See supra note 710 and accompanying text (mentioning engagement in the form of 
US-Soviet détente). 
748. See Mani, supra note 733, at 308-09; Martin Sieff, Why the UN Security Council 
Still Matters, GLOBALIST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.theglobalist.com/un-security-council-
still-matters/ (noting the effectiveness of the Security Council, despite its criticisms). 
749. Cf. supra notes 732-48 and accompanying text (noting the promise of the postwar 
engagement model). 
750. See infra notes 751-54 and accompanying text. 
751. See supra note 733 and accompanying text. 
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noncompliant.752 From this it stands to reason that post-World War II 
engagement, while ideal, might not provide the best model for 
twenty-first century engagement policymaking concerning Iran.753 
Fortunately, more recent history provides an insightful alternative 
model: Europe’s Critical Dialogue with Iran throughout the 1990s.754 
B. Engaging Iran: Europe’s Model of Critical Dialogue 
While the unique circumstances that inspired engagement at the 
end of World War II provide an imperfect lens for developing US-
Iran engagement policies, the European experience of engaging Iran 
though the 1990s contains more direct lessons for US 
policymakers.755 For approximately a decade following 1992, 
European States implemented a variety of engagement policies aimed 
at positively inducing changes in Iranian behavior, under the umbrella 
label of Critical Dialogue.756 Like the postwar global engagement 
policies discussed above, Critical Dialogue was also born out of 
particular facts and circumstances that merit the attention of 
policymakers.757 First, the strategy was grounded in the expansive 
pre-existing European trade relationships with Iran, which following 
the Iran-Iraq War were posed to grow significantly as Iran 
transitioned to a peacetime economy.758 Then, like now, Europe also 
had a more immediate interest in the regional stability of the Middle 
East, which made influence through trade there a sensible strategy.759 
                                                                                                             
752. See REINALDA, supra note 736, at 269-346 (running through the role of US 
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754. See infra Part III.B. 
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756. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 33-50; Patrick Clawson, Europe’s ‘Critical 
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pressure-for-change (summarizing Critical Dialogue). 
757. See infra notes 758-64 and accompanying text. 
758. See Reissner, supra note 94. at 35-36; Walter Posch, Iran and the European Union, 
in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, at 190-91 (mentioning the economic foundations of 
Europe’s stance on Iran). 
759. While reckless isolation policies grounded in narrow special interests might have 
been permissible across the Atlantic, Europe’s close proximity to the wars, terrorist 
movements, and refugee crises that sprung from Middle East instability demanded an approach 
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In 1992, at the start of Critical Dialogue, it was also relevant that 
the United States was largely silent on the issue of Iran. President 
Clinton’s policy of Dual Containment had not come into existence 
until 1993, and this silence provided Europe the freedom to initiate 
policies without attracting criticism from its North American ally.760 
Third, Iran’s domestic political climate was particularly suited to 
policies of engagement with Europe.761 The reconstruction years 
under President Rafsanjani positioned the nation in a search for 
international capital, European hostages in Lebanon had just been 
freed with Iranian cooperation, and the reform platform pursued later 
under President Khatami gave Critical Dialogue advocates a renewed 
surge of optimism that their strategy was actually working.762 Finally, 
the last major factor was Europe’s own investment climate throughout 
the 1990s.763 Intra-European engagement and economic integration 
via the EU had created new wealth and surplus capital seeking new 
horizons for productive use, and given all the above, Iran seemed an 
ideal destination for this foreign investment.764 
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764. See supra note 763 and accompanying text. 
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However, as history and the multilateral spread of the sanctions 
regime demonstrate, these policies ultimately failed to achieve 
meaningful political changes in Iran.765 In short, Critical Dialogue did 
not work.766 International affairs scholar Johannes Reissner identifies 
five main reasons for this failure, which should raise red flags for 
future policymakers.767 These factors resulted in a hollow engagement 
policy, which in time became seen as an “immoral cover for 
maintaining lucrative commercial relations with Iran that ignored 
Iranian behavior concerning human rights, terrorism, the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, and weapons of mass destruction.”768 These straying 
policies thus devolved into a one-sided platform, “too obviously in 
the interest of the European side to be considered by Iran as an 
incentive.”769 In this sense, the failure of Critical Dialogue mirrors a 
common pitfall of international investment more generally, where 
both investors and investor home States forget that investment implies 
a partnership or at least common interest with investor host States.770 
Following the failures of Critical Dialogue at the policy level, 
European investors were eventually made losers as well, being 
ultimately forced to exit Iran with the rise of multilateral sanctions.771 
These failures, however, provide instructive lessons for future 
policymakers, also noted by Reissner.772 These include: Critical 
Dialogue’s failure to manifest an actual strategy, as opposed to a 
                                                                                                             
765. See supra Parts I.A-B (dealing with the history and legal framework throughout the 
sanctions regime). 
766. See infra notes 767-71 and accompanying text. 
767. These include: the failure to appreciate Iran’s internal political divisions; the failure 
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768. Id. at 34. 
769. Id. at 39. 
770. See, e.g., SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 359 (“Lawyers, arbitrators, government 
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foreign investors and foreign investment. That view may lead to distortions in understanding 
and interpreting investment treaty texts.”); cf. Leyla Davarnejad, Strengthening the Social 
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Multinational Enterprises 2-3, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (Mar. 27, 2008), http://
www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40352144.pdf (advocating for socially conscious 
international investment). 
771. See supra notes 176, 296 and accompanying text (addressing Europe’s eventual 
arrival at sanctions targeting Iran). 
772. See infra note 773 and accompanying text. 
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common political stance shared by individual European States; its 
extensive delay to meet the expectations of reform-minded Iranians; 
its failure to engage with Iranian civil society, preferring to deal 
exclusively with the Iranian government; its lack of specific 
guidelines, which provided no tangible positive or negative 
incentives; and finally, its failure to connect the dots and convey its 
importance to Europe’s own populations, who came to see 
engagement with Iran as an artificially polarized choice between 
being for multinational corporations or for human rights.773 
Ultimately, these lessons provide some insights regarding how 
the United States might structure its own engagement policies toward 
Iran on the back of the JCPOA.774 Any US engagement policy 
seeking to move past the restrictions of footnote six of the JCPOA 
needs to steer clear of these pitfalls.775 Unfortunately, it is a product 
of history that these insights must be indirectly inherited, since the 
United States played no constructive role in Europe’s Critical 
Dialogue.776 During the Khatami years in particular, such US absence 
is commonly cited as a historic missed opportunity.777 But none of 
this should be taken to mean that Europe’s engagement efforts were 
entirely futile. On the contrary, engagement may sometimes be 
viewed as playing the strategic long-game, making tactical moves in 
the present that “strive to maintain momentum” for better relations in 
the future.778 Nobody possesses a realistic assessment of how Critical 
Dialogue might have impacted Iran’s social fabric or the political and 
economic forces that comprise the Islamic Republic.779 While one 
might question whether any of the momentum of Critical Dialogue 
could have possibly survived the long Ahmadinejad years, it is no 
small development that President Rouhani was elected on a platform 
                                                                                                             
773. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 42-45 (highlighting Critical Dialogue’s perceived 
dichotomy between business and human rights); Posch, supra note 758, at 190 (“The main 
complaint was that the diplomatic dialogue was cheap cover for booming European business 
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774. See infra notes 776-83 and accompanying text. 
775. See supra notes 773-74 and accompanying text. 
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777. See Mousavian, How to Engage Iran, supra note 142; Takeyh, Time for Détente 
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throughout the Reform Era). 
778. Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Conclusion, in HONEY AND VINEGAR: 
INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 94, at 187. 
779. See supra note 778 and accompanying text. 
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promising a return to the internationalism of Iran through the 
1990s.780 If the United States neglected a historical opening the first 
time around with Khatami, then perhaps Rouhani and the JCPOA 
provide a second shot at that missed opportunity.781 If so, US foreign 
investment will be a crucial component of seizing it and recalibrating 
Washington’s relationship with Tehran.782 
C. Engagement Today: Can the United States Engage with Iran? 
One of the critical arguments often raised against a US policy of 
engagement toward Iran is that, in its current form, the Islamic 
Republic is simply too irrational or theocratically zealous for any 
engagement policy to result in meaningful change.783 A similar 
criticism often raises moral objections to engagement, out of Iran’s 
regional conduct, which in places like post-2003 Iraq has directly cost 
US lives.784 Such behavior is problematic, but it is hardly irrational or 
preclusive to successful engagement between the US and Iran. In fact, 
this sort of behavior is not unusual to situations that strategically call 
for increased engagement.785 International relations theorist Stephen 
M. Walt and others commonly cite Kennedy and Johnson-era 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s bombastic criticism of US-Chinese 
engagement, in comparisons to the pervasive contemporary rhetoric 
                                                                                                             
780. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 492-93; Suzanne Maloney, Prudence And Hope Prevail: Iran Election Reflects Desire 
For Change, Brookings Inst. (June 16, 2013), http://www.
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Rouhani’s 2013 election campaign). 
781. See supra Part I.A.3 (exploring Iran’s Reform Era). 
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783. See Jennifer Rubin, An irrational regime, WASH. POST, May 26, 2015, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/05/26/an-irrational-regime/ (“ . . . 
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784. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Iran Killing American Troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
ATLANTIC (July 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/iran-
killing-american-troops-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/241486/; Richard Kemp & Chris Driver-
Williams, Killing Americans and their Allies: Iran’s Continuing War against the U.S. and the 
West, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUBLIC AFF. (Mar. 2015), http://jcpa.org/killing-americans-allies-
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785. See infra notes 786-89 and accompanying text. 
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lobbed at Tehran.786 History showed such commentary to be severely 
misguided, as Nixon and Kissinger’s later efforts at engagement with 
China helped wind down the Vietnam War, even at a time when 
China was providing direct military support to the Viet Cong.787 
Advocates of US-Soviet détente faced similar outcries.788 Whether or 
not some of the fear-mongering criticisms in the Iranian case amount 
to mobilization by Islamophobia, they are at the very least a 
problematic basis upon which to formulate sound US policy.789 
This is not to say that Iranian State practices are anything less 
than reprehensible.790 The Islamic Republic’s support for civilian-
targeting terrorist groups, its draconian crackdown on internal dissent, 
and its blatant violations of international human rights norms are each 
grossly unpalatable.791 But from a realist’s perspective, it would be 
                                                                                                             
786. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs in 1966, 
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789. See Hugh Gusterson, A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?, MIT CTR. INT’L 
STUD. (Apr. 2006), http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/gusterson_audit.pdf; Robert Naiman, The U.S. 
and Iran are talking. Why is the New York Times peddling Iran Islamophobia?, Daily Kos 
(Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/4/19/1084743/-The-U-S-and-Iran-are-
talking-Why-is-the-New-York-Times-peddling-Iran-Islamophobia (identifying common 
Orientalist tropes within some criticisms of US-Iran engagement). 
790. See infra note 791 and accompanying text. 
791. See Ryan Mauro, Fact Sheet, Iranian Support for Terrorism, CLARION PROJECT 
NATIONAL SECURITY, http://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Iranian-Support-For-
Terrorism.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, 
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (terrorism); 
Stephanie Nebehay, Rouhani has not stopped Iran suppressing human rights: U.N. envoy, 
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-un-rights-idUSBREA2D175
20140314; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran steps up campaign against activists and lawyers, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/06/iran-human-
rights-activists-lawyers (suppressing civil and political rights); Annual Report: Iran 
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foolish for the United States to deny that Iran is capable of behavioral 
change, and equally foolish to fail recognizing that both Iran and the 
world have changed in various ways since the era of Critical 
Dialogue.792 The election of President Rouhani provides some 
indication of Iranian distaste toward the confrontational foreign 
policies and wasteful economic policies intensified under 
Ahmadinejad.793 The fact that Iranians have gone down this path, 
experienced its undesirable consequences, and managed to 
collectively correct their direction cannot be a bad thing from the 
perspective of future engagement.794 Although Rouhani is unlikely to 
prove a human rights champion anytime soon, his political 
momentum post-JCPOA provides an interesting window through 
which to examine Iran’s internal developments. 795 Concerning the 
potential efficacy of international investment as a tool of engagement, 
the official Iranian attitude on capitalism provides a more promising 
evolution. Compare President Khatami’s 1997 comments, “we 
definitely do not want capitalism. But we respect the value of 
capital,”796 to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s more recent declaration: 
The mere possession of capital and its investment in the progress 
of the country is not a bad thing. It is an admired thing. It is not 
contemptible at all. What is contemptible is that capital and 
capitalism form the basis of all the major decisions made in the 
                                                                                                             
2015/2016, AMNESTY INT’L. (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-
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(Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.politico.eu/article/iranian-dissidents-human-rights-worse-rouhani/ 
(pointing out the continuation of Iran’s past human rights practices under Rouhani); see also 
Alireza Nader, Post Deal, Can Rouhani Deliver on Promises of Reform?, AL-MONITOR (July 
24, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/rouhani-iran-reform-nuclear-
deal.html (evaluating Rouhani’s political capital in the aftermath of the JCPOA). In this sense, 
the outcome of Iran’s February 2016 elections should also be read positively. See supra note 
600 and accompanying text. 
796.  MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, 
at 263. 
2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 969 
country and drag everything towards themselves… This is 
contemptible capitalism. But if some people have capital and 
they use it to help the country develop – and of course they will 
also make some profit in this process – then that act [investment] 
is good, and the profit made is halal.797 
Such a development looks especially encouraging for a future 
engagement policy heavily grounded in foreign investment.798 
Stepping away from Iran, international law has also undergone 
drastic changes since the era of Critical Dialogue.799 The early 
twenty-first century has been marked by a proliferation of 
international investment treaties, and a clarification of international 
customs and principles related to both international investment and 
dispute resolution procedures.800 Khamenei’s comments aside, these 
factors indicate that future international investment in Iran would 
likely be far more institutionally protected than throughout most of 
Europe’s Critical Dialogue.801 Other developments in the business 
world, like the explosion of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) 
principles, provide additional tools that could be utilized for the 
purpose of bringing investment-induced change to Iran.802 Likewise, 
the rise of innovative international human rights mechanisms, such as 
the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and the 
Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”), offer an additional means of 
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gradually influencing Iran’s internal behavior.803 Taking these 
developments as a unified whole, there is reason to believe that the 
United States could now utilize engagement strategies toward Iran 
more effectively than at any time prior in history.804 
Finally, the ultimate strategic blunder for the United States 
would be failure to recognize that the United States too has changed 
since the era of Critical Dialogue.805 The US role in the Middle East, 
along with US interests there, have undergone serious transformations 
in the past twenty years.806 From 9/11 and the rise of international 
terrorism, to the US experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the 
complete collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, to the Arab 
Spring and subsequent civil wars, to the ascent of ISIS and increased 
Chinese-Russian great power posturing, no region of the world has 
moved as fast in past decades as the landmass stretching from 
Pakistan to the Maghreb.807 With these various developments, US 
interests have also evolved.808 While Iran has played a prime 
adversary in US thinking on the Middle East since 1979, today 
Washington’s actual interests in the region are largely 
indistinguishable from those in the immediate aftermath of the Shah’s 
ousting.809 After decades spent trapped in unceasing sanctions inertia, 
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the JCPOA now frees Washington to take stock and honestly evaluate 
where the United States stands on the region generally, and on Iran in 
particular.810 In doing so through the lens of engagement, there are 
many reasons to believe that US interests in the region will be best 
served through an investment-rich engagement strategy that is 
mutually beneficial to both the United States and Iran.811 
D. Steering Engagement Toward US Foreign Policy Interests 
A broad and comprehensive US-Iran engagement strategy would 
have a positive impact on a variety of Washington’s Iran-specific and 
wider Middle East foreign policy interests.812 In order to explore how 
these developments might potentially manifest, the following 
provides a survey of Washington’s largest and most commonly cited 
regional foreign policy interests, and how international investment 
and other engagement tools might be used to achieve positive results 
within each of them.813 While these opportunities exist at present only 
as status quo opportunity costs, a liberalizing of OFAC’s footnote six 
guidance and the encouragement of US investment to Iran could 
provide a means of transforming them into reality.814 
1. Limiting Iran’s Nuclear Capacity & Regional Non-Proliferation 
The primary impetus for the JCPOA was to curb Iran’s nuclear 
development program.815 Fears of a nuclear-armed Iran concerned not 
only the behavior of the Islamic Republic, but also the regional 
response to such a development.816 The logic, often reduced to catch 
phrases like “an arms race in the Middle East,” was that if Iran 
acquired a bomb, then its regional rivals like Saudi Arabia would be 
pressed to develop their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby 
proliferating nuclear arsenals in one of the world’s most volatile 
regions.817 As discussed above, the JCPOA limits Iran’s nuclear 
                                                                                                             
810. See supra Part I.B (summarizing the sanctions regime); supra Part II.A 
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811. See infra Part III.D. 
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813. See infra Part III.D. 
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817. See, e.g., Seth Mandel, The Iran Deal Ensures a Mideast Arms Race – Nukes and 
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development program by placing severe restrictions and oversight 
mechanisms over their development process.818 While the 
effectiveness of these provisions has been widely debated, a more 
interesting question for the purposes of this Note is how engagement 
and increased international investment to Iran might influence Iran’s 
nuclear development logic.819 The JCPOA aside, engagement by itself 
is likely to result in greater Iranian compliance with IAEA regulations 
and other international standards.820 One reason for this is that 
engagement naturally implies increased leverage over Iranian 
actions.821 The more Iran’s economy comes to depend on foreign 
capital, the more it will seek to safeguard this capital, acting in a way 
that ensures its continued integration within the international 
economy.822 In this regard, the JCPOA’s snapback provisions are only 
as effective as the magnitude of engagement.823 The more Iran has to 
lose in terms of international investment and trading partners, the 
greater the fear of sanctions will become in the Islamic Republic.824 
At the same time, a reinterpretation of footnote six to allow US 
investment to flow to Iran would make it more difficult for Iran to 
ever argue that the United States has violated its terms of the deal.825 
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A show of US goodwill in the form of increased US investment to 
Iran would make it all the more domestically unpopular for any 
individual Iranian hardliner to renege on the JCPOA.826 Likewise, if 
the JCPOA were to fail and the United States were ever forced to 
rebuild an international coalition aimed at containing Iran, this 
goodwill could prove important in securing the cooperation of 
Washington’s allies.827 
Considering that the United States and Israel have made it 
explicitly clear that they will not accept a nuclear-armed Iran, and that 
all options are on the table to prevent Tehran from acquiring a bomb, 
there are also many reasons to believe that some form of détente will 
be a far more effective bargaining tactic than resorts to threats and 
military action.828 Many analysts raise compelling arguments that 
threatening Iran is counterproductive, in that it convinces the 
government that it actually needs a nuclear arsenal.829 Between the 
United States’ unrivaled military power, and Israel’s own nuclear 
weapons capabilities, the use of threatening rhetoric convinces the 
Islamic Republic that the possession of nuclear weapons is vital to 
deterring US or Israeli military action, and is thus a legitimate interest 
to Iran’s national security.830 By this logic, the presence of a rich layer 
of international investment in Iran would not only serve as a “carrot,” 
but the threat of yanking FDI from Iran would provide the United 
States and its allies a more credible “stick” to influence Iranian 
behavior, short of counterproductive threats.831 
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Backscratching, Not Blackmail, FOREIGN POL'Y (Feb. 22, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2013/02/22/on-iran-try-backscratching-not-blackmail/ (critiquing military threats as a form of 
nuclear non-proliferation leverage). 
829. See Walt, On Iran, Try Backscratching, supra note 828; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, 
supra note 26, at 285 (arguing the role of US and Israeli military threats within Iran’s nuclear 
logic). 
830. See supra note 829 and accompanying text. 
831. See supra notes 829-830 and accompanying text. 
974 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 
2. Encouraging Reform Within the Islamic Republic and/or Regime 
Change 
Another often-cited US goal in Iran is to see transformative 
changes to the Islamic Republic itself.832 In reality, this goal exists as 
a sort of conglomerated shortcut to various other US regional 
interests, such as the state of human rights for ordinary Iranians, 
counterterrorism efforts, regional cooperation, and so on.833 The idea 
is that a more moderate government in Tehran would prove easier to 
work with on these various issues.834 At its most extreme, this goal 
manifests in calls for outright regime change.835 However, whether 
one hopes for gradual changes to the Islamic Republic, or an abrupt 
regime change, there are reasons to believe that both goals will be 
best served by US engagement and increased investment.836 A 
peaceful transition away from Iran’s theocratic state is not beyond the 
realm of possibility.837 One of the usual products of international 
investment is the formation of narrow alliances with local elites, 
which, through the normal conduct of business, come to share 
common interests.838 In Iran, such alliances could prove a meaningful 
way of infiltrating Tehran’s government and influencing its shape and 
                                                                                                             
832. See, e.g., John Hannah, It’s Time to Pursue Regime Change in Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y 
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/05/its-time-to-pursue-regime-change-in-iran/; 
Jamie M. Fly & Gary Schmitt, The Case For Regime Change in Iran, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 17, 
2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-01-17/case-regime-change-iran 
(proposing Washington’s interests in fostering regime change in Iran). 
833. Cf. Michael Gerson, To gain leverage in Iran, the U.S. Needs to Go Green, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
12/01/AR2009120103283.html; James A. Lyons, Regime Change Needs to be Endgame in 
Iran, WASH. POST, July 20, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/20/regime-
change-needsto-be-endgame-for-iran/. 
834. See Gerson, supra note 833. 
835. See, e.g., supra note 832. 
836. See infra notes 837-90. 
837. CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 115 (“There are possibilities for a peaceful 
transition to a post mullocracy, though these tendencies are unlikely to be fostered should there 
be a military confrontation with the West, since in Iran, as elsewhere, the ‘nationalist card’ 
may easily trump all others.”); Ray Takeyh, How to Squeeze Iran on the Nuclear Issue, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/11/AR
2010111106147.html (“By linking its diplomacy to human rights behavior, the United States 
could mitigate Iran’s nuclear ambitions and pave the way for a peaceful transition from clerical 
autocracy to a more responsible and humane government.”). 
838. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 55; NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-82 (analyzing 
the common interests formed by investment and similar commercial activity). 
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its functions.839 The issue here, of course, is whether these sorts of 
alliances (and the post-sanctions inflow of FDI generally) will 
entrench the current regime, or lead to new stakeholders that erode the 
government’s current monopoly of authority.840 Naturally, who owns 
Iran’s resources is important, as such ownership carries political 
weight in the country.841 Unfortunately, under the status quo, much of 
the Iranian economy is run by State-owned or semi-State-owned 
enterprises, making it difficult for investment to reach or create 
alternative stakeholders.842 It is also safe to assume that current elites 
will be watching international investment closely, in order to 
safeguard their control of the national economy.843 However, all 
things held constant, international investment tends to give rise to an 
increasingly developed host-State private sector.844 In Iran, such a 
development could have a positive impact on the country’s overall 
governance.845 
One of the chief criticisms of the sanctions regime was that the 
traditional US negotiating style “failed to provide Iranian moderates 
with an alternative narrative to use against hardliners like Ayatollah 
                                                                                                             
839. Cf. supra note 838 and accompanying text (noting general political consequences of 
international investment). 
840. See Robert Jarvis, Turn Down for What? The Iran Deal and What Will Follow, 
FOREIGN AFF. (July 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-07-15/turn-
down-what; Laurence Norman, Iran’s Economy Stands to Get Boost If Nuclear Deal Reached, 
WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-economy-stands-to-get-
boost-if-nuclear-deal-reached-1428019653 (presenting the debate on whether the JCPOA will 
entrench the regime or foster moderation). 
841. See SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 10; NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-81 (noting the 
link between economic empowerment and political power). 
842. See supra notes 635-41 and accompanying text (dealing with privatization in Iran). 
843. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 164 (addressing the 
resistance of established elites); cf. supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (examining the 
IRGC’s presence in Iran’s economy). Indeed, IRGC opposition to the JCPOA demonstrates 
this exact trend. See David Patrikarakos, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Loved the Sanctions, 
DAILY BEAST (Jul. 16, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/16/iran-s-
revolutionary-guards-loved-the-sanctions.html; Mahan Abedin, Iran Hardliners Mobilise 
Against Nuclear Deal, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Jul. 25, 2015), http://www.middleeasteye.net/
columns/iran-hardliners-mobilise-against-nuclear-deal-601933816. 
844. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 112-14 (exploring why states turn to 
privatization); Seyed Reza Miraskari et al., Analyzing Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on 
Private Sector in Economic Growth of Iran, 4 INT’L J. ACADEMIC RES. BUSINESS & SOC. SCI. 
223, 235 (2014) (examining the impact of FDI on Iran’s private sector). 
845. Cf. supra note 844 and accompanying text (noting the general trend toward 
increased privatization, as a result of international investment). 
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Khamenei.”846 Such an approach always failed to recognize the 
political strategy of Iranian moderates, who, having their hands 
structurally tied by the Supreme Leader, always attempted to 
gradually reform the system without overthrowing it or challenging 
its legitimacy.847 Like Khatami and Rafsanjani before him, President 
Rouhani is now shifting Iranian politics toward the system’s moderate 
center.848 However, his success in this endeavor will require the help 
of international investment and demonstrated improvements in Iran’s 
standard of living.849 International investment provides a powerful 
means of incentivizing specific stakeholders, though different 
packages of incentives.850 By crafting a smart engagement policy, the 
United States could seize on Iran’s current political situation and 
actually empower moderate pragmatists.851 
One of the primary failures of Europe’s Critical Dialogue was its 
exclusive focus on government-to-government incentive platforms, 
without seeking to influence key segments of Iran’s social fabric.852 
At the same time, the failure to monitor internal Iranian political 
developments precluded Europe from identifying key targets of 
increased engagement.853 But things have changed since the 1990s.854 
                                                                                                             
846. Stephen M. Walt, Our Myopic Approach to Iran, FOREIGN POL'Y (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/26/our-myopic-approach-to-iran/. 
847. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; MALONEY, IRAN’S 
POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 260-62 (clarifying the 
methodologies of Iran’s reform movement under Khatami). 
848. See Mohsen Milani, Rouhani’s Foreign Policy: How to Work with Iran’s Pragmatic 
New President, FOREIGN AFF. (June 25, 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/
2013-06-25/rouhanis-foreign-policy; Sayed Hossein Mousavian, The Rise of the Iranian 
Moderates, AL-MONITOR (July 5, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/
rise-iranian-moderates.html (presenting the moderation of the Rouhani administration). Here 
too, the recent February 2016 elections evidence that Rouhani’s strategy is working. See supra 
note 600. 
849. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; Ganji, supra note 600 
(assessing Rouhani’s prospects for bringing meaningful change to Iran). 
850. Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 168; NINCIC, supra note 715, 
at 80-81 (emphasizing the ability for economic engagement to reach specific stakeholders). 
851. See Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357 (positing Rouhani’s 
potential of sidelining Iranian hardliners); Ganji, supra note 600 (suggesting Rouhani’s need to 
demonstrate tangible improvements to Iranian livelihoods, following the JCPOA). 
852. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 43 (identifying Critical Dialogue’s failure to reach 
Iranian civil society); cf. Posch, supra note 758, at 191 (illustrating the state-to-state focus of 
Critical Dialogue). 
853. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 45 (pointing out Critical Dialogue’s failure to 
monitor Iran’s internal politics); see also Michael Rubin, Europe’s Critical Dialogue with 
Iran: An Assessment, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.washington
institute.org/policy-analysis/view/europes-critical-dialogue-with-iran-an-assessment 
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As was made explicitly clear in the short-lived rise of the Green 
Movement, today the international community has come to recognize 
that there are important divisions within Iranian society.855 There is no 
reason to believe that continuing to isolate the Iranian regime 
demands international isolation of Iran’s population.856 More 
specifically, the world has noticed that a struggling middle class 
exists in Iran, and it is these Iranian stakeholders that the United 
States should seek to empower.857 Indeed, according to some analysts, 
the future of Iran will largely boil down to how this middle class fares 
in Iranian society.858 
Iran’s Bezaari—its urban commercial class—has played a 
meaningful historical role in the nation’s political currents.859 As 
opposed to its traditional reliance on urban marketplaces, today’s 
Bezaari is highly connected with the global economy.860 Naturally, 
international sanctions and economic mismanagement created severe 
frustrations within the Bezaari during the height of the sanctions 
regime.861 Yet, these frustrations never manifested into outright 
political mobilization.862 Notably, the Bezaari’s absence from the 
2009-10 Green Movement protests partly explains why that 
movement failed to take flight.863 This failure to mobilize the Bezaari 
                                                                                                             
(identifying Critical Dialogue’s failure to seriously address Iranian domestic reform and 
political stability). 
854. See infra notes 855-78 and accompanying text. 
855. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing Iran’s Green 
Movement). 
856. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 173-74 (positing the 
fallacy of isolating Iran’s population); cf. Bill Spindle, Iran’s Legions of Weary Young People 
Push Against the Old Ways, WALL STREET J., July 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-
legions-of-weary-young-people-push-against-the-old-ways-1436323115 (showing Iranian 
youth’s distaste with international isolation). 
857. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 46; Marais, supra note 449, at 12 (noting the 
potential of Iran’s middle class). 
858. See Reissner, supra note 94, at 46; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 41, at 115 
(establishing the Iranian middle class’ importance to the future of Iran). 
859. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 108; FISK, supra note 45, at 110 
(illustrating the political importance of Iran’s Bazaari). 
860. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 108 (identifying the ties of Iran’s Bazaari 
to world markets); cf. A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 129-141 (assessing the impact of 
sanctions on Iran’s Bazaari and wider middle class). 
861. See A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324, at 129-141; Harris, The Bazaar, supra 
note 50, at 109 (exploring how sanctions have harmed Iran’s Bazaari). 
862. Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109. 
863. See id.; Kevan Harris, Iran: Why Workers Aren’t Joining the Protests, TIME, Feb. 
22, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2053157,00.html (pointing out the 
rift between the Bazaari and Iran’s youth during the Green Revolution). 
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is a result of ongoing political cleavages, which have made this 
segment of Iranian society extremely difficult to publically 
mobilize.864 While the Bezaari should not be rendered exactly 
synonymous with Iran’s wider middle class, which today extends well 
beyond the traditional marketplace, its shared economic interests with 
the middle class generally provides insight into how a US engagement 
strategy might identify key destinations of US trade and investment 
capital.865 Where negative incentives like sanctions tend to get 
drowned out in political divisions, the positive inducements of trade 
and investment might be used to broadly inspire middle class support 
for moderate government policies, effectively pressuring the regime 
from below.866 In his coverage of Iran’s 1979 Revolution, journalist 
and historian Robert Fisk notes, “while the physical power behind the 
revolution lay in those colossal street demonstrations by the urban 
poor and Islamic revivalists, it was the middle class from the bazaar . 
. . that provided economic backing for Khomeini’s return. It was this 
merchant class and its alliance with the mullahs that emerged as the 
critical combination of secular and religious opposition.”867 Given 
international investment’s potential alignment with host country 
private sectors, a US engagement policy could be crafted to 
specifically target these powerful agents of change in Iran.868 In doing 
so, international investment and economic integration more broadly 
might undermine the alliance so crucial to the Islamic Republic’s 
survival since 1979.869 
Another strategic Iranian target of US engagement would be the 
nation’s large youth population.870 As explained above, there are 
some existing sympathies between the West and Iran’s youth, 
stemming in large part from cultural overlap and consumerist 
                                                                                                             
864. See Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 109; Arang Keshavarzian, Back to the 
Future: Bazaar Strikes, Three Decades after the Revolution, MIDDLE E. INST. (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.mei.edu/content/back-future-bazaar-strikes-three-decades-after-revolution (noting 
the political divisions within Iran’s modern Bazaar). 
865. See infra notes 866-69. 
866. See NINCIC, supra note 715, at 80-82; Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 
778, at 165 (articulating engagement’s ability to influence target-state politics). 
867.  FISK, supra note 45, at 110. 
868. See supra note 838 and accompanying text. 
869. Cf. supra note 838 and accompanying text (noting general political consequences of 
international investment).  
870. See Memarian & Nesvaderani, supra note 576, at 49-50; Spindle, supra note 856 
(characterizing Iran’s youth). 
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preferences.871 During the sanctions era, Iran’s youth openly called 
for better relations with the rest of the world.872 The youth population 
is also a key vulnerability for the government in Tehran, which faces 
serious challenges in meeting this segment’s growing socioeconomic 
needs.873 Although increased FDI to Iran might have the unintended 
consequence of partially insulating the regime from these 
vulnerabilities, such investment could occur in a manner that actually 
strengthens the youth within Iranian society, making the government 
more vulnerable to their future demands.874 Iranian youth face the 
highest rate of unemployment in the country today.875 By targeting the 
flow of international investment in ways that provide young Iranians 
with jobs, the United States could create common interests between 
Iranian youth and the global economy.876 Furthermore, by revising 
Washington’s guidance on footnote six and allowing development, 
the United States could empower Iran’s youth and “promot[e] 
positive changes in Iran.”877 Put another way, “[if] we really believe 
in the transformative power of markets, Hollywood, hip-hop, the 
Internet, democracy, and free speech, let’s turn ‘em loose on Tehran. 
If your goal is a more moderate Iran, that approach is likely to work a 
lot better than ostracism, covert action, and repeated threats of 
military force, which merely galvanize Iranian nationalism and help 
justify continued repression by hardliners.”878 
Of course, even in targeting these key segments of Iranian 
society, the problem that a large percent of the national economy is 
held in the hands of regime loyalists still remains.879 In particular, the 
IRGC’s expansive hold of the private sector following President 
                                                                                                             
871. See Houshyar & Sarmadi, supra note 539; Harris, The Bazaar, supra note 50, at 
110 (identifying Western sympathies among Iran’s youth). 
872. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 15; Spindle, supra note 856 (noting the 
youth’s open resistance to regime hardliners). 
873. See Memarian & Nesvaderani, supra note 576, at 49; CAMMETT ET AL., supra note 
41, at 315 (discussing the regime challenges of meeting the expectations of Iran’s youth). 
874. See infra notes 875-78. 
875. See supra note 576 and accompanying text (looking at youth unemployment in 
Iran). 
876. Theoretically, emerging technologies that are most likely to employ recent 
graduates, such as the renewable energy sector, could provide the best means of channeling 
international investment toward Iran’s youth. Cf. supra notes 558-67 and accompanying text 
(discussing the potential of a renewable energy industry in Iran). 
877. Lorber & Rosenberg, supra note 339. 
878. Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117. 
879. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (exploring the role of the IRGC in 
the Iranian economy). 
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Ahmadinejad’s privatization decrees is especially troubling.880 No 
matter how strategically specialized the United States’ incentive 
platforms, a downside of engagement is that any improvement in 
Iran’s economy is likely to put money in the pockets of the IRGC.881 
However, without belittling this risk, one should at least recognize 
that the mainstream US conception of the IRGC is commonly 
misguided.882 First, the IRGC does not possess broad public support 
in Iran, and its concentrated hold of the private sector has been highly 
controversial.883 In fact, during the Ahmadinejad years, future 
President Rouhani was a crucial critic of its growing grip on the 
private sector.884 From this, it is likely that future privatization under 
Rouhani will seek to dilute the economic power of the IRGC.885 At 
the same time, the IRGC itself is not a monolithic establishment.886 
While most guardsmen have some form of existing or past ties to the 
military, they are in fact “ordinary people,” comprised of a wide 
variety of individual motivations and interests.887 Furthermore, 
despite their broad ties to Khamenei, internal divisions do exist within 
the IRGC.888 It is not beyond reason that the ordinary self-interests 
and profit motives of capitalism may exacerbate these divisions, were 
Iran’s private sector to grow alongside capital inflows to Iran’s 
                                                                                                             
880. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text. 
881. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 165 and 168 (conceding 
the impossibility of an entirely targeted engagement platform); see also Elliott Abrams et al., 
supra note 161; Babak Dehghanpisheh & Yeganeh Torbati, Firms Linked to Revolutionary 
Guards to Win Sanctions Relief Under Iran Deal, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.
reuters.com/article/iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUSL5N10I3N320150810 (revealing that some 
firms linked to the IRGC will benefit from the JCPOA). 
882. See infra notes 883-90 and accompanying text. 
883. See WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362; Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note 
360 (exploring the widely held middle class perception that, before his death, Khomeini 
actually banned the IRGC.) 
884. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 285 (citing Rouhani’s criticism of the IRGC’s role in the economy before being elected); 
cf. Arash Karami, Rouhani Criticizes Consolidation of Power in Government, AL-MONITOR 
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/rouhani-criticizes-
revolutionary-guard-power.html# (offering more recent Rouhani criticisms of the IRGC). 
885. See Karami, Rouhani Criticizes Consolidation of Power in Government, supra note 
884; Mehdi Khalaji, President Rouhani and the IRGC, WASH. INST. NEAR E. POL’Y (Jan. 8, 
2014), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/president-rouhani-and-the-
irgc (assessing Rouhani’s contentious relationship with the IRGC). 
886. See Nader, The Revolutionary Guards, supra note 360, at 61; WEHREY ET AL, supra 
note 362, at 81 (pointing out an unexpected degree of factionalism within the IRGC). 
887. Sadakova, supra note 158. 
888. See supra note 886. 
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broader economy.889 Were further splinterings to occur, such a 
development would represent a remarkable achievement of US 
foreign policy. However remote the likelihood of this actually 
happening, the larger purpose of a US engagement strategy would be 
to empower alternative stakeholders in Iran, capable of bringing 
positive changes to Tehran’s political establishment. Empowering 
such agents of change should not be precluded on account of the 
regime accruing some unintentional benefits.890 
3. Enhancing Regional Counterterrorism 
Another key US foreign policy interest, both in the Middle East 
and globally, is the need to combat terrorism and prevent the growth 
of terrorist movements targeting the United States and its allies.891 
Iran’s continued support for movements like Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
Islamic Jihad is in opposition to Washington’s counterterrorism 
efforts.892 However reprehensible, Tehran’s support for these terrorist 
organizations is not irrational, nor entirely born of religious or 
ideological zealotry.893 In the same way that Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
might be explained by their seeking a meaningful deterrent to US or 
Israeli military action, maintaining their influence with groups 
                                                                                                             
889. See WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362, at 93 (“[The IRGC’s] vested and increasing 
interests in the country’s economy make it an increasingly conservative force rather than a 
radical one.”); cf. Meir Javedanfar, Leaked Video May Signal Cracks in Iranian Leadership, 
AL-MONITOR (Jun. 4, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/iran-irgc-
2009-elections-violations-leaked-video-reformists.html# (hypothesizing emerging cracks 
within the IRGC). 
890. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 172; Takeyh, Time for 
Détente With Iran, supra note 357 (asserting the benefits of engaging Iran, despite some 
potential gains to Iran’s hardliners). 
891. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM,  WHITE HOUSE (June 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Linda Robinson, 
The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships, WASH. POST , Oct. 18, 
2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-future-of-counterterrorism-fewer-drones-
more-partnerships/2013/10/18/47e49f02-35cc-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html. 
892. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrosim, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Overview, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 
2016); Robert Baer, Who’s a Terrorist?, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/tehran/axis/terror.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). 
893. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 283-84 and 294; Walt, Accentuate 
the Positive, supra note 117 (analyzing Iran’s motives for supporting regional terrorist 
movements). Indeed, if Iran’s Twelver Shi’ite ideology is the primary lens to understand 
Tehran’s behavior, the regime’s support for Sunni Palestinian movements such as Hamas is 
confounding. 
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situated along the borders of Israel traces a similar reasoning.894 In the 
event of a US or Israeli strike on Iran, it makes sense for the Islamic 
Republic to seek influence over movements capable of inflicting 
direct damage on Washington’s closest regional ally.895 This 
Machiavellian logic aside, the United States should not stand for 
Iran’s continued support of violent non-State actors that seek to harm 
noncombatants.896 Yet contrary to much JCPOA criticism, enhanced 
engagement between Washington and Tehran could be the best means 
of curtailing Iran’s support for regional terrorist movements.897 
 For example, the incentive of massive international investment 
could provide a reason for Tehran to question its ongoing support for 
terrorist movements.898 Up until the present, supporting such terrorists 
has been a relatively cheap way of harassing US regional interests, 
and Iran has had little reason to question such policies.899 This 
calculus would look very different if the risk of precluding investment 
made Iran’s actions far more expensive.900 Similarly, the United 
States has a strategic interest in co-opting Iran’s influence over these 
terrorist movements.901 In the 1980s, Iran’s cooperation was vital to 
the safe release of Western hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
and future US-Iran cooperation could have a constructive influence 
                                                                                                             
894. Cf. supra notes 828-31 and accompanying text (citing Iran’s security interests in a 
nuclear weapons program). 
895. Cf. supra notes 828-31 and accompanying text.  
896. See supra note 892. 
897. See, e.g., Jonathan Schanzer & Mark Dubowitz, It Just Got Easier for Iran to Fund 
Terrorism, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jul. 17, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/17/it-just-got-
easier-for-iran-to-fund-terrorism-swift-bank/; James Phillips, The Iran Nuclear Deal: What the 
Next President Should Do, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/
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that the JCPOA will empower regional terrorism). But see infra notes 898-914 (arguing that, to 
the contrary, broad engagement following the JCPOA may provide the best means of reigning 
in Iran’s support for regional terrorist movements). 
898. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117 (noting that under the status quo, 
Iran has no reason to meaningfully question its support for regional terrorist movements); 
Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran supra, note 357 (further arguing that under the status quo, 
Iran has nothing to lose by supporting movements targeting Israel). 
899. FACT SHEET IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, CLARION PROJECT, https://www.
clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/Iranian-Support-For-Terrorism.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 
2016); Marisa Sullivan, Middle East Security Report 19: Hezbollah In Syria, INST. ON THE 
STUDY OF WAR (Apr. 2014), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_
Sullivan_FINAL.pdf.  
900. See supra note 898. Cf. supra notes 819-24 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
leverage created by international investment, within the context of Iran’s nuclear program).  
901. See infra notes 902-05. 
2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 983 
on Lebanon’s political stability.902 Likewise, in the event of any 
resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Iran’s sway over 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad could prove vital to concluding that 
decades-long conflict.903 Israel’s own past negotiations with Hamas 
indicate that these movements are not incommensurable with the 
negotiating table, and Iranian cooperation could result in a more 
pliant negotiating position of Israel’s enemies.904 In the absence of 
peace talks, such influence could be similarly used to heal the rift 
between Fatah and Hamas, which has been partially responsible for 
both a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and the complete paralysis of 
Palestinian development within the West Bank: trends that foster 
regional extremism.905 
Finally, as repugnant as Iran’s support for terrorism may be, it 
would behoove US policymakers to recognize that the movements 
receiving Iranian funding and arms supplies are hardly the same breed 
of Wahhabi extremists bent on striking the United States.906 While 
                                                                                                             
902. See supra note 95; Mousavian, How to Engage Iran, supra note 142 (exploring 
Iran’s role in releasing Western hostages in Lebanon); see also Takeyh, Time for Détente With 
Iran, supra note 357; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303 (contending that Iran’s 
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903. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117; Shlomi Eldar, Without Hamas, 
Israelis and Palestinians Can Find Peace, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/hamas-gaza-peace-oslo-accords-terror-palestinians.html# 
(looking at how Hamas has complicated the Israeli-Palestinian peace process). 
904. See Daniel Sobelman, Israel and Hamas Appear to Be Advancing Towards Ending 
the Siege on the Gaza Strip, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/daniel-sobelman/israel-hamas-gaza_b_8037888.html; Uri Savir, Israel, Hamas Negotiate, 
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originals/2015/06/israel-hamas-truce-negotiations-egypt-netanyahu.html (discussing Israel-
Hamas negotiations); see also Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 357; Yoav 
Zeitun, IDF Intelligence: Deal Could Help Rein in Iran’s Terrorist Activities, YNET NEWS 
(Jul. 17, 2015), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4691689,00.html (presenting the 
argument that engaging Iran could help tame movements like Hezbollah). 
905. See Ahmad Melhem, The Deepening Rift Between Fatah, Hamas, AL-MONITOR 
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/palestine-hamas-fatah-
plo-accusations.html#; Adnan Abu Amer, Gaza Bombings Deepen Hamas-Fatah Rift, AL-
MONITOR (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/gaza-
explosions-hamas-fatah-division.html# (exploring the Fatah-Hamas rift). Within the West 
Bank, fears of a Hamas victory have prevented elections within the Palestinian Authority. See 
Khaled Abu Toameh, Palestinians Need Reforms, Not Elections, GATESTONE INST. (May 4, 
2015), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5686/palestinians-reforms. 
906. Although a comprehensive and nuanced treatment of Wahhabism and Islamic 
extremism is beyond the scope of this Note, as a general matter Wahhabism refers to a specific 
conservative sect of Sunni Islam that originated among 18th century Najdi Bedouins, in 
rejection of the tomb and shrine worship that adherents perceived to amount to polytheism. At 
its core, Wahhabism advocates a return to Tawhid, the principle of Islamic monotheism. In 
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nothing justifies the intentional targeting of civilians, it is worth 
noting that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad all conceive 
themselves as legitimate resistance movements combating Israeli 
occupation.907 The same cannot be said for movements like Al Qaeda 
and ISIS.908 Noting the rise of groups like Al Qaeda, shortly before 
his death, Ayatollah Khomeini himself decried “‘the anti-Koranic 
ideas propagating the baseless and superstitious cult of 
                                                                                                             
doing so, it rejects a host of worldly institutions as impure additions to Islam (bid’ah), from 
secular music and dance to the contemporary nation-state. Originally a narrow and parochial 
school of Islam, Wahhabism gained fortuitous significance with its adoption by Mohammed 
Ibn Saud in 1733, whose ancestors would later establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after 
World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As the monarchy’s oil wealth, the threat 
of pan-Arab nationalism, the threat of communism, and other political developments all 
evolved over the course of the 20th century, strains of Saudi Wahhabism were cross-pollinated 
with other Salafist political writings, such as those of Sayyed Qutb, whose own scholarship 
was deeply informed by his personal experiences in the United States and in Egyptian prisons. 
The combination of Wahhabi puritanism and Qutb’s jihadist-takfiri calls to redeem the Ummah 
(Islamic community) from modern vices (more specifically, Jahiliyya, or the Ummah’s current 
state of godless ignorance) directly provided an intellectual foundation for movements like Al 
Qaeda, and more recently, ISIS. See generally ROBERT LACEY, INSIDE THE KINGDOM: KINGS, 
CLERICS, MODERNISTS, TERRORISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA 10-11 (2009); 
LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11 (2006); 
Yousaf Butt, How Saudi Wahhabism is the Fountainhead of Islamic Terrorism, WORLD POST 
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-
terrorism_b_6501916.html; Trevor Stanley, Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and 
Salafism, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (Jul. 15, 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/
tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=528#.VoR4lhorJ-U; Samer Abboud, The Only Way to 
Take on ISIS is to Take on Wahhabi Doctrine, MONDOWEISS (Nov. 23, 2015), http://
mondoweiss.net/2015/11/isis-wahhabi-doctrine. 
907. See Profile: Hamas Palestinian movement, BBC NEWS (Jul. 11, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13331522; Borzou Daragahi, Lebanon’s Hezbollah savors 
increasing legitimacy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/13/
world/fg-lebanon-hezbollah13; Islamic Jihad Urges Factions to Escalate Resistance After 
Arson Attack, MA’AN NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.maannews.com/Content.
aspx?id=766804 (revealing how these organizations conceive of themselves). The point is not 
that such differentiation morally exonerates these groups’ tactics, but that from a perspective 
of accurate US threat assessment, the threat posed by terrorist organizations supported by Iran 
pail in comparison to the threats posed by groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. See Daniel 
Benjamin, Is Iran About to Unleash a Wave of Terrorism Against the United States?, FOREIGN 
POL'Y (Aug. 13, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/13/is-iran-about-to-unleash-a-wave-
of-terrorism-against-the-united-states-iran-hezbollah-assad/ (“Since the 1996 attack, a small 
number of Americans have been caught up and killed in Iranian-backed terror attacks directed 
against Israelis, but specifically American targets have not been struck.”). 
908. Tom Quiggan, Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work, 
TERRORISM RESEARCH INITIATIVE (2009), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.
php/pot/article/view/67/html; http://www.protect.expert/ideology-al-qaeda-prof-matthew-
ogilvie/. 
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Wahhabism’.”909 The amount of blood and treasure Iran has recently 
spent combating Sunni insurgents like ISIS and Al-Nusra Front (and 
defending Bashar al-Assad) in Syria and Iraq indicates that the 
Islamic Republic’s position on Wahhabi terrorism has not strayed too 
far from the days of Khomeini.910 In this light, Iran is committed to an 
all too familiar war against terrorism, when it comes to the terrorists 
actually seeking to target the United States and its most strategically 
valuable allies in Europe.911 Engagement could lead to positive 
breakthroughs in this arena.912 While the United States cannot 
realistically abandon its ally Israel to groups like Hezbollah and 
Hamas, it should at least nuance its designation of Iran as a State 
sponsor of terrorism, and realistically explore whether the positive 
incentives of engagement might be used to reign in the terrorist 
movements that make their home in South Lebanon and the Occupied 
Territories.913 In fact, if Iran were to alter its conduct and allow the 
United States to lift it from lists of designated sponsors of terrorism, 
many of the administrative-legislative knots that restrict the lifting of 
sanctions could theoretically be circumvented.914 
                                                                                                             
909. FISK, supra note 45, at 125. That said, these comments should not be taken out of 
the political context of Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia. See supra notes 369-72 and 
accompanying text (discussing Iran-Saudi tensions). 
910. See Will Fulton et al., Iranian Strategy in Syria, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 
WAR (May 2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-
1MAY.pdf; Eli Lake, Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 9, 
2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-prop-up-
assad (assessing the costs of Iran’s operations in Syria). While countering Wahhabi terrorism 
is unquestionably less important to Iran than retaining their geostrategic influence in Syria, the 
ultimate result is still an alignment of US and Iranian interests. 
911. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 63 (“We may believe that all 
terrorist acts are morally wrong, but from the perspective of U.S. strategic interests, not all 
terrorists are alike.”); Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni and Shi’a Terrorism: Differences that 
Matter, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2008/12/29-terrorism-lynch (juxtaposing trends within Sunni and Shi’a terrorism). 
912. See supra notes 891-911. 
913. At least on a rhetorical level, Iran has offered to stop supporting these groups in the 
past. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303; David Coghlan, Timing Iran: 
Broaching the U.S.-Iran Divide Would Have Been Easier Ten Years Ago, GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 
(Nov. 20, 2013) (noting Khatami’s offers to cease terrorist funding in exchange for US 
concessions). 
914. However such a development would only apply to US terrorism-based sanctions, 
and not sanctions pertaining to human rights, ballistic missiles proliferation, and so on. See 
supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. 
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4. Protecting Traditional US Allies: Saudi Arabia & Israel 
Overlapping with the United States’ counterterrorism interests, 
perhaps the most sensitive criticisms of the JCPOA have concerned 
what the deal means for the United States’ traditional Middle East 
allies.915 Any massive flow of US capital to Iran would likely amplify 
such criticisms.916 Even when sanctioning Iran had run contrary to the 
United States’ direct interests, Washington’s ties with Israel and the 
Sunni Gulf States (most notably Saudi Arabia) were perceived to have 
merited a continuation of the sanctions regime.917 Considering the 
intractable divisions between these two camps, it is unsurprising that 
Washington’s Middle East policies have at times been incoherent.918 
This, ironically, has helped fuel the rise of Iran, especially since the 
US removal of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party from Iraq in 2003.919 
Both Israel and Saudi Arabia do have legitimate reasons to be 
concerned about Iran’s rise to Middle East dominance: Iran boasts the 
most sizeable armed forces of any State in the region, and its 
geostrategic location provides many natural military advantages.920 
Furthermore, for the Gulf States especially, Iran’s ability to foster 
cross-border alliances with sizable pockets of Shi'a believers is a 
                                                                                                             
915. See, e.g., Teresa Welsh, Iran Nuclear Deal Makes Middle East Allies Nervous, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jul. 14, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/
iran-nuclear-deal-makes-middle-east-allies-nervous; Sam Dagher, Iran Deal Worries Mideast 
Neighbors, WALL STREET J., July 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deal-worries-
mideast-neighbors-1436900286. 
916. Cf. supra note 915 and accompanying text (citing the uneasiness of traditional US 
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917. See Bhala, supra note 27, at 255; MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 282 
(arguing that foreign interests propelled the US sanctions regime, even when it ran contrary to 
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918. See MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 299; Gideon Rachman, America’s 
Middle East Alliances are Cracking, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013), https://next.ft.com/content/
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Washington’s alliances with both Israel and Saudi Arabia).  
919. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161 (citing Saudi disapproval for US policies that 
have empowered Iran); Conor Friedersdorf, How Foreign-Policy Hawks Empowered Iran, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/how-
foreign-policy-hawks-empowered-iran/384500/ (demonstrating how the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 strengthened Iran).  
920. See Wright, The Challenge of Iran, supra note 353, at 6; Ben Piven, Iran and 
Israel: Comparing military machines, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2012/03/2012326131343853636.html (assessing Iran’s military strengths).  
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notable cause for concern.921 However, allowing Washington’s allies 
to dictate the official US position on Iran over the past four decades 
has undercut the United States’ own foreign policy interests.922 The 
problem is that Washington’s one-sided approach to the region has 
prevented the establishment of any sustainable semblance of a 
regional balance of power.923 At the same time, this blind devotion to 
Washington’s regional allies has tied the United States’ hands and 
kept Washington from playing regional powers against one-another, 
at times when it would have been in the United States’ best interests 
to do so.924 
a. Ensuring the Interests of Saudi Arabia 
The United States’ ties with Saudi Arabia extend back to the 
Kingdom’s first oil concession granted to Standard Oil of California 
in the spring of 1933.925 Today, however, Saudi Arabia’s relationship 
with Iran has managed to destabilize much of the entire Middle East 
region, which has caused serious problems for the United States’ 
interests there.926 From Iraq and Syria to Yemen, many of the region’s 
most fever-pitched conflicts are commonly cited as proxy wars 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia.927 Overall, these Saudi-Iranian 
tensions are often described exclusively in religious terminology, 
even to the extent that today’s Middle East is habitually compared to 
Europe’s seventeenth century Catholic-Protestant Thirty Years’ 
                                                                                                             
921. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; The Shia Crescendo, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 
2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647367-shia-militias-are-
proliferating-middle-east-shia-crescendo (noting the sectarian reach of Iran and Gulf fears of a 
rising Shia Crescent).  
922. See infra notes 923-24 and accompanying text.  
923. See Walt, Accentuate the Positive, supra note 117 (calling for Washington to use 
the Iran Deal as a means of establishing a more sustainable balance of power in the Middle 
East); Mohsen M. Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal: Why it is Time for Optimism, 
FOREIGN AFF. (July 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-07-
15/iranian-politics-after-deal (proposing a more balanced US approach toward Saudi Arabia).  
924. See supra note 923 and accompanying text.  
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Saudi Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/saudi-
arabia/us-saudi-relations/p36524 (documenting the origin of US-Saudi relations).  
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927. Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; Takeyh, Time for Détente With Iran, supra note 
357 (articulating upon Iran’s ongoing proxy war with Saudi Arabia).  
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War.928 However, such an analysis ignores the fact that, during Iran’s 
Reform Era, the Islamic Republic and the House of Saud were 
perfectly capable of dealing amicably toward one another.929 In fact, 
despite religious tensions that might have existed at the time, 
President Rafsanjani viewed Iran’s Sunni Gulf neighbors as a 
lucrative economic and investment opportunity, and an important 
destination for Iranian investing capital.930 To this day, the Sunni 
Emirate of Dubai remains an important offshore Iranian commercial 
hub, and as a general matter, analysts and policymakers should not 
forget that Sunnis and Shi’ites managed to live in relative peace for 
entire centuries of Ottoman rule, and throughout most of the region’s 
history.931 
In reality, much of the Saudi-Iranian conflict today stems from 
the regionally destabilizing US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the 
divergent oil policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia.932 While US 
sanctions targeting Iran’s petroleum sector had disincentivized any 
harmonization of oil policies between these two rivals, today, the 
recognition that regional tensions require urgent mitigation could 
infer a US need to get tough on its Saudi ally, encouraging it to 
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931. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; Karim Sadjadpour, The Battle of Dubai: The 
United Arab Emirates and the U.S.-Iran Cold War, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE 
(July 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf at 21-22 (pointing out Iran’s 
commercial ties with Dubai); see also Shireen Hunter, Sunni-Shia Tensions are More About 
Politics, Power and Privilege than Theology, GEORGETOWN U. SCH. OF FOREIGN SERV., 
https://acmcu.georgetown.edu/sunni-shia-tensions (last visited July 11, 2016); Murtaza 
Hussain, The Myth of the 1,400 Year Sunni-Shia War, AL JAZEERA (July 9, 2013), http://www.
aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/2013719220768151.html (recognizing the role of 
contemporary politics in today’s Sunni-Shia tensions).  
932. See Molavi, supra note 149, at 161; MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY 
SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 28, at 385, 479 (exploring the origins of today’s Saudi-
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negotiate toward more reasonable oil politics.933 Such harmonized oil 
policies could represent a first step toward broader, perhaps even US-
brokered, Saudi-Iranian cooperation.934 Although controversial, 
numerous commentators have noted that today, Iran likely represents 
a more strategic ally than Washington’s traditional Gulf partners.935 
This very perception has likely contributed to Saudi Arabia’s 
complete refusal to cooperate with Tehran on regional issues.936 
However, as the recent upswing of terrorist attacks inside Saudi 
Arabia might imply, such a strategy is likely undermining the 
Kingdom’s own national security interests, whether they realize it or 
not.937 
On this last point, a word should be noted on the Saudi 
relationship with Wahhabi extremism.938 The blunt truth is that 
Islamic terrorism, as the world has come to experience it, would not 
exist today without the unique role Saudi Arabia has played.939 The 
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east-stability-peace (declaring Iran to be a more strategic ally to the United States than Saudi 
Arabia).  
936. Jennifer Williams, Why Saudi Leaders Keep Making Bad Decisions: They’re 
Scared, VOX (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/1/7/10725896/saudi-insecurity-iran; 
Kenneth Pollack, Fear and Loathing in Saudi Arabia, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 7, 2016), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/fear-and-loathing-in-saudi-arabia/.  
937. See The Associated Press, Timeline: Al-Qaeda and ISIS Attacks in Saudi Arabia, 
AL ARABIYA NEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/11/
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also Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923 (“Such a tactical [US-Iran] 
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eighteenth-century alliance between Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Saud 
remains at the heart of the Kingdom today, and even as the United 
States’ closest Arab ally, the House of Saud still perceives it in the 
national interest to cultivate radical Wahhabism and export its 
teachings into neighboring territories.940 In addition to spreading these 
extremist doctrines, various swaths of Saudi society continue to 
provide clerical and financial support to Wahhabist militant 
movements.941 Despite its close relations with Washington, Saudi 
Arabia has yet to meaningfully address this concern.942 Worse, Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated it has little control over such movements 
once they develop and metastasize, often turning against their own 
patrons and seeking to liberate the Hedjaz from the Kingdom’s 
wealthy, pro-United States monarchy.943 Such passive tolerance of 
Wahhabi extremism is surprising, until one considers Saudi Arabia’s 
own perception of its relationship with Washington over past decades: 
that “as long as the United States remained dependent on imported oil 
and was antagonistic toward Iran, Riyadh could count on 
Washington’s unconditional support to pursue its regional 
ambitions.”944 
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The Saudi carte blanche has existed for too long now in 
Washington.945 Saudi Arabia should be held accountable for its 
regional conduct, in the same way that a revised US relation with Iran 
would still hold Tehran accountable for its actions.946 By taking a 
more evenhanded approach to the region, Washington could seek to 
influence more sensible and cooperative regional politics, that take 
seriously the interests and concerns of all parties involved.947 
Furthermore, if US passivity toward Saudi misconduct is in fact a 
result of the United States’ reliance on Saudi oil, then engagement 
and increased international investment with OPEC’s second-largest 
producer might prove a sensible “stick” to shore up Riyadh’s 
behavior.948 Again, by more evenly balancing US interaction with 
regional power bases, Washington can play powers upon each other 
to further US policy interests.949 In fact, such a shift might already be 
naturally evident.950 US imports from Saudi Arabia have fallen a 
shocking sixty-six percent in the period from 1973 to 2014, and other 
rifts in the US-Saudi relationship are equally manifest.951 While 
Washington should remain cautious not to needlessly alienate the 
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articles/2015/08/25/the-u-s-backed-war-in-yemen-is-strengthening-al-qaeda.html; Yemen’s Al-
Qaeda Branch now in Control of Several Aden Neighborhoods, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemens-al-qaeda-branch-now-control-several-
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(Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/why-the-us-is-stuck-
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951. See McGrath Goodman, supra note 330, at 15; Herman Franssen, Obama and 
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driven by the rise in US domestic energy production, which has offset the need for Saudi oil. 
See id. For other US-Saudi tensions, see LACEY, supra note 906, at 292-302.  
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Kingdom and other Gulf allies, the US should at least reassess Saudi 
Arabia’s input in guiding Washington’s Iran policies.952 
b. Ensuring the Interests of Israel 
A more difficult challenge of US engagement with Iran concerns 
Washington’s “special relationship” with the State of Israel.953 Since 
the mid-Cold War, Israel has undoubtedly played the role of the 
United States’ closest ally in the Middle East, and the ties between 
Washington and the Jewish State have proven resilient.954 In fact, 
perhaps the largest rift the special relationship has ever encountered 
was the controversy surrounding the JCPOA itself, which placed 
President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu in a rare position of 
public contest.955 Although both the US legislature and the executive 
branch were always careful to pay homage to the special relationship, 
the fact that the JCPOA was adopted at all atop Israel’s protests is a 
marked deviation from Washington’s standard operating procedure in 
the region.956 To turn now and liberalize US investment in Iran would 
certainly be controversial.957 
Many factors however suggest that it is actually in Israel’s long-
term interests for the United States to sensibly engage with Iran.958 
Nuclear weapons or not, Iran boasts a population of approximately 
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Daniel Piples, How Special Is the U.S.-Israel Relationship?, 4 MIDDLE E. Q. 41 (1997) 
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U.S. Aid to Israel, HARVARD ISRAEL REV. (2006), http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hireview/
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Israel Relations?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/
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the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties, WALL STREET J., Oct. 22, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
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NEWS AND WORLD REPORT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/
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2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-iran-nuclear-deal-vote_us_55f88337e4b0d
6492d6350b4. See generally MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26.  
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seventy-eight million, and recent reports from Israel’s own 
intelligence community suggest that the Islamic Republic is rapidly 
closing in on Israel’s levels of military technology.959 While Israel has 
consistently blocked US efforts at détente with Iran in the past, it 
might be time for the Jewish State to seriously consider the upsides of 
easing tensions with the Islamic Republic. 960 In fact, Israel would 
accrue many benefits from a US engagement policy toward Iran.961 
As discussed above, Iran’s influence over various terrorist movements 
along Israel’s borders could prove a sensible means of (privately, if 
not publically) securing enhanced security for the State of Israel, 
effectively reigning in the conduct of these groups to resemble 
something closer to Palestinian/Lebanese political parties, as opposed 
to openly militarist movements.962 Likewise, having the Iranians on 
board any future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal would be a sensible 
way of avoiding Israel’s past experiences that partially yielded the 
attrition of the Oslo Accords.963 If Israel’s own voice carries little 
weight in the political corridors of Tehran, the increased weight of 
Washington’s voice there could help secure Israel’s interests.964 
Furthermore, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, the special 
relationship between Israel and the United States has itself 
occasionally undermined US foreign policy interests.965 Foremost, it 
is unsurprising that sixty years of Washington’s pro-Israel policies 
have resulted in problematic anti-US sentiments, shared by both 
regional regimes and regional population bases.966 This has not only 
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undermined US security cooperation with local governments, but has 
also placed the United States in the direct crosshairs of Sunni-Arab 
terrorist organizations.967 Groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS strategically 
use the special relationship as a powerful means of recruiting 
supporters and combatants to their causes.968 Public rhetoric aside, 
while the plight of the Palestinians has been largely forgotten by the 
region’s Arab governments, this injustice remains emotionally potent 
among regional populations and Islamic communities across the 
world.969 If the United States is serious about eroding support for 
these terrorist movements, then, at least in the long-term, some 
semblance of a more nuanced Israel policy is certainly in order.970 In 
the case of Iran specifically, the issue of Palestine has proved a 
consistent means for the Islamic Republic to undermine US interests 
in the region.971 Throughout the sanctions regime, mass domestic 
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PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. (1995), http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=646; Frank Newport, Gallup 
Poll of the Islamic World, GALLUP (Feb. 26, 2002), http://www.gallup.com/poll/5380/gallup-
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Palestinian conflict). 
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opinion on Palestine also checked Arab governments from ever 
forming a meaningful alliance or synchronized effort against the rise 
of their Iranian rival.972 As long as Iran was popularly perceived as 
the only regional power looking out for oppressed Palestinians, Arab 
governments risked alienating their own populations in raising too 
much noise about Iran’s troubling conduct.973 
Beyond the Palestinian issue, Israel’s past actions have revealed 
other large rifts in the overlap between Israeli and US regional policy 
interests.974 The Knesset’s encouragement for the removal of Saddam 
Hussein from Iraq in 2003 helped contribute to one of the largest US 
strategic blunders of the past century, and many credible 
policymakers see the JCPOA as the only thing currently standing 
between a repeat of history and the same mistakes being made in 
regards to Iran.975 Furthermore, from the 1954 “Lavon Affair” to 
more recent unauthorized military technology transfers to US 
adversaries like China, the State of Israel has often demonstrated little 
regard for Washington’s policy interests when conducting its own 
affairs.976 This, of course, is perfectly reasonable. In a global system 
of sovereign and equal nations, there is nothing surprising nor 
reprehensible in a nation-State’s pursuit of its own foreign policy 
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interests at the expense of the interests of others.977 But in the case of 
Israel and the United States, nothing prevents this logic from being 
equally applied in the opposite direction.978 From a normative 
standpoint, protests from the Knesset are hardly a reason for the 
United States to abandon the foreign policy opportunities posed by 
engaging Iran.979 
All of the above has led some US policymakers, and even 
notable Israeli policymakers, to question whether the State of Israel 
has transformed from a strategic asset of the United States to a 
strategic liability.980 However one answers this question, it is unlikely 
that, at least in the short-term, Washington will cease to perceive of 
itself as strategically and even morally committed to the defense of 
the Jewish State.981 In regards to Iran, there are certainly red flags to 
consider.982 President Ahmadinejad’s bombastic threats against Israel, 
along with his revolting displays of Holocaust denial, lend 
considerable credibility to Israel’s concern over the rise of Iran.983 
However, the entire purpose of a US-Iran engagement strategy would 
be to prevent figures like Ahmadinejad from taking the helm of the 
Islamic Republic.984 Whereas isolation and the economy of resistance 
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982. See infra note 983 and accompanying text. 
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have historically resulted in populist and nationalist rallying behind 
Iranian hardliners, an investment-focused US engagement strategy 
would provide a powerful way of assembling incentives to empower 
Iranian moderates, much more open to a manageable, if indirect, 
relationship with Israel.985 While one might question the authenticity 
of their underlying sentiment, the “Happy Rosh Hashanah” messages 
emanating out of President Rouhani’s Twitter account certainly stand 
in stark contrast to the lambasts of his immediate predecessor.986 If 
increased US investment in Iran has the ability of propagating these 
sentiments, then whether it is appreciated or not, Israel stands to 
benefit from US-Iran engagement initiatives.987 
5. International Cooperation & Collective Security Across Today’s 
Middle East Conflicts 
Increased engagement with Iran would also likely have a 
dramatic impact on wider US security interests. Considering the 
Islamic Republic’s reach in the region, as well as the Middle East’s 
current prevalence of sectarian crises, many US policymakers have 
noted the need to enhance US-Iranian concerted security measures, 
even declaring that “cooperation has never been more important.”988 
In fact, President Obama himself has echoed these sentiments.989 
Whether one likes it or not, Iran’s influence makes it an 
“indispensible partner” in stabilizing Iraq.990 Likewise, the Iranians 
and the United States are natural partners in stabilizing Afghanistan 
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and stemming narcotics trafficking throughout Central Asia.991 
Further arenas of cooperation could involve bringing an end to the 
Syrian Civil War, sorting out a compromise between warring factions 
in Yemen, and, as discussed above, combatting extremism and 
terrorism throughout the whole region.992 
Given the particular brutality of the current conflict in Syria, 
Iran’s interests there merit highlighted attention. As Iran’s only 
recognized Arab ally and an important geostrategic corridor to the 
Levant and Mediterranean Sea, Syria is crucially important to Iran.993 
The Islamic Republic has a direct interest in retaining its influence in 
Damascus, and the Alawi offshoot of Shi’ism practiced by Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad and much of the Syrian government 
provides further impetus for Iran’s pro-regime strategies there.994 
Although Washington’s demands for al-Assad to step down have 
fluctuated, Iranian influence could prove vital in negotiating his 
eventual exit, while retaining the cooperation of powerful Alawi elites 
in Syria’s post-conflict transition.995 One of the central flaws of the 
United States’ experience in Iraq was the post-Saddam policy of de-
Baathification—a process that alienated that nation’s military-trained 
and well armed traditional Sunni power wielders, and eventually 
fueled their return to combat under the black flags of ISIS.996 Whether 
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President al-Assad stays or goes, a similar process of 
comprehensively gutting the regime from Syria’s post-conflict 
political landscape would likely yield a similar Alawi backlash.997 In 
this sense, Iranian cooperation could play a major role in convincing 
Syria’s Alawites that they will share in the prosperity and security of 
any brokered end to hostilities.998 
Furthermore, despite the differences between Washington and 
Tehran concerning al-Assad, both nations share an equally 
compelling interest in defeating ISIS.999 Unlike the United States, 
where over a decade of failed wars in the Middle East have nearly 
eradicated political support for renewed military intervention, the 
Iranians have proven themselves willing and capable of taking on 
ISIS.1000 The Iranian military is probably the most capable regional 
force, behind Israel.1001 The Iranians have also expended significant 
blood and resources in their own fight against ISIS: a fight that has 
inflicted detrimental casualties on their allies in Hezbollah, and efforts 
they continued to fund even through the debilitating economic turmoil 
of the worst sanctions years.1002 If the United States is serious about 
“degrading and destroying” the Islamic State, then its most effective 
partner for doing so could very well be the Islamic Republic.1003 
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Far from being farfetched or unrealistic, significant security 
cooperation between the United States and Iran is not without 
precedent.1004 Under President Khatami, Iranians played a sizeable 
role in US military efforts both in Afghanistan and Iraq.1005 In 2001, 
Iran fought alongside US forces in ousting the Taliban, and went on 
to play a major role in supplying and training the Afghan National 
Army.1006 Afghanistan’s post-Taliban constitution resembled a 
democracy upon Iranian insistence, and on at least one occasion 
following the Taliban’s ousting, Iran pledged more aid to Afghan 
reconstruction than even the United States.1007 Years later, when the 
United States turned its sights on Iraq, the Iranians initially showed up 
a second time, helping to curtail a rising insurgency.1008 More 
recently, when the tarnished credibility of Iraq’s democratically 
elected Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sparked increased sectarian 
tensions, Iran joined the United States in asking al-Maliki to step 
down from high office, avoiding what could have been an ugly 
showdown considering Iran’s patronage of the Shi’ite Prime 
Minister.1009 In all of these events, history reveals a surprising 
capacity for cooperation when US and Iranian interests overlap.1010 
Increased engagement with Iran would not only facilitate this 
cooperation, but would likely foster new common interests and areas 
of potential cooperation between Tehran and Washington.1011 
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Ayatollah Khamenei himself has publically stated that the nuclear 
negotiations provided a chance of testing the ability for Iran and the 
US to discuss other issues.1012 Security cooperation is an important 
and especially sensible field for this to occur.1013 In this light, 
Washington’s recent invitation to Iran concerning Syria peace talks is 
a healthy development.1014 
6. Old Friends & Old Enemies: Bolstering Europe and Curtailing 
the Regional Influence of Russia and China 
A US engagement strategy toward Iran would not be strictly 
bilateral.1015 In fact, improved relations between these two countries 
would have a positive ripple effect for the United States across the 
whole world.1016 Foremost, the United States has its European allies 
to consider, who still represent Washington’s most obvious foreign 
policy asset.1017 Washington’s stance on Iran has historically differed 
from these various allies, and as discussed above, these differences 
seriously undercut Europe’s Critical Dialogue policies.1018 But like in 
the 1990s, Europe still has too much to gain from investment in Iran, 
and the presence of US investment there, while competitive, would 
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provide at least some sign of security that Washington is not going to 
complicate Europe’s long-term operations. In particular, Europe’s 
current reliance on Russian natural gas to meet its massive domestic 
energy needs would be mitigated, were it to increase imports from 
Iran.1019 Although this development is likely to occur whether or not 
the US chooses to further engage Iran, any future US action targeting 
or limiting Iran’s gas sector would come at the expense of indirectly 
harming the United States’ allies. If, in the event of JCPOA 
noncompliance, the US were forced to take action against the Islamic 
Republic, then doing so after a genuine and good faith effort at 
attempting engagement would at least soften the blow inflicted on 
Washington’s traditional friend base.1020 
At the same time, perhaps a more damning consequence of a 
future US failure to engage with Iran concerns Washington’s 
traditional adversaries.1021 This cuts at one of the fundamental flaws 
of the entire sanctions regime: where the United States and its allies 
choose policies of isolation, somebody else is always standing on 
deck, ready to seize opportunities.1022 While internally sanctions 
against Iran tended to empower hardliner elements like the IRGC, on 
the international stage, China and Russia directly benefited from US-
imposed sanctions against Iran.1023 Throughout the sanctions regime, 
Iran “explicitly sought to utilize China as a bulwark against Western 
pressure, deliberating privileging Chinese companies with major 
deals,” while Beijing was of the mindset that “commercial 
arrangements should have no bearing on security issues, and vice 
versa.”1024 Sure enough, from 2010 onward, Chinese FDI was the 
only significant player left within Iran’s energy sector, with firms like 
China National Petroleum Company (“CNPC”) and Sinopec landing 
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major deals there.1025 By consistently ducking under sanction-
triggering thresholds and resorting to US dollar-avoiding buybacks 
and bartering, China positioned itself as a powerful competitor in 
Iran’s post-sanctions future.1026 
Meanwhile, Russia has also gained from the United States’ past 
anti-Iran policies.1027 Although for centuries Moscow and Tehran 
have shared (and in fact, still do share) a turbulent relationship, US 
policies on Iran have provided ample posturing opportunities for 
Russian President Vladimir Putin to expand his role in the region. 1028 
This is most evident in the Kremlin’s recent intervention in Syria: an 
intervention that, while premised on combating ISIS and Sunni 
extremists, was debuted with targeted airstrikes on moderate US-
backed Syrian rebels.1029 The trouble with Russia’s Syrian 
intervention is that it need not be confined to Syria’s borders.1030 If 
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Iran were to fall entirely into the Russian sphere of influence, then 
from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Moscow will find no shortage of 
theaters to severely frustrate US regional interests.1031 
Nations like Russia and China represent much larger potential 
hazards to Washington than Iran or any other State (or non-State 
actor) in the Middle East region.1032 If the United States fails to 
engage Iran, it is likely that the Islamic Republic will fall even further 
under the influence of these globe-spanning rivals.1033 The head start 
in Iran that Russia and China secured through the sanctions regime 
places the United States and its allies at a comparative 
disadvantage.1034 In its current form, footnote six of the JCPOA 
provides little hope of outpacing the growing influence of these rival 
States.1035 While troubling in itself, this influence would also cripple 
any future multilateral efforts at pressuring or constraining Iran.1036 
Russia and China’s permanent-member vetoes in the UN Security 
Council could effectively shield Iran from future multilateral action, 
were their partnerships with Tehran to grow in the absence of US 
competition.1037 This could look very different, however, were the 
United States to abandon its commitment to footnote six and facilitate 
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broad US investment back to Iran.1038 The Conoco episode from the 
1990s, as well as Iranian consumerist tastes for US goods, show that 
Washington does have many competitive advantages over its rivals, 
were it to change course and actually exploit them.1039 In fact, as its 
desperation softened with the signing of the interim JPA in 2013, Iran 
was quick to cancel a US$2.5 billion development contract to Chinese 
firm CNPC.1040 This is a healthy sign for quality-differentiated US 
firms, should investment be allowed back to Iran. In time, the awards 
of such contracts to US firms could gravitate Tehran away from the 
troubling sway of Moscow and Beijing.1041 
7. Advancing US Economic Interests 
The most obvious benefit of US engagement concerns the sheer 
amount of money at stake in post-sanctions Iran. The World Bank 
estimates that if all sanctions had been lifted by 2016, real GDP in 
Iran would grow by 5.8% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017.1042 As discussed 
above, such a trend would represent a major investment opportunity 
for US capital.1043 While such lucrative profit potential alone should 
not guide US policy, it would certainly be an added perk of engaging 
Iran. Under the sanctions regime, US economic harm was tallied at 
billions of dollars annually.1044 Some firms paid billions of dollars in 
fines, while US airliners paid millions each year for Iranian air traffic 
control services.1045 These sanctions also had a negative effect on 
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global free trade, as well as on global oil supplies.1046 None of this 
accounts for the opportunity costs involved in isolating Iran: from 
Conoco onward, US firms lost billions of dollars in contracts to 
European and non-European competitors.1047 
Considering the investment opportunities highlighted above in 
Part II.B, there is surely money to be made in the Islamic 
Republic.1048 The repatriation of profits from US investment activities 
in Iran would present a dividend to US companies, thereby 
contributing to the US economy.1049 A strong domestic economy 
advances all US policy efforts.1050 Furthermore, because engagement 
in general tends to foster liberalization, US investment in Iran would 
likely give rise to new investment opportunities, creating a multiplier 
effect on the economic benefits the US would obtain.1051 “Bottom 
line: A better relationship with Iran would be good for the U.S. 
economy.”1052 Not only does engagement make foreign policy sense; 
it makes economic sense, too.1053 
8. Protecting Human Rights in Iran and Abroad 
Finally, the state of human rights in Iran is an often-quoted US 
foreign policy interest, and one that has occasionally made its way 
into the legislative purpose of US-imposed sanctions.1054 Indeed, 
while the JCPOA is intended to partially lift sanctions related to 
Iran’s nuclear activities, human rights-based sanctions remain in full 
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effect against the Islamic Republic.1055 The human rights question 
poses some of the hardest issues for any future US engagement 
strategy.1056 Put simply, the emerging post-sanctions Iranian 
investment landscape will likely channel significant revenues to a 
regime that has demonstrated no qualms in brutally suppressing 
dissent; limiting the expression and freedoms of its nationals; actively 
discriminating on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender, and sexual 
orientation; and subjecting its population to a harsh and draconian 
judicial system with little semblance of due process.1057 With more 
annual per capita executions than any other nation, the stakes of these 
human rights violations are immense.1058 Unfortunately, there are no 
easy solutions to addressing these issues.1059 
International investment has historically held an uneasy 
relationship with international human rights.1060 From the Calvo 
Doctrine to Dependency Theory, Classical Marxism to today’s anti-
globalization movement, various critical vantage points have provided 
well-reasoned critiques regarding international capitalism’s impact on 
human rights issues.1061 These critiques should not be ignored. In fact, 
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if the purpose of US engagement with Iran is to target Iranian civil 
society and empower Iranian moderates, such concerns are absolutely 
crucial.1062 If conducted properly and with caution, numerous factors 
suggest that US investment to Iran could provide a net-positive on 
that nation’s human rights situation.1063 
First, from a minimal standpoint, the traditional human rights 
critiques concerning international investment might be partially 
mitigated through the mere economic power of investment to improve 
the ordinary Iranian standard of living.1064 Enriching the livelihoods 
of the poorest Iranians would benefit human rights.1065 While this 
does not exactly address arbitrary detention or the execution of 
minors, it is surely better than nothing.1066 Second, and along similar 
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1062. See supra note 773 and accompanying text (recalling that one of the primary 
failures of Critical Dialogue was the perception of prioritizing business above human rights). 
1063. See infra notes 1064-85 and accompanying text. 
1064. See Behdad Bordbar, Will Nuclear Deal Improve Human Rights in Iran?, AL-
MONITOR (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-human-
rights-nuclear-lausanne.html (citing the consensus among Iranian activists that the JCPOA 
would help improve standards of living in Iran); cf. A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 289 
(looking at the sanction regime’s impact on socioeconomic rights in Iran). 
1065. See generally A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324; Poverty and Human Rights: 
Demand Dignity, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/poverty-and-
human-rights (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). See also U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural 
Rights, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRN/Co/2 (Jun. 10, 2013).  
1066. See U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on 
the Second Periodic Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IRN/Co/2 (Jun. 
10, 2013). 
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lines, if the long-term US strategy for dealing with Iran boils down to 
a choice between engagement and eventual war, then surely human 
rights advocates should prefer the former as opposed to the latter.1067 
Past US military promises to liberate Afghan women and bring 
democracy to Iraq have hardly furthered the overall state of human 
rights in either of those countries, and there is no reason to believe 
that the same complications would not arise in any military 
confrontation with Iran.1068 Third, by aligning incentives and 
increasing US economic leverage within the Islamic Republic, the 
typical naming-and-shaming mechanisms of human rights law would 
likely carry more weight in Iran.1069 Throughout the sanctions era, 
Iran had little to lose in failing to comply with the suggestions 
provided by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, or other human rights 
bodies.1070 Were the potential costs of Iran’s human rights violations 
to increase, then, out of raw economic logic, Tehran might more 
seriously consider such suggestions.1071 Fourth, although not directly 
related to future engagement policies, past sanctions policies have 
carried numerous human rights setbacks in their implementation.1072 
                                                                                                             
1067. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, It’s Either Iran Nuclear Deal or ‘Some Form of War,’ 
Obama Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/us/politics/
obama-urges-critics-of-iran-deal-to-ignore-drumbeat-of-war.html?_r=0 (reporting on the 
perceived dichotomy between war and the JCPOA); Ishaan Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-
Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/26/these-iranian-pro-
democracy-activists-want-congress-to-back-the-nuclear-deal/ (acknowledging various human 
rights activists who prefer international engagement with Iran, as opposed to any viable 
alternatives). 
1068. Compare Shereena Qazi, UN Report Highlights Afghan Conflict’s Toll on Women, 
AL JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/report-highlights-
afghan-conflict-toll-women-150805153732522.html (specifying the costs of ongoing conflict 
on today’s Afghan women), with Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? 
Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 783 (2002) (observing how the war in Afghanistan was rhetorically 
premised on protecting the human rights of Afghan women who suffered under the rule of the 
Taliban). 
1069. Essentially, this logic follows the same reasoning as how increased investment in 
Iran might cause the regime to question its practice of funding terrorist movements. By upping 
leverage over Iran and making its internal decisions/practices more expensive, the regime 
would be forced to at least think about amending its behavior. Cf. supra note 898. 
1070. The logic here follows that of Iran’s other problematic practices. Cf. supra note 
898 and accompanying text (arguing that sanctions resulted in reduced leverage to force Iran to 
rethink its support for regional terrorist movements). 
1071. See id. 
1072. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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The human costs of sanctions discussed above are worth recalling.1073 
Furthermore, past prohibitions against trade and the restricted export 
of Internet technologies to Iran actually undercut the democratic 
ambitions of Iran’s Green Movement.1074 Although Congress later 
legislatively corrected these prohibitions, the change came too late to 
impact the young Iranian dissenters being crushed by their 
government.1075 The episode provides a lesson on the dangerous ex-
ante imperfections of any isolation policy.1076 In this sense, the more 
buffer space that the United States can build between relapsing into 
sanctions, the more likely these human rights costs will be 
lessened.1077 
Considering the impact of US sanctions on Iranian human rights, 
it is no surprise that the JCPOA won wide support among human 
rights advocates, both within Iran and worldwide.1078 Among these 
stakeholders, the general consensus has been that sanctions hurt 
ordinary Iranians.1079 Prominent Iranian lawyer and human rights 
activist Shirin Ebadi has welcomed the JCPOA.1080 Likewise, Iranian 
                                                                                                             
1073. See supra Part I.C.3 (assessing the human costs of the sanctions regime). 
1074. See generally N. Kashani & M. Sadra, Technology in Green: How Removing 
Sanctions Can Encourage Iranian Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2010-02-26/technology-green; Anna Yukhananov, 
U.S. Loosens Sanctions on Iran for Mobile Gadgets, REUTERS (May 30, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-iran-sanctions-phone-idUKBRE94T0WA20130530 
(noting how sanctions unintentionally undermined the Green Movement). 
1075.  Yukhananov, supra note 1074 (reporting on the relaxation of internet and 
telecomm sanctions); Muhammad Sahimi, Victims of Economic Sanctions: The People and the 
Green Movement, FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
tehranbureau/2010/11/victims-of-economic-sanctions-the-people-and-the-green-movement.
html (emphasizing the Green Movement’s opposition to sanctions). 
1076. See supra note 1075 and accompanying text. 
1077.  See supra note 1075 and accompanying text. 
1078. See generally Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to 
Back the Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; 74 Prominent Iranians Urge Congress to Support 
Nuclear Deal with Iran, INT'L CAMPAIGN FOR HUM. RIGHTS IN IRAN (Aug. 31, 2015), http://
www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/08/letter-74-iranians-iran-deal (documenting widespread 
support for the JCPOA among human rights advocates). 
1079. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the 
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; A GROWING CRISIS, supra note 324 (presenting the view 
among human rights advocates that sanctions unintentionally weakened human rights in Iran). 
1080. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the 
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067; Interview by Amy Goodman with Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Peace 
Prize Laureate, the Hauge (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.democracynow.org/2015/4/28/iranian_
nobel_peace_prize_laureate_shirin (asserting Ebadi’s support for the JCPOA); see also Shirin 
Ebadi - Biographical, NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2003/ebadi-bio.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (providing a biography on Shirin 
Ebadi). 
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scholar Forrokh Negahdar has echoed these sentiments, forecasting 
that the JCPOA “will likely reign in Iran’s more hard-line groups.”1081 
The fact that engagement in the form of the JCPOA has received such 
a positive reaction from these direct stakeholders lends support to the 
view that future engagement would yield positive outcomes for the 
state of human rights in Iran.1082 But the JCPOA, as it currently 
stands, is just the first step in that direction.1083 As noted by Iranian 
human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh, “When a regime can no longer 
use the excuse of having foreign enemies, it can no longer imprison 
its own citizens as easily as it can when there is a foreign threat. 
However, it is wishful thinking to imagine that this nuclear agreement 
will automatically result in better human rights policies in Iran.”1084 
While increased US investment to Iran would not provide a silver 
bullet against the regime’s human rights abuses, perhaps it can at least 
do some of the work suggested by Sotoudeh.1085 
CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOUND US-IRAN 
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
As demonstrated above, increased US international investment 
in Iran could have a meaningful, positive impact upon each of these 
US foreign policy issues.1086 In this light, the restrictions faced by US 
investors under footnote six of the JCPOA delay these potential 
developments.1087 Such a delay is even more precarious, given that 
the momentum of US-Iran goodwill in the wake of the JCPOA cannot 
last forever. Meanwhile, while the United States waits on the 
sidelines, European and other investors are already flocking to Iran 
and sealing long-term investment deals, likely to yield various first-
mover advantages.1088 Read negatively, the United States’ loss to 
                                                                                                             
1081. See Tharoor, These Iranian Pro-Democracy Activists Want Congress to Back the 
Nuclear Deal, supra note 1067 (stating Negahdar’s support for the JCPOA); see also Farrokh 
Negahdar, Farrokh Negahdar on Mousavi’s 17th Statement: Relevance, KHORDAAD88 (Jan. 
19, 2010), http://khordaad88.com/?p=953 (providing a biography of Farrokh Negadhar). 
1082. See supra notes 1078-81. 
1083. See infra note 1084 and accompanying text. 
1084.  Bordbar, supra note 1064. 
1085. See supra notes 1055-84 and accompanying text. 
1086. See supra Part III.D (surveying the ways US engagement with Iran might be 
utilized to advance various US foreign policy interests). 
1087. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the footnote six issue). 
1088. See supra notes 446-48 and accompanying text (identifying the immediate 
attractiveness of Iran’s investment landscape, and international players already laying stakes 
there). 
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these global first-movers can be seen as increasing foreign influence 
in Iran, while US influence there only diminishes.1089 As under the 
sanctions regime in the 1990s, the incentives shared by Tehran and 
other investor home States is likely to frustrate any future US 
multilateral action targeting the Islamic Republic.1090 Read positively, 
many of these first-movers (but by no means all of them) are in fact 
the United States’ traditional friends in the world.1091 The US and 
Europe share numerous policy interests, and from this, if engagement 
does work, then indirect US benefits might be facilitated through the 
engagement efforts of the EU.1092 
However, there are two fundamental problems to this latter 
approach.1093 First, such a third-party engagement strategy almost 
identically replicates the problematic scenario of the Clinton years, 
where divergent US and European approaches to Iran severely 
strained the United States’ European relationships.1094 In today’s 
demanding world of global counterterrorism cooperation and 
competitive alternative markets and trading partners, the United 
States is arguably more vulnerable to diminishing its beneficial 
relations with Europe than at any time in the 1990s.1095 Over half a 
                                                                                                             
1089. See supra Part III.D.6. 
1090. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text (examining how US non-
participation in Iran throughout the sanctions era opened the door to the increasing influence of 
others). 
1091. See supra notes 1017-20 and accompanying text (exploring European investors’ 
interest in post-sanctions Iran.) 
1092. See Geranmayeh, Europe's Edge, supra note 759; Tarja Cronberg, Europe Matters 
in Iran’s Search for its Identity, EUROPE’S WORLD (Aug. 25, 2015), http://europesworld.org/
2015/08/25/europe-matters-irans-search-identity/#.VoXXiBorJ-U; Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, 
Europe’s Unique Opportunity to Engage with Iran, EUROPE’S WORLD (July 28, 2015), http://
europesworld.org/2015/07/28/europes-unique-opportunity-engage-iran/#.VoXYEBorJ-U 
(suggesting the positive role Europe can play in post-sanctions Iran). 
1093. See infra notes 1094-1102. 
1094. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (pointing out the strain on US-
European relations upon the passing of the ILSA). 
1095. See generally Charles A. Kupchan, The Fourth Age: The Next Era in Transatlantic 
Relations, NAT’L INTERESt 77 (Sept./Oct. 2006), http://www.cfr.org/world/fourth-age-next-
era-transatlantic-relations/p11488 (arguing that European and US foreign policy interests are 
gradually diverging); Sally McNamara, The EU-U.S. Counterterrorism Relationship: An 
Agenda for Cooperation, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2011/03/the-eu-us-counterterrorism-relationship-an-agenda-for-cooperation 
(highlighting the important but often conflicted state of US-EU counterterrorism cooperation); 
Eric Bradner, Talking Trade Differences, POLITICO (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.politico.com/
story/2013/10/us-eu-trade-heads-talk-regulatory-differences-097587 (noting regulatory trade 
conflicts between Europe and the United States); Razeen Sally, Looking East: The European 
Union’s New FTA Negotiations in Asia, EUR. CTR. INT’L POL. ECON. (Mar. 2007), http://ecipe.
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century of US-European engagement should not be needlessly tested. 
Second, the experience of Critical Dialogue suggests that it is unlikely 
Europe can shoulder meaningful engagement with Iran left on its 
own.1096 As discussed above, the US rift with Europe in the 1990s 
concerning Iran seriously undermined Critical Dialogue’s efficacy as 
an engagement strategy.1097 Additionally, the EU’s composition as 
individual nation-States has not changed since the 1990s.1098 If 
anything, in the aftermath of the Euro Crisis, the continent is probably 
less cohesive as a network of States than it had been throughout the 
Critical Dialogue.1099 The problem again is that a collection of self-
serving bilateral agreements with Iran removes any semblance of the 
common rationality or design needed to form an actual unified 
engagement strategy as opposed to disparate national policies.1100 
Worse, in the 1990s, such disparate investment policies devolved into 
competitive and nationalistic bare-naked profit chasing.1101 Repeating 
this trend today could undermine engagement as a whole, and even 
yield a resurgence of the populist Iranian impulses that fostered the 
rise of Ahmadinejad.1102 
In this sense, the US restrictions exemplified in footnote six of 
the JCPOA could be described as exactly the wrong policy.1103 An 
outright ban on US investment in Iran, including that conducted by 
foreign subsidiaries, would send a clear message to all US-based 
investors, and raise something resembling a principled stance against 
                                                                                                             
org/app/uploads/2014/12/looking-east-the-european-union2019s-new-trade-negotiations-in-
asia-1.pdf (exploring Europe’s growing trade relationships with Asia). That said, recent 
Russian adventurism in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, while not a positive development, point 
US-EU relations in the opposite direction. See Anne Applebaum, Obama’s Legacy Could Be a 
Revitalized NATO, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
anne-applebaum-obamas-legacy-could-be-a-revitalized-nato/2014/08/22/0f43da78-2a22-11e4-
8593-da634b334390_story.html. 
1096. See supra Part III.B. 
1097. See supra Part III.B (summarizing Europe’s period of Critical Dialogue with Iran). 
1098. See infra note 1099 and accompanying text. 
1099. See Jose Ignacio Torreblanca & Mark Leonard, The Continent-Wide Rise of 
Euroscepticism, EUR. COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (May 2013), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR
79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf; Allister Heath, Europe Could be Torn Apart by the 
Wrong Sort of Eurosceptics, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/europe/11391092/Europe-could-be-torn-apart-by-the-wrong-sort-of-Eurosceptics.
html (reviewing the rise of Euroscepticism across the EU). 
1100. See supra note 767 and accompanying text. 
1101. See supra notes 766-71 and accompanying text (assessing the ultimate failures of 
Europe’s Critical Dialogue). 
1102. See supra Part I.A.4 (summarizing the Ahmadinejad presidency). 
1103. See infra notes 1104-10 and accompanying text. 
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Iran’s ongoing troublesome behaviors.1104 While this route would not 
seize the foreign policy opportunities highlighted above, it would at 
least protect US investors from self-harm in the future, both in terms 
of potential capital losses, and in preventing contribution toward 
Europe’s problematic and structurally flawed engagement renewal, 
which could result in pushing Iran to further recalcitrance.1105 At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, a complete liberation of US investors 
and the full lifting of sanctions (or broad OFAC general licensing) 
would take advantage of the above opportunities, while likely also 
inspiring cautious guidance and regulatory oversight aimed at shaping 
the way investment in Iran is conducted.1106 Yet, under the status quo, 
both of these strategies are rejected in exchange for the exclusive 
allowance of US foreign subsidiary investment: investment by its 
very nature beyond the US jurisdiction to directly control.1107 It is 
dangerously likely that such an approach will result in rogue 
corporate profit chasing by US foreign subsidiaries licensed to 
operate in Iran, while also significantly undermining any US efforts at 
steering international investment toward Washington’s foreign policy 
goals.1108 If post-JCPOA US investment in Iran is perceived to be an 
activity occurring in the periphery, only by US foreign subsidiaries, 
then it is hard to believe that US administrative agencies and other 
government regulators will devote serious attention to the way US 
capital reaches Iran, or what it does there.1109 This approach is not 
only inefficient in its failure to seize ripe foreign policy opportunities, 
but it may also be dangerous in its potential to empower the most 
hardline elements of the Iranian regime.1110 
                                                                                                             
1104. Contra JCPOA, supra note 185, at Annex II n.6 (committing the US to waive 
nuclear sanctions against US-owned, foreign subsidiaries). See generally Part II.A.2. 
1105. See supra Part III.D (surveying US foreign policy benefits that would be forsaken 
under this strategy). 
1106. See supra Part III.D. 
1107. See supra Part II.A.2 (exploring the footnote six issue). 
1108. Cf. supra note 773 and accompanying text (citing similar failures under Critical 
Dialogue). 
1109. Cf. supra note 438 and accompanying text (discussing OFAC’s General License 
H). Focused primarily on building a firewall between US parent companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries transacting with Iran, General License H—as opposed to a case-by-case, specific 
licensing regime—shows that, US regulators do not appear strategically concerned with how 
legally compliant investment impacts Iran. Considering the opportunities highlighted supra in 
Part III.D, this amounts to an unfortunate missed opportunity. 
1110. Cf. supra Part III.B. 
2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 1015 
In contrast to this current approach, the United States 
government—and OFAC in particular—should play an active and 
supportive role in guiding US investors back to Iran, in a cautious 
manner consistent with United States policy interests.1111 Under a 
broad policy of engagement, the United States should work to remove 
the remaining barriers to international investment exemplified in 
footnote six, and instead utilize the power of incentives to achieve 
Washington’s regional foreign policy goals.1112 Furthermore, 
Washington’s revised guidance concerning footnote six, and 
subsequent investment policies, should be developed with the careful 
thinking and creativity that such a rare opportunity merits.1113 
Although the details and exact composition of such an 
engagement policy are best left to policymakers, the stakes involved 
and the potential upsides of a comprehensive US engagement strategy 
toward Iran should leave no innovation untapped.1114 For example, the 
use of investment codes, such as the MacBride Principles and the 
Sullivan Principles, could provide effective binding or nonbinding 
methods to channel investment along certain agreed-upon criteria, 
consistent with US policy goals.1115 In Iran, such corporate codes of 
conduct might discourage investment from certain IRGC-heavy 
                                                                                                             
1111. This could be achieved primarily by issuing specific licenses, on a case-by-case 
basis. See supra note 1108; see also supra note 230. 
1112. See generally supra Part III.D (listing US foreign policy goals that could be 
secured under such an approach). 
1113. See infra notes 1114-28 and accompanying text. 
1114. See infra notes 1115-28 and accompanying text. 
1115. Generally, investment codes operate as binding or non-binding codes of conduct, 
aimed at influencing the way investment is conducted. For example, if the US State 
Department or Treasury were to draft a set of guidelines related to investment in Iran that 
Washington determined would advance Iranian human rights or other US foreign policy 
interests, OFAC could then make these principles effectively binding by conditioning license 
granting upon their adherence. Alternatively, investment codes could be used to establish less 
binding, but nonetheless incentive-packed guidelines, which might, for example, condition a 
firm’s access to public pension funds upon their adherence. Historically, the MacBride 
Principles offered specified standards related to US investment entering Northern Ireland, 
while the Sullivan Principles provided guidelines for businesses with operations in apartheid 
South Africa. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 172-173; see also Fr. 
Sean McManus, MacBride Principles – Genesis and History, IRISH NAT’L CAUCUS, INC. 
(Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/principle/macbride-principles-genesis-
and-history/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (overviewing the historical implementation of the 
MacBride Principles); Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational 
Corporations: What Can the Sullivan and MacBride Principles Tell Us?, 19 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 167 (1999) (considering the lessons of the Sullivan and MacBride Principles, 
and investment codes broadly). 
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industry sectors, or incentivize opening joint ventures with recent 
Iranian university graduates (the youth) or members of Iranian civil 
society.1116 Whether adopted by formal legislation, agency 
rulemaking, or decentralized shareholder resolutions completely 
within the private sector, investment codes could help facilitate US 
capital to the exact strata of Iranian society that the United States 
would like to see empowered there.1117 
Another interesting proposition would be to incorporate explicit 
human rights provisions into a future US-Iran BIT.1118 While the 
sparse human rights-mentioning BITs currently in existence tend to 
couch their commitment to human rights within broad “preambulor 
wording,” a  post-sanctions US BIT with Iran could be the ideal 
grounds to deploy actual substantive human rights provisions. 1119 A 
drawback to this strategy is that Iranian negotiators might prove 
unwilling to sign to such provisions.1120 However, by focusing human 
rights-based restrictions upon investors, as opposed to States Parties, 
such provisions could achieve meaningful results while appearing less 
directly threatening to the Iranian regime.1121 Such language might 
condition investment protection upon specified human rights-based 
                                                                                                             
1116. See supra notes 359-64 and accompanying text (IRGC); see also notes 870-78 and 
accompanying text (the youth). 
1117. The use of agency and private sector action are particularly attractive, given 
Congress’ prevailing attitudes concerning Iran. See generally Kristina Peterson, Congressional 
Republicans Signal Deep Resistance to Iran Nuclear Deal, WALL STREET J., July 14, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deal-faces-u-s-lawmakers-scrutiny-1436868209; David M. 
Herszenhorn, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Congress Has Its Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/the-iran-nuclear-deal-congress-has-its-say.html?_r=
0. 
1118. See generally Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human 
Rights, INST. FOR DEV. AND PEACE (INEF) (Mar. 2010), http://www.humanrights-business.
org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf; Patrick Dumberry & 
Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, A Few Pragmatic Observations on How BITs should be Modified to 
Incorporate Human Rights Obligations, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (Jan. 
2014), http://droitcivil.uottawa.ca/sites/droitcivil.uottawa.ca/files/a_few_pragmatic_oberva
tion_on_how_bits_should_be_modified_to_incorporate_human_rights_obligations.pdf 
(exploring the potential of human rights provisions being formally incorporated into BITs). 
1119. Jacob, supra note 1118, at 10 (recognizing the current weakness of preambulor 
human rights BIT provisions); see also Davarnejad, supra note 770, at 11-12 (calling for the 
formal adoption of human rights clauses in BITs and other international investment 
agreements). 
1120. In light of Iran’s current human rights violations, it seems unlikely they would be 
willing to bind themselves to any instrument that would put them on the hook for such 
behavior. Cf. supra notes 1054-59 and accompanying text (examining the human rights 
situation in Iran). 
1121. Cf. id. 
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investment parameters, or rights-based due diligence requirements.1122 
The effects of such a provision would begin long before actual 
investor-State arbitration by incentivizing US investors to cautiously 
choose where to launch their investment operations in Iran, lest they 
not receive the BIT’s substantive investment protections.1123 Along 
similar lines, the United States could make use of the institutions at its 
disposal, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(“OPIC”).1124 By premising access to political risk insurance in Iran 
upon certain investment guidelines, and perhaps even discounting 
insurance premiums for specified investment categories, OPIC too 
could play a direct role in incentivizing the most appealing forms of 
investment in Iran.1125 
Further innovations from CSR literature should also be explored 
in order to craft sensible US-Iran investment policies.1126 If a common 
critique of international sanctions is that they tend to be “blunt 
mechanisms, analogous to blowing up an entire airplane with 
innocent passengers on board to kill just one terrorist,” then the use of 
these CSR innovations could provide a targeted means of 
economically incentivizing the same effects of sanctions, while 
simultaneously allowing for the various positive influences of 
economic engagement. 1127 In this sense, by bringing human rights 
concerns directly within the mechanisms of international investment 
                                                                                                             
1122. See Davarnejad, supra note 770, at 11-12 ; Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 
1118, at 15 (examining how human rights restrictions could be implemented within 
international investment agreements). 
1123. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 1118, at 15. 
1124. See generally SALACUSE, supra note 10, at 250-51; Who We Are, OPIC, https://
www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (introducing OPIC’s role in 
supporting US investment overseas). 
1125. In terms of developing specific principles to guide investment, the United States 
could, as a minimum floor, aim to neutrally impose standards that Iran has already obliged 
itself to upholding, such as the provisions within the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”). See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
1126. See generally U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights [OHCHR], 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), IISD, https://www.iisd.org/business/issues/sr.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 
2016). 
1127. Wolfe, supra note 29, at 12; cf. Breckinridge, supra note 119, at 2441 (“In the 
words of Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, employment of sanctions can be ‘like applying a 
meat-cleaver where laser surgery would be more appropriate.’”).  
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law, future US engagement with Iran could leave a major positive 
impression on the future of investment law as a whole.1128 
The key limitation to all of this, of course, is whether such a 
comprehensive engagement strategy toward Iran is actually politically 
feasible.1129 Unfortunately, there are no easy answers here.1130 A 
direct bilateral engagement policy would weigh politically heavy on 
both the United States and Iran.1131 In the United States, such a radical 
change in direction would require massive amounts of political will 
and political capital, which, at the very least, are circumstances 
unlikely to be realized until a fresh administration takes office in 
January 2017.1132 In today’s globalized world, the sheer speed of 
international capital could result in a very different Iranian investment 
landscape by then.1133 Additionally, this type of engagement policy 
would require a meticulous navigation of hypersensitive special 
interests, both in Congress and among the general population.1134 It 
seems few political platforms would strike US voters as more 
repugnant than cozying up with the Islamic Republic.1135 Engagement 
advocates would therefore require great skill and nuance in 
mobilizing these policies.1136 
                                                                                                             
1128. See supra note 1127 and accompanying text. 
1129. See infra notes 1130-52 and accompanying text. 
1130. See infra notes 1131-52 and accompanying text. 
1131. See Dobbins, supra note 709, at 205; Jonah Shepp, Hawks on Both Sides Are 
Trying to Kill the Iran Nuke Deal, SLATE (June 24, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2015/06/24/iran_nuke_deal_khamenei_and_iran_hawks_look_to_scuttle_
nuclear_agreement.html (anticipating the politics of further engagement, in both Iran and the 
United States). 
1132. Cf. supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (noting the controversies surrounding 
the JCPOA). 
1133. Indeed, since Implementation Day, transactions with Iran are already valued are 
valued in the billions. See Jim Boulden, Iranian President Does Big Business in Europe, CNN 
(Jan. 26, 2016, 6:58 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/26/news/companies/iran-europe-
deals-italy-france/; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran's Dealmaking with Europe: the Seven Biggest 
Contracts, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016, 9:28  EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/jan/29/irans-dealmaking-europe-seven-biggest-contracts. 
1134. See Herszenhorn, supra note 1117; see also supra Part III.D.4 (examining Saudi 
and Israeli interests in US-Iran policy). 
1135. Among the US population, opinions on Iran are unsurprisingly unfavorable. Iran, 
GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2016); Iran, 
POLLINGREPORT, http://www.pollingreport.com/iran.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
1136. Cf. supra notes 1131-35 and accompanying text (recognizing the political 
challenges of enhanced US-Iran engagement). 
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Likewise, there are no promises that engagement will be viewed 
as desirable to the clerics and Mujtahids currently running Tehran.1137 
President Rouhani’s existing mandate could be quickly eroded by a 
failure to achieve improvements in Iran’s standard of living, including 
economic improvements.1138 Investment or no investment, Iran’s 
economy faces real structural problems.1139 Although Ayatollah 
Khamenei appears open to foreign investment, and has no reason to 
want to return to the chaos of the Ahmadinejad years, any perceived 
lack of goodwill on the world’s part has the potential of seriously 
jeopardizing the JCPOA. 1140 Even under ideal international 
circumstances, Khamenei is nearly eighty years old, and it is 
impossible for the world to know who will one day take his place.1141 
For both sides, today’s rare overlap of wide-spanning policy 
interests is simply too great not to put serious efforts toward trying to 
make engagement work.1142 The ability to cooperate on a wide range 
of common policy goals would serve both US and Iranian 
interests.1143 Furthermore, in the same way that international 
                                                                                                             
1137. Cf. Gerald F. Seib, Will Iran Hard-Liners Buy Economic Opening?, WALL 
STREET J. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-hard-liners-say-no-thanks-to-
economic-opening-1446481974; Iran Elections: Moderates 'Colluded' with West, Says 
Hardliner, BBC (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35683881. 
1138. See IRAN COUNTRY FORECAST, supra note 157, at 18; Ganji, supra note 600 
(noting Rouhani’s need to translate the JCPOA into tangible benefits). 
1139. See supra Part II.C.1 (outlining commercial risks in Iran). 
1140. See MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION, supra note 
28, at 362 (“ . . . for the final two years of his second term, Ahmadinejad was effectively 
sidelined, reduced to playing a convenient foil for intraélite skirmishing while Khamenei 
publicly mused about simply eliminating the presidency altogether…”); see also Thomas 
Erdbrink, Ayatollah Khamenei, Backing Iran Negotiators, Endorses Nuclear Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/world/middleeast/ayatollah-ali-
khamenei-of-iran-backs-negotiators-and-doesnt-criticize-nuclear-deal.html?_r=0 (illustrating 
Khamenei’s approval of the JCPOA). 
1141. Contrast Milani, Iranian Politics After the Deal, supra note 923 (predicting that a 
moderate is likely to replace Khamenei), with WEHREY ET AL, supra note 362, at 89 
(hypothesizing the likelihood of Khamenei being replaced by elements even more beholden to 
the IRGC). On this note, one of the most significant developments of Iran’s February 2016 
elections was the resulting majority of moderates seated on the government’s Assembly of 
Experts, the bodily designated to elect the next Supreme Leader. See Moderates Win A 
Majority Of Seats In Iran's Clerical Assembly, NPR (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/02/29/468521874/moderates-win-a-majority-of-seats-in-irans-
clerical-assembly; Iran elections: Moderates Win Most Votes for Assembly of Experts Race, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/iran-elections-moderates-win-
most-votes-for-assembly-of-experts-race/a-19079351. 
1142. See generally supra Part III.D (identifying overlap across various US foreign 
policy interests). 
1143. See id. 
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investment has the power to create new stakeholders among Iran’s 
youth and middle class, the opening of Iran to US investment would 
also create a new class of commercial stakeholders and engagement 
advocates here in the United States, with shared corporate interests, 
capable of lobbying for these sensible policies.1144 Whatever its 
failures related to Iran throughout the 1990s, few would classify the 
US oil lobby as irrelevant in steering Washington’s policies. It is also 
not beyond reason that these groups might appreciate the opportunity 
to be seen inducing positive change in Iran.1145 After chants of “no 
blood for oil” marked the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the mere 
prospect of “oil for human rights” has a more pleasant ring to it.1146 
By arming themselves with the above benefits that engagement would 
bring to US foreign policy interests, these players could play a major 
role in constructively shifting the United States political consensus 
regarding Iran.1147 
Furthermore, the efforts to mobilize a comprehensive US-Iran 
engagement strategy would not require starting from scratch. 
Throughout the entire sanctions regime, various Track II diplomacy 
efforts were carried out in the absence of official relations.1148 These 
efforts “generally have taken a long-term approach geared toward 
socializing elites with access to and influence on policymakers” and 
have aimed at “shap[ing] the policy debate by presenting a more 
                                                                                                             
1144. See supra Part III.D.2 (exploring engagement’s potential to empower alternative 
stakeholders in Iran); see also Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 166 
(noting the creation of engagement-supporting constituencies within Washington’s Iraq 
sanctions regime). 
1145. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Introduction, supra note 709, at 173 (suggesting that 
international investors are not just financially motivated, but also interested in promoting US 
values overseas); David B. Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas 
Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, (2010) (examining 
CSR within the oil and gas industry). 
1146. See Greg Muttitt & Ali Issa, “No Blood for Oil”: The Unfinished Story of Iraq’s 
Oil Law, GLOBAL RES. (July 30, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/no-blood-for-oil-the-
unfinished-story-of-iraq-s-oil-law/32129; Anti-War Protests Span the Globe, BBC (Mar. 22, 
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2875555.stm (characterizing opposition to the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq). 
1147. See supra Part III.D (arguing how engagement could be used to advance US 
foreign policy interests). 
1148. See Suzanne DiMaggio, Track II Diplomacy, in THE IRAN PRIMER, supra note 12, 
at 206 (“The term ‘track II diplomacy’ refers to frank, off-the-record interactions, often 
between members of adversarial countries outside of official negotiations.”); see also Charles 
Homans, Track II Diplomacy: A Short History, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 20, 2011), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/ (providing a general 
overview of Track II Diplomacy). 
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nuanced picture of problems and possible options for cooperative 
solutions.”1149 While the results of these efforts have remained largely 
confidential, it is known that politically powerful players have often 
been involved in them.1150 Although Track II diplomacy is incapable 
of mobilizing engagement strategies on its own, it is also worth noting 
that, at least during the George W. Bush Administration, various 
pockets of both the CIA and the State Department actively supported 
détente with Iran.1151 By shoring up these official and unofficial 
support channels, these political power blocs could align with private 
sector engagement advocates in order to expand Washington’s 
perspective on engaging Iran.1152 
Engagement policies in general are always initially a gamble for 
all parties involved.1153 Yet, with a little bit of political will, early 
confidence building measures, and the establishment of mutually 
agreed-upon and easily traceable roadmaps, the positive results of 
engagement could open the door to self-perpetuating shared benefits 
and bring constructive changes within the Islamic Republic.1154 In 
2010, US diplomat James Dobbins predicted that, in engaging Iran, 
“[a] breakthrough on the nuclear front could expand the room for 
dialogue on other issues.”1155 While the JCPOA has certainly 
provided a breakthrough on the Iranian nuclear issue, both the United 
States and Iran remain in a position where more is now needed. In 
seeking to sensibly advance its foreign policy goals within Iran 
specifically and the Middle East generally, the United States should 
now revise its policies concerning footnote six of the JCPOA, 
                                                                                                             
1149. DiMaggio, supra note 1148, at 208. 
1150. See id. (“Over 20 influential Americans participated in one or more of these 
meetings; many were former senior government officials.”); see, e.g., Randa M. Slim, The 
U.S.-Iran Track II Dialogue (2002-2008): Lessons Learned and Implications for the 
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players involved in one past vein of Track II diplomacy between the United States and Iran). 
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See also MEARSHEIMER & WALT, supra note 26, at 303; Lauren French, Former Bush 
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(revealing the will for détente shared by past policymakers, outside of their official capacity). 
1152. See supra notes 1148-51 and accompanying text. 
1153. See Haass & O’Sullivan, Conclusion, supra note 778, at 169-70; Chester A. 
Crocker, Terms of Engagement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
09/14/opinion/14crocker.html (evaluating the risks posed by engagement). 
1154. See supra Part III.C. 
1155. Dobbins, supra note 709, at 205. 
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bringing a formal conclusion to the sanctions regime for US investors 
and freeing their capital to get to work in Iran.1156 
 
                                                                                                             
1156. See supra notes 694-1156 and accompanying text. 
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